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Self-relevant material presents an encoding advantage termed the self-reference 
effect (SRE) in which rich pre-existing schemas allow such material to be efficiently 
encoded. Self-relevant material is also prioritised during information processing, 
acting as a powerful distractor. Furthermore, activation in the Default Mode Network 
(DMN), engaged during self-referential processing, has been linked to errors during 
tasks, suggesting self-focussed attention as a potential source of distraction. The 
current work explored whether individuals with a stronger SRE, thought to reflect the 
level of articulation of one’s self-schema, would perform worse at inhibitory control 
tasks that demand sustained attention on the external world. Study 1 and Study 2 
confirmed this hypothesis suggesting that poor performance in inhibitory control tasks 
is at least in part due to attention being diverted towards the self. Study 2 explored 
the neural underpinnings of such relationships using a cross-sectional resting-state 
analysis. Connectivity of regions involved in self-referential processing was explored 
in relation to inhibitory control efficiency scores revealing that individuals with 
stronger coupling to right inferior frontal gyrus performed better at a Go/No-Go task. 
Similarly, the Frontoparietal Control Network (FPCN) was more coupled to the ventral 
striatum, commonly associated with self-relevance assignment, when SREs were 
smaller. Study 1 also found stronger coupling between DMN and executive control 
regions for individuals with better memory in the non-self control condition (low SRE), 
whereas individuals with stronger within DMN coupling had high self-memory scores 
(high SRE) suggesting integration between DMN and FPCN reduces self-focus. Study 3 
measured self-focussed attention using the private self-consciousness scale and 
revealed the FPCN to be more coupled to fusiform/hippocampus in individuals with 
higher private self-consciousness scores, potentially reflecting episodic information in 
the working memory space. Overall we present substantial evidence supporting a 
strong relationship between self-bias and executive control both at the behavioural 
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 Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
Who is the I that knows the bodily me, who has an image of myself 
and a sense of identity over time, who knows that I have propriate 
strivings? I know all these things, and what is more, I know that I 
know them. But who is it who has this perspectival grasp? . . . It is 
much easier to feel the self than to define the self. 
—G. W. Allport, Patterns and Growth in Personality 
 
In an attempt to study the nature of commonly used concepts such as memory, 
attention or self, psychologists and philosophers have stumbled across the hidden 
complexity that underlies these widely used concepts. Self-consciousness, self-
awareness, objective self, episodic self, are examples of this. The main focus of the 
current doctoral work was to study the abstract representation of one’s self, i.e., the 
self-schema. In particular, the current research was interested in how individuals 
differ in the degree to which they have developed and articulated their self-schema, 
as well as to how this relates to the intrinsic architecture of the brain and to their 
inhibitory control abilities.  
Evident prerequisites for the development of the self-schema are the ability to 
perceive the self as an object which in turn allows attention to be directed inwards. 
As will be discussed in future sections this objective representation of self is believed 
to be achieved through the semantic memory system. A safe assumption to make is 
that individuals who engage more in self-focussed attention will more commonly 
recruit the self-schema, which through its interaction with episodic memory, shall 
result in a deeper articulation of itself by allowing its revision, reinforcement and 
updating.  Building on previous literature exploring the enhancing role that pre-
existing information in the form of schemas has on encoding and retrieval (van 
Kesteren, Fernández, Norris & Herman, 2010; van Kesteren et al., 2013; van 
Kesternen, Rijpkema, Ruiter, Morris & Fernández, 2014; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; Ghosh, 
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Moscovitch, Colella & Gilboa, 2014), we developed our research question from the 
assumption that a deeper articulation and engagement of the self-schema shall result 
in a stronger memorial advantage for material processed in relation to the self. Study 
1 and Study 2 studied the relationship of this measure to inhibitory control 
performance. In addition, the first study explored how the magnitude of the self-
reference effect relates to the functional connectivity of memory-related regions, with 
a particular focus on regions involved in self-referential processing. The second study 
instead explored the functional connectivity of inhibitory control regions in relation to 
the magnitude of the self-reference effect.  
The first section of the introduction briefly presents some theories regarding 
how the objectification of self emerges (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Mead, 1934). Due to 
its object-like nature this representation of self is highly related to the semantic 
system. Evidence that a highly resilient aspect of self, that of who we believe we are, 
is held as an abstraction and hence shares properties of semantic information is 
further presented (Klein & Lax, 2010). We then delve into reviewing the potential 
mechanisms underlying the emergence of the memorial advantage observed for 
material processed in relation to the self and introduce the neural correlates 
underpinning this effect. This section will help the reader understand the rationale 
behind using a self-descriptive task, thought to recruit the semantic self, as a means 
to obtain incidental memory scores reflective of the extent to which an individual has 
articulated their self-schema. Building on previous research demonstrating the role of 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) to self-referential processing and more 
specifically to the memorial advantage achieved through self-reference (Kelley et al., 
2002; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield & Kelley, 2004) the first empirical chapter 
was directed at studying whether individual differences in the magnitude of the self-
reference could predict individual differences in the intrinsic architecture of this 
region. 
After having established the legitimacy of the magnitude of the self-reference 
effect as an indirect measure of the degree to which one has articulated their self-
schema, the next part of the introduction focusses on the detrimental aspects of 
excessive self-focussed attention. In particular, an overview of the evidence 
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demonstrating that self-relevant material acts as a powerful distractor is presented ( 
Geller & Shaver,1976; Moray 1959; Sui, He & Humphreys, 2012) alongside aspects of 
the neural mechanism underlying the salient properties of this material (Sui, Rotshtein 
& Humphreys, 2013a; Sui, Liu, Mevorach & Humphreys, 2013b). This doctoral thesis 
was particularly interested in this detrimental aspect of self-focussed attention and in 
particular its aim was to explore whether a direct relationship between the magnitude 
of the self-reference effect and an individual’s performance during inhibitory control 
tasks could be found. This was based on the notion that good performance on 
inhibitory control tasks requires sustained attention on the task, achieved through 
restraining oneself from processing self-relevant material. Hence we hypothesised 
that individuals with worse performance would present a stronger self-reference 
effect. This prediction was behaviourally tested and confirmed in the first empirical 
chapter suggesting the magnitude of the self-reference effect captures one’s tendency 
for self-focussed attention. The second empirical chapter replicated this finding and 
building on this existing relationship, a cross-sectional design was used to explore its 
neural underpinnings. In particular, the behaviour of regions involved in self-reference 
was studied in relation to the inhibitory control scores and similarly, the magnitude of 
the self-reference effect was used to explore the functional connectivity of regions 
involved in inhibitory control.  
 
1.1 Philosophical Aspects of the self 
1.1.1 Subjective and Objective Self 
The self, like language, is inherent to the human experience. Long theorised about in 
theology, psychology and philosophy, innumerable notions of self exist. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this doctoral thesis to present an extensive review or to formulate 
a theory of the self, one cannot ignore a principal distinction recurrently being made 
in the literature. This is the notion of the self as subject, or the “I” and the self as object 
or the “me” (Cooper 1992; James, 1981). The self as “I” refers to the subject who is 
aware of the qualia being experienced. An idea or feeling that it is “I” who is having 
this experience; this is the subjective self. Instead, when the knower’s attention 
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focuses on itself the “I” becomes the object of study. A meta-representation of the 
self is created, which constitutes the “me” or empirical self, what today is called the 
self-concept (Wylie 1974). Gallagher (2000) makes a similar distinction between what 
he calls the “minimal self” and the “narrative self”. The minimal self is defined as “an 
immediate subject of experience, unextended in time” (p.15) in opposition to the 
narrative self which depends largely on memory and language. The minimal self is pre-
reflective, non-conceptual and emerges from interactions with the environment, it is 
also tightly linked to the sense of agency and ownership. This is the most primitive 
sense of self, and it constitutes the embodied self, which is independent of the use of 
the first person pronoun (Gallagher, 2000). Despite differences across the different 
theories, a general division between objective and subjective self is recurrent 
throughout the literature. Although some attempts have been made in studying and 
describing the subjective component of the self (see Gallagher, 2000) it is the memory-
dependent self, the self as object that has been the target of most psychological 
experiments, including this doctoral thesis. 
  
1.1.2 Objectification of Self 
Considering we are interested in the object-like qualities of self, an overview 
of how this objectification of self is thought to emerge is briefly presented in this 
section.  Studies on children have commonly been used to study the development of 
self-reference and unravel when it is that the ability to observe the self as an object 
first emerges. Piaget (2002) for example asked children to select which blocks were 
nearest to a person sat opposite them. The children, failing to see themselves as a 
separate entity and understand that other perspectives beyond their own exist, 
selected those blocks which were closest to them instead of those closest to the other 
individual. This is defined by Piaget (2002) as absolutism, in which “the child, ignorant 
of his own ego, takes his own point of view as absolute” (p.197) . For the child there 
are no boundaries of the self and hence fails to understand that the self is an object, 
leaving him devoid of self-objectification and self-consciousness. 
Most explanations of how objectification of the self develops emphasize the 
importance of social interactions arguing towards a social origin theory. Mead (1934) 
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for example, believes that the individual lacks an innate ability to observe itself as an 
object and that this ability only becomes available through social interaction.  In 
particular, according to Mead (1934), it is through the development of an empathic 
relationship that the individual learns to visualise itself from an external point of view 
and develops a conscious awareness of itself as an object. Duval and Wicklund (1972) 
however point out that Mead’s social origin theory presupposes that the child is aware 
that other points of view different to its own exist, a presupposition that is in 
contradiction with the child’s absolutist point of view demonstrated by Piaget (2002). 
Instead, Duval and Wicklund (1972) argue that at the basis of self-consciousness is a 
differentiation process by which, through interaction with the environment and other 
individuals, the child’s perceptions, thoughts and actions become challenged, 
eventually leading to the realisation of itself as a separate and distinct entity. In both 
theories social interaction plays an important role in the development of self-
consciousness however for Duval and Wicklund (1972) the mechanisms that allow 
consciousness to focus on the self are inherent to the individual and no different than 
those mechanisms used to focus on any other object. The objectification does not 
occur through taking the perspective of another, like social origin theories propose. 
Instead the child must first recognise that other views exist. Once the child realises 
this, attention can begin to be directed towards the self. It is then that objective self-
awareness emerges. For Duval and Wicklund (1972) the main distinction that needs 
to be made refers to whether attention is focussed on the self (objective self-
awareness) or whether it is focussed elsewhere (subjective self-awareness).  
A main interest of the current doctoral thesis was to explore individual 
differences in this tendency to engage in objective self-awareness and whether, due 
to the internal focus of this type of cognition, we could find an impairment in tasks 
that require sustained external attention in those individuals with a stronger memorial 
advantage for items processed in relation to the self. As all instances of internal 
mentation, obtaining an objective measure is a challenging endeavour. The next 
section delves into different memory systems involved in representing the self and 
explains why a measure of one’s memorial advantage for self-related material can act 
as an objective measure of self-focussed attention, an assumption that we aimed to 
test and confirmed in the current doctoral work by demonstrating a negative 
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relationship between performance at executive tasks and an individual’s memorial 
advantage for self-related items. 
 
1.2 The Role of Memory and the Self 
An obvious prerequisite for self-consciousness is memory, for example one 
needs to have a memory of one’s actions to reflect upon them, or of one’s life events 
to understand where certain emotions might be rooted. Moreover, one needs a sense 
of how the self would judge such actions or respond to the environment, a point of 
reference of ideal self-behaviour.  This requires the activation of different processes 
such as retrieval of past episodes as well as judgement of them based on a personal 
sense of identity. The next section will present what the main systems that give rise 
to the self are, i.e., which systems provide the self with knowledge about itself. As we 
will discuss in the future section there is a difference between the system that 
provides the self with memories of past behaviours (episodic) and the system that 
provides the self with information about who one is (semantic). 
 
1.2.1 The Semantic Self 
Within declarative memory Tulving (1972, 1985) distinguished two systems- 
semantic and episodic. Whereas episodic memory is set on a time and space and has 
a narrative, semantic memory is composed of abstractions and is context-free. As 
such, retrieval of semantic information lacks a source, it lacks the self-referential 
quality present during episodic retrieval. However, a type of semantic memory that 
can be consider self-referential also exists. For example, one can have a sense of one’s 
personality, necessary to rapidly guide behaviour, or one can remember facts such as 
the place of birth of the self (Klein & Nichols 2012). These are both examples of self-
referential information held in the semantic memory system. Whereas philosophers 
like Locke (1841) theorised that it was episodic memory that provided the self with a 
sense of continuity and consistency we now know that the semantic system also plays 
a fundamental role in sustaining a sense of identity. Furthermore, as we will consider 
shortly, it has become apparent that the semantic self displays a certain degree of 
independence from the episodic memory system. It is important to make this 
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distinction between episodic and semantic self as the task in the current doctoral work 
was particularly aimed at recruiting semantic aspects of the self.  In particular, through 
the use of a self-descriptive task in which participants had to judge whether certain 
trait-adjectives described them or not, we aimed to measure the degree to which an 
individual has developed their semantic self.  
 
Evidence supporting that the retrieval of our personal identity is independent 
from episodic memory comes from both neuropsychology and behavioural 
experiments. For example, patients with severe episodic amnesia (for example patient 
H.M who underwent removal of a large portion of the medial temporal lobes) 
maintain an accurate sense of who they are despite severe episodic impairment (Klein 
& Nichols, 2012). Building on this, laboratory experiments have confirmed that 
memory of who we are is stored independently of episodic memory (Klein, Loftus, 
Trafton & Fuhrman, 1992). To test this, participants were asked to rate how much 
certain trait adjectives described them. This descriptive task was either preceded by 
an autobiographical task in which subjects had to recall an episode in which they 
displayed such a trait, or by a semantic task. This experimental setting allowed 
comparison of two competing theories regarding how these trait-descriptive 
judgements are made in relation to episodic memory. The first theory, the pure 
exemplar model, hypothesised that in order to make such judgements one needs to 
retrieve an episode in which an exemplifying behaviour of that trait was present. This 
would negate the existence of a semantic self or at least its independence from the 
episodic system. In contrast, pure abstraction models hypothesised that there is no 
need to recollect an episode and that instead personality trait judgements are made 
by accessing information that is stored as an abstraction, as a summary. If the 
abstraction model is true episodic recollection of a trait-exemplifying behaviour 
preceding the trait-judgment condition should not necessarily facilitate the trait-
judgement, a result which would suggest that access to the semantic self is somehow 
independent of episodic memory.  By measuring and comparing response times to 
judgements of trait adjectives made either after an autobiographical task 
(exemplifying such trait) or a semantic task (control) the authors found that for highly 
self-descriptive traits, priming the descriptive task with the autobiographical task did 
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not facilitate the response of the descriptive task. Instead, in cases in which the trait 
was not considered part of an individual’s image of self, the descriptive trials that were 
preceded by an autobiographical task were answered faster than if preceded by a 
semantic task. These results led the authors to suggests that the self holds an image 
of itself as an abstraction or schema composed of the highly self-descriptive traits. This 
image of self is independent of the episodic system and only when the trait adjective 
is not part of the self-schema is episodic memory necessary to make the descriptive 
judgement. 
The cases presented above suggest that retrieval of personality traits of the 
self is independent of episodic memory. Whether episodic memory is necessary to 
build that meta-representation has also been debated. Some neuropsychological 
cases suggest that in addition to retrieval, encoding of these trait summaries can also 
occur independently of episodic memory. For example, patient K.C, who after a 
motorcycle accident underwent personality changes and suffered severe episodic 
memory impairment, was still able to accurately describe his postmorbid personality 
despite being unable to recall any episodes in which he displayed such personality 
traits (Tulving, 1993; Klein, 2004). Similarly, autistic individuals, characterised by 
diminished episodic memory (Bowler, Gardiner & Grice, 2000; Crane & Goddard, 
2008; Lind, 2010), also seem to maintain a memory of who they are despite their 
episodic memory impairment. For example, patient R.J, an autistic patient with 
episodic performance similar to that observed in brain trauma induced amnesia, was 
able to report a view of himself that reliably correlated with the description given by 
his relatives (Klein, 2004). This suggests that the formation and updating of such self-
schema can occur online and not necessarily through rehearsal and reconstruction of 
episodes.  
Importantly, it seems like semantic self-knowledge is particularly resilient and 
is dissociated within the semantic system from generic knowledge about the world. In 
support of this, Klein describes the case of patient D.B whose amnesia expanded 
beyond episodic memory to the semantic memory system, but who however still 
maintained an intact memory of his personality (Klein, 2004; Klein, Rozendal & 
Cosmides, 2002). These experimental and neuropsychological cases suggest that 
neither the retrieval nor the acquisition of trait self-knowledge relies on episodic 
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memory retrieval and that instead there is a specialised system within the semantic 
system involved in the representation of the self. This representation of self is 
responsible for holding our sense of identity, as observed from the neuropsychological 
cases presented above, and hence should be activated whenever a judgement of 
either a past or present event is made, using our semantic self as a point of reference. 
Due to the evident role that the semantic representation of self plays in constructing 
a sense of who we are, part of the current doctoral thesis was targeted at measuring 
aspects of this representation of self. In order to engage this aspect of the self, 
participants were asked to decide whether certain trait-adjectives described them or 
not, a process that requires one to access information about one’s identity. 
Subsequently, participants were tested on their memory for the trait-adjectives they 
had judged in relation to themselves. These memory scores were controlled for overall 
memory by subtracting memory scores for items in a control, non-self-referential 
condition. Note that the memory measures obtained through the self-reference 
paradigm were episodic memory measures (i.e., Did you see this word before and if 
so in which condition did you see it?) however, the difference in performance in such 
measures will be driven by how well the items were encoded, which as we will discuss, 
is reliant on the articulation of the semantic self. 
We have so far presented neuropsychological and experimental evidence 
suggesting that an aspect of an individual’s sense of identity relies heavily on a 
semantic representation of the self. This meta-representation of self is highly resilient 
and to some extend independent from the episodic memory system and will be 
recruited during self-descriptive trait judgments. 
The following section presents evidence suggesting why memory scores for 
items processed when making the self-descriptive judgements can be indicative of the 
degree to which an individual has articulated their self-schema. It begins by presenting 
theories aimed at explaining mechanisms involved in successful encoding and retrieval 
of information. We then present studies which extrapolate these theories in order to 
explain why material processed in a self-referential manner presents a mnemonic 
advantage over other types of material. Lastly, we explain why, taking into 
consideration these theories, it is possible that individual differences in the memorial 
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advantage for self-related material might be reflecting an individual’s tendency for  
self-focussed attention.  
 
1.2.2 The Self-Reference Effect 
Whether in an episodic or in a semantic fashion, a common finding is that 
relating information to the self facilitates encoding and subsequent retrieval of such 
information. Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker (1977) were the first to report this. By 
comparing memory of self-referenced items judged during a descriptive task (Does 
this word describe you?) with memory of items judged during a semantic task (Finding 
a synonym to the word) the researchers found a mnemonic advantage for self-related 
material. This self-reference effect has also been replicated using objects. For 
example, Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald and Macrae (2008) demonstrated that 
objects which had been assigned to the self were remembered better than objects 
assigned to another subject. Many other studies have repeatedly replicated this effect 
(e.g., Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Keenan & Baillet, 1980) giving rise to a debate about 
whether self-referential processing has any special properties that distinguishes it 
from other types of processing.  
Several theories aimed at explaining the self-reference effect have been 
described, however, which theory best explains the phenomenon depends on the 
nature of the task being used to obtain the memory measures. The theory that has 
received most attention is the elaborative/organizational dual-process explanation 
(see meta-analysis by Symons & Johnson, 1997). This theory proposes that self-
reference promotes both elaboration and organization, processes which cause 
incidental encoding and aid retrieval. Elaborating on a word results in the activation 
of a network of associations related to such item, it is item specific. This network then 
acts as a trace that can guide and facilitate retrieval of the item. According to the depth 
of processing literature, the richer the elaborated trace, the stronger the facilitation 
during retrieval (Craik & Tulving, 1975). Whereas elaborative processing promotes the 
encoding of item-specific information, organizational processing highlights 
information common to a list of items, promoting encoding of the relational 
information between items within a hierarchical structure. Einstein and Hunt (1980) 
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demonstrated that relational and item specific processing are additive processes and 
contribute differently to retrieval processes. To demonstrate this, they measured 
retrieval after using an elaborative task (judging pleasantness of words in a list), an 
organizational task (organise words by categories) or both and found that a 
combination of both tasks promoted the higher recall rates. Along with organizational 
theorists (e.g., Tulving, 1964), they argued that organizational processing aids retrieval 
by allowing the formation of schemas and that once the retrieved schema has been 
activated, item-processing further aids retrieval through promoting discriminatory 
processes.  
In a second experiment Einsten and Hunt (1980) demonstrated that in addition 
to the type of the processing performed, the way the stimuli were presented also had 
an effect on retrieval. Presenting stimuli as a list of related items triggers an automatic 
processing of the relational properties of the items, so organization happens 
regardless of the presence of an organizational task or not. The effect of an 
organizational task would therefore be redundant and not provide any additional 
processing than that obtained by just reading the items in the list.  If instead the 
material is presented as a list of individual items, elaboration processes are 
automatically triggered regardless of the task, and a task that promotes elaboration 
would not provide any additional processing. In support of this theory, when lists of 
related words were studied, encoding was more enhanced by an elaborative task than 
by an organizational task. When instead the list was composed of seemingly unrelated 
items then the organisational task enhanced encoding to a higher degree than the 
elaborative task, suggesting that both processes contribute differently to encoding 
and that both the task as well as the way the material was presented had an impact 
on memory. 
Building on the findings of Einstein and Hunt (1980), Klein and Loftus (1988) 
included a self-referential condition and tested whether the self-referential condition 
acted either like an elaborative or an organisational task. The authors found that in 
the conditions in which the words in the list were unrelated (i.e, automatic 
elaboration), self-reference resulted in higher recall than elaborative processing but 
not in higher recall than when material was processed using a categorical task. In 
contrast, when the items in the list were related, self-reference enhanced recall to the 
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same extent than the elaborative task. Klein and Loftus (1988) concluded that self-
reference is unique in the sense that it promotes both elaboration and organization, 
independently of how the material is processed during encoding. If deeper 
elaboration and organisation lead to better encoding and retrieval, as is discussed 
above, then individuals who have a more elaborated construct of self should show a 
stronger memorial advantage than those who have a less elaborated construct and 
hence present a stronger self-reference effect. 
Deeper elaboration during encoding cannot however fully account for the self-
reference effect obtained when using descriptive tasks that rely on the semantic self. 
For example, self-descriptive judgements have short response times (Kuiper & Rogers, 
1979). If the mnemonic advantage for items judged in reference to the self over a 
semantic judgment was due to a deeper elaboration during encoding, one would 
expect longer response times during self-reference. Instead, trait-judgements, 
especially highly descriptive ones, produce fast responses (Judd & Kulik, 1980) 
suggesting that other mechanisms aside from elaboration and organization contribute 
to the self-reference effect. 
An alternative, non-mutually exclusive explanation for the self-reference 
effect, is presented by Rogers, Rogers and Kuiper (1979) who suggests that the 
memorial advantage for self-related material is due to the fact that the self is stored 
in semantic memory as a prototype.  According to Cantor and Mischel (1977) a 
prototype is “ a collection of the most typical or highly related features associated with 
a category label…….. and is thought to function as a standard around which a body of 
input is compared and in relation to which new input is assimilated into the set of 
items remembered about a given experience” (p.39). Previous research on cognitive 
prototypes predicts that response times for an item should be related to the degree 
to which the item resembles the prototype, with judgments for the more prototypical 
items resulting in faster responses. It also predicts that false recognitions will be more 
common for items that resemble the prototype (e.g., Bransford & Franks, 1971; 
Posner & Keele 1970).   
Using descriptive self-referential tasks both of these predictions, i.e., faster 
response times and higher false alarm rates for prototypical items, have been met, 
supporting the idea that the self is stored as a prototype. For example, the more an 
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item was felt as being part of the prototype, the shorter the response times were 
(Kuiper, 1981). In addition, during retrieval, a bias was found for items which were 
conceptually related to the prototypical self. In particular, items which had never been 
presented during encoding but held a strong resemblance to the prototype were more 
likely to be falsely remembered (Cantor & Mischel, 1977; Nasby, 1997; Rogers et al., 
1979). These findings suggest that there is a prototypical representation of self.  
During self-referential processing this cognitive structure is activated and, according 
to the prototype theory, enhances encoding by rapidly making information between 
the trait and the prototype salient.  
The idea of a prototype is closely related to the concept of a schema in the 
sense that a prototype is a hypothetical item that presents the most characteristic 
qualities of the schema. Whereas the term schema has been loosely used across the 
literature a common notion is that it is a network of associations built from several 
episodes (Ghosh et al., 2014). So, for example, the schema of bird would contain 
concepts such as flying, feathers, eggs or wings.  Considering this schematic bird-
concept, a robin would be a more prototypical bird than an ostrich or a penguin 
because ostriches and penguins can’t fly whereas robins can.  Extensive literature has 
demonstrated that during information processing having prior knowledge in the form 
of a schema facilitates encoding as well as retrieval (Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014; Ghosh et 
al., 2014; van Kesteren et al, 2010; 2013; 2014).  Building on this, Olson (1980) 
suggested that “as the semantic content of schema becomes more complex, abstract, 
interrelated, etc., deeper semantic encoding operations will tend to be more likely, 
easier and more efficient” (p.158).  Taking the information so far presented, it is 
therefore possible that the magnitude of the self-reference effect, i.e, how much one’s 
memory for self is better than memory for another control condition, is related to the 
degree to which someone has elaborated their self-schema. In particular, individuals 
who have more thoroughly developed their self-schema should have a stronger 
mnemonic advantage for self-related material than those who have not developed 
their self-schema as much.  
Further evidence suggesting that a stronger engagement in self-focussed 
attention results in a stronger mnemonic advantage for self-related material comes 
from a study by Agatstein and Buchanan (1984). Building on the idea of a private and 
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public aspect of self-consciousness introduced by Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975), 
in which the private aspect relates to examining one’s behaviours, and the public to 
how others perceive one’s self, the authors designed a new version of the trait-
adjective self-reference paradigm targeted at distinguishing between a private and a 
public self-reference condition. The private self-referent condition asked participants 
to judge whether certain adjectives described them (Private self-referent), which was 
the same approach used in the current doctoral thesis. Agatstein and Buchanan (1984) 
however included a new condition in which participants had to judge whether a third 
person thought a certain trait-adjective described the participant (e.g., “Does Alice 
think you are punctual?”) thereby creating a public self-referent condition. In addition 
to the private and public self-referent conditions, self-consciousness was also 
measured through self-reports and participants were split into high and low private 
and public self-consciousness groups. The authors found that the memory differences 
in both conditions was dependent on which type of self-consciousness was 
predominant in the individual. Those in the high public/low private self-consciousness 
group had better memory for the items in the public but not the private self-referent 
condition than those in the high private/low public self-consciousness group. This 
study demonstrated that the degree to which one engages in a certain type of 
cognition affects the ease with which the system recruited encodes information.  
Building up on the idea that a stronger engagement in self-focussed cognition 
will results in a deeper articulation of the self-schema with a subsequent memory 
advantage for self-related items, the first empirical chapter of the current doctoral 
thesis measured the magnitude of the self-reference and explored whether 
differences in the self-reference effect could be correlated with the intrinsic functional 
architecture of certain brain regions previously related to self-related processing.  The 
next section presents an overview of which brain regions are of special interest to the 
current study.  
 
1.2.3 Neural Correlates of the Self-Reference Effect 
The self-reference effect refers to the mnemonic advantage that material 
processed in relation to the self holds. As we have discussed so far, this advantage is 
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thought to emerge thanks to a pre-existing and deeply elaborated network of 
associations related to our self-schema that gets activated during self-referential 
processing. Building on this we assume that individual differences in the magnitude of 
the memorial advantage for self-related material are indicative of differences in the 
degree to which one has elaborated one’s self- schema. In order to engage in such 
elaboration, attention will need to be focussed on the self, hence it is possible that the 
magnitude of the self-reference effect is capturing one’s tendency for self-focussed 
attention. The aim of the first empirical chapter was to study whether we could 
capture neural correlates underlying such differences in elaboration of the self-
schema. 
To study neural correlates related to self-focussed attention the current 
doctoral thesis implemented an approach based on the intrinsic architecture of the 
brain. Instead of looking at isolated peak activations during tasks we were interested 
in studying how the way in which regions communicate between each other when the 
mind is free from laboratory tasks is informative of the degree to which one engages 
in self-focussed attention. Previous literature using this resting-state functional 
connectivity approach has revealed that the brain is organised into distinct networks 
(e.g., Yeo et al., 2011), each network being composed of regions that are highly 
synchronised between them and poorly synchronised with regions outside of it. We 
first selected regions that have been commonly associated with self-referential 
processing during task-based analyses and explored whether their connectivity 
patterns to any other areas in the brain during rest were informative of the magnitude 
of one’s self-reference effect. The following section presents an overview of the 
literature that led us to select the mPFC as the region of interest in the resting-state 
functional connectivity analyses performed in the first empirical chapter.  
 
1.2.3.1 Self-Referential Processing in the Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
Research on the relationship between self and memory was first extended to the 
brain by Craik and colleagues (1999). Previous research on memory suggested a 
hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry (Tulving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch & 
Houle, 1994) based on the observation that activation in the left prefronal cortex was 
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involved during encoding. Instead, retrieval processes engaged the right prefrontal 
cortex. Craik and colleagues (1999) argued that episodic retrieval inherently requires 
reference to the self, a process which is not necessary during encoding. Building on 
this the researchers hypothesised that self-reference might recruit regions involved in 
episodic retrieval. To test this the activity during several deep processing conditions 
was measured, including self-reference, as well as during a superficial processing 
control (syllable count) and a series of contrasts were performed. When comparing 
self-reference to the other conditions, results revealed activation in the right 
prefrontal cortex, an area previously associated with episodic retrieval, pointing 
towards the role of the self during episodic retrieval. In addition, activation in the 
mPFC was also found. A similar follow up study by Kelley and colleagues (2002) failed 
to replicate the right prefrontal activation but argued it could be due to differences in 
the neuroimaging method used, with the first study using PET and the second one 
using fMRI. Nonetheless, the study by Kelley and colleagues (2002) did replicate 
activation in the mPFC, reinforcing the involvement of this area during self-referential 
processing and pointing towards the mPFC as the fundamental neural correlate of self-
referential processing. Importantly, schema related activity has been localised mainly 
to the mPFC and more specifically to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) 
(Ghosh & Gilboa 2014; Ghosh et al., 2014), overlapping with regions activated during 
self-referential processing, potentially related to the semantic representation of the 
self. 
A question that naturally followed was whether activation in this area was 
contributing to the self-reference effect directly. To test this, Macrae and colleagues 
(2004) measured activity during a self-descriptive task and subsequently tested 
participants incidental encoding of the items presented during the descriptive task. 
The authors found that activation in the mPFC predicted encoding, with activation in 
this region being higher for items that were subsequently remembered than for those 
forgotten. The results of this study expanded the role of the mPFC not only to self-
referential processing but also demonstrated activation in this regions to be directly 
related to the self-reference effect. 
Based on the findings so far mentioned, the mPFC seemed like an ideal candidate 
for studying the relationship between the semantic self, the self-reference effect and 
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the brain. The studies mentioned so far focused on peak activations during self-
referential processing. In the current doctoral work, we wanted to extend the 
literature by moving from a peak activation approach to a resting-state functional 
connectivity one. This approach has been used in the past, revealing how the intrinsic 
architecture of certain regions of the brain relates to psychological measures of 
functions that recruit those regions (e.g., Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski & Margulies, 
2013; Poerio et al., 2017; Sala-Llonch et al., 2012; Seeley et al., 2007). Considering 
activation in the mPFC is involved in the self-reference effect, could it be possible for 
individual differences in the magnitude of such effect to be related to differences in 
the intrinsic architecture of this region? The first question of the current doctoral 
thesis deals with this issue by measuring the memory for items presented during a 
descriptive self-other reference paradigm. It then uses these memory scores as 
regressors of interest in seed-based functional connectivity analyses of the mPFC 
during the resting-state as a means to study individual differences in functional 
connectivity related to the self-reference effect. Results obtained from such analyses 
will inform the literature as to which patterns of intrinsic architecture of the mPFC 
relate to individuals who present an increased self-bias.  
 
1.3 The Self and Attention 
The introduction so far has argued why the magnitude of the self-reference effect 
might be indicative of an individual’s tendency to engage in self-focussed attention. 
Furthermore, it has introduced studies that demonstrate an important role of the 
mPFC during self-referential processing leading to the first question of the current 
doctoral thesis: Is the functional connectivity of the mPFC related to the magnitude of 
the self-reference effect?  
After having explored how functional connectivity patterns of regions involved in 
self-referential processing relate to the magnitude of the memorial advantage for self, 
the second question of the current work turned to explore the relationship between 
one’s self-bias as measured through the self-reference effect and one’s inhibitory 
control efficiency. The rationale for this question was built from the idea that 
attentional resources are limited (Anderson, 2004; Kahneman, 1973;), resulting in a 
39 
 
recurring competition between processing of internal representations and processing 
of external stimuli. Good performance at inhibitory control tasks require sustained 
attention on the external world, hence we hypothesised that individuals with a 
stronger self-reference effect would be less efficient at inhibitory control, a finding 
that would confirm that the magnitude of the self-reference is indicative of one’s 
tendency to focus attention on the self. The following section foreshadows the 
relationship between self and attention, presenting evidence revealing self-relevant 
material to have a privileged position during information processing. In particular, we 
introduce evidence demonstrating that the brain perceives self-relevant material as 
salient, which in turn leads to the automatic reallocation of attentional resources 
inwards and away from the external world.  
 
1.3.1 The Self as Salient 
In addition to its mnemonic properties, the self has also been extensively 
studied in relation to attention. Self-relevant material is treated as particularly salient 
by the brain, acting as a powerful distractor by automatically capturing attentional 
resources. This was first demonstrated by Moray in 1959 using a dichotic listening 
task. During this task, participants were simultaneously presented with one set of 
stimuli through one ear and with another set of stimuli through the other ear and 
instructed to create an attentional barrier so that only the material presented through 
one of the sides would reach consciousness. In other words, they had to attend to one 
side whilst ignoring the other side. Subsequent tests on the participants’ memory for 
material presented on the to-be-ignored side revealed that participants successfully 
managed to suppress processing of that material except when presented with the 
subject’s own name, this stimulus being particularly efficient at breaking through the 
attentional barrier. These results demonstrated that material that is relevant to the 
subject has a stronger ability to automatically attract attention than other type of 
material and that it is therefore harder to inhibit. 
Expanding on this research Geller and Shaver (1976) demonstrated that the 
presence of mirrors and cameras, known to increase self-focussed attention, 
produced more interference during a Stroop Task. This interference, measured as 
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longer response times, indicates that the self automatically competes for attention 
with the task, leading to the subsequent impairment in performance.  Furthermore, 
the authors also compared the response times based on the self-relevance of the 
words and found that self-relevant words produced higher interference than neutral 
words. It is therefore not only one’s name or self that is salient, but more generally, it 
seems like salience increases with the degree of self-relevance of the material. 
In addition to response-time measures, the impact of self-relevance on 
attention has also been studied through directly measuring brain responses to 
material related to the self. For example, using EEG, Gray, Ambady, Lowenthal and 
Deldin (2004) studied the P300 event-related potential (ERP) during processing of 
autobiographical stimuli such as the subject’s hometown or middle name. Previous 
research has related this ERP to selective attention (Donchin & Coles, 1988) and found 
that its amplitude is proportional to the degree of attentional resources demanded by 
the task (Johnson, 1988) as well as to the stimulus relevance to the task (Farwell & 
Donchin, 1991; Squires, Donchin, Herning, McCarthy, 1977). Furthermore, its 
amplitude varies with the “emotional value” of the stimuli (Johnston, Miller & 
Burleson, 1986). Based on these findings the authors measured the P300 across three 
conditions: during the appearance of a red dot to which the subjects had been told to 
attend to, a condition expected to have a large P300 ERP, and during the presentation 
of both self-relevant and neutral stimuli to which participants had not been instructed 
to attend to. Comparing the P300 across the three conditions revealed that the ERP 
between the red dot condition and the self-relevant condition did not differ, both of 
these conditions eliciting a stronger ERP than the neutral condition, hence confirming 
that self-relevant material automatically recruits attentional processes.  
In a series of elegant experiments Sui (2012; 2013a; 2013b) has demonstrated 
that this effect of self-relevant material on attention does not only apply to 
autobiographical stimuli for which we are highly familiar. Instead, this effect is also 
observed for material which has been newly associated to the self during experimental 
conditions. To test this, different neutral shapes such as triangles or squares were 
assigned during the experiment to either the self or to different referents. Once the 
subjects had learned the shape-referent associations participants were presented 
pairs of shape-referents (e.g., triangle-self) and had to judge whether the presented 
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pairs were correct. As expected, performance was better for trials which contained 
the self-related shape (Sui et al., 2012). In a follow up study (Sui et al., 2013a) brain 
activity using fMRI was measured while subjects performed a similar shape-referent 
task and found that congruent self-related pairs elicited stronger activation not only 
in vmPFC commonly associated with self-related processing, but also in the left 
posterior superior temporal sulcus (LpSTS). The LpSTS is part of the ventral attentional 
network involved in bottom-up attentional processes (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
DiQuattro & Geng, 2011). In other words, the LpTST is commonly activated when 
attention is automatically reoriented to salient stimuli in the environment. 
Importantly, the strength of coupling between the vmPFC and the LpSTS increased 
during judgment of pairs containing the self and was correlated to the behavioural 
efficiency during self-shape matching trials, suggesting this pattern of connectivity 
plays an important role in the automatic reorientation of attention towards self-
relevant material. More specifically, effective connectivity analyses revealed that 
vmPFC received the visual input before LpSTS and, through its projections to the 
attentional network region, triggered reorientation towards the self-related stimuli by 
recruiting LpSTS.  
Inspired by the shape-referent experimental design developed by Sui and 
colleagues, other studies have explored the effect that self-relevance has on 
perception of visual stimuli. Previous research revealed how peripheral cues that 
trigger covert attention over stimuli enhanced the perceived contrast in the stimuli 
(Carrasco, Ling & Read, 2004). Building on this, Macrae, Visokomogilski, Golubickis & 
Sahraie (2018) used stimuli that either had self-relevance or not as the peripheral cues 
and found that when the cue was self-relevant there was a heightened enhanced 
contrast than when it wasn’t, once again demonstrating that self-relevance facilitates 
stimulus processing.  
The evidence presented above situates the self and the material it relates to in 
a preferential position during information processing. As such, an enhanced 
performance can be observed when material related to the self has to be judged or 
remembered. A counter side to this  naturally follows. The more salient a stimulus is 
the more distracting it becomes. For example, Theeuwes (2010), measuring the effect 
on response time of distractors of different perceptual salience, demonstrated that 
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the most perceptually salient distractor caused the highest interference. Using a 
global-local hierarchical task, Sui and colleagues (2013b) have demonstrated that self-
related stimuli cause a similar interference to that of perceptual salience. In this task 
subjects were presented with a global, big shape perimeter (e.g., square) composed 
of smaller local shapes (e.g., triangles). As in previous experiments, the shapes had 
been assigned different referents and the participants were instructed to report either 
the local or the global shape. In trials in which the shape assigned to the self was 
presented on the opposite level to which the participant was being tested on 
(local/global), the response time performance was similar to that observed in a 
preceding experiment in which local or global salience had been visually manipulated 
previous to the shape-referent assignation, matching the behaviour of the most 
salient stimuli. Using a task based on these same principles, Mevorach, Shalev, Allen 
and Humphreys (2008) found that activity in the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) was 
higher during the trials in which the target was less salient than the distractor. Using 
this IPS cluster as a region of interest in a future study, Sui and colleagues (2013b) 
found higher activation in this region during trials in which the self-shape was 
presented as a distractor. These studies demonstrate that the self, and material 
related to it, present the same qualities as salient material and as such should act as a 
powerful distractor. Furthermore, an inability to suppress self-focussed attention has 
been related to numerous psychopathologies such as depression, anxiety or even 
schizophrenia and psychopathy (for a review see Ingram, 1990). Despite the different 
behavioural expressions of these disorders, they seem to share this common feature 
which Ingram (1990) describes as self-absorption: a sustained and inflexible focus on 
the self.   
 
1.3.2 External Versus Internal Attention: A Network 
Perspective 
The last decade has experienced a paradigm shift in cognitive neuroscience by 
which the focus of attention has expanded from solely studying peak activations 
during tasks to studying connectivity between regions during not only tasks but also 
during the resting-state. This paradigm shift introduced the idea of brain networks, a 
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network being composed of regions that show higher synchrony between them than 
with regions outside of the network. With particular interest to the current doctoral 
thesis, studies of resting-state functional connectivity have revealed that regions 
involved in self-representation such as the mPFC form part of a larger and distributed 
network. This network is highly active during periods of rest, i.e., when the mind is 
free of task execution, the reason for which it was termed the default mode network 
(DMN) and originally considered a task negative network (Fox et al., 2005). This task-
negative perspective of the DMN rapidly shifted in face of evidence revealing DMN 
activation during several tasks. As previously mentioned, self-descriptive tasks 
activate the mPFC, one of the main hubs of the DMN (Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et 
al., 2004; Northoff et al., 2006). More generally, activation in DMN regions such as 
medial temporal lobes or the posterior cingulate cortex has also been found during 
episodic and semantic retrieval (Hujibers et al., 2012; Maddock, Garret & Buonocore, 
2001) or during scene reconstruction (Irish et al., 2015; Sugiura, Shah, Zilles & Fink, 
2005), or in the angular gyrus during theory of mind tasks (Schurz, Radue, Aichhorn, 
Richlan & Perner, 2014; Seghier, 2013). In face of these findings it becomes apparent 
that this network is not a task-negative network but that instead it is engaged across 
multiple task states, especially during instances when attention is focussed on internal 
representations. Instead, deactivation in nodes of the DMN is commonly observed 
during processing of external stimuli (Raichle et al., 2001).  
As a result of this competition between the internal and external worlds, 
internal mentation leads to a state of perceptual decoupling by which responses to 
external stimuli become dampened. This was elegantly demonstrated by Barron, Riby, 
Greer and Smallwood (2011) who using EEG measured cortical responses to both 
target and distractor stimuli during an oddball task. Using the amount of task-
unrelated thought reported after every trial, researchers found a reduced amplitude 
in the P3a and P3b ERP components, commonly associated with distractor and target 
stimuli respectively, in individuals who reported higher task-unrelated thought. 
Hence, regardless of the stimuli’s task relevance, during internal mentation there is a 
general reduction in cortical responses related to processing of external stimuli. 
Activation in DMN regions has also been associated with faster responses in tasks in 
which performance did not depend on perceptual input. Instead, when tasks 
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depended on perceptual input, DMN activation was linked with worse performance 
(Smallwood et al., 2013) further supporting the DMN’s role in processing of internal 
representations. Similarly, as a result of perceptual decoupling, it is not surprising that 
DMN activation has been associated with instances of lapses of attention (Weissman, 
Roberts, Visscher & Woldorff, 2006), and errors during inhibitory control tasks (Li, Yan, 
Bergquist, Sinha, 2007). Perceptual decoupling is also indirectly inferred from the 
intrinsic network dynamics of the brain which display anticorrelated activity during 
rest between the DMN and externally oriented networks such as the dorsal attentional 
network (Fox et al., 2005; Fox, Zhang, Snyder & Raichle, 2009).   
A third network, the FPCN, is strategically positioned between the DMN and 
DAN (Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle & Buckner, 2008) and can flexibly couple to either 
depending on environmental task demands. For example, Spreng, Stevens, 
Chamberlain, Gilmore & Schacter (2010) compared activation and functional 
connectivity during an autobiographical and a visuospatial planning task and 
demonstrated that the FPCN changed its coupling to either the DMN or the DAN based 
on task demands, being actively engaged in both tasks. During the autobiographical 
planning task, the DMN was active and coupled to the FPCN whereas DAN was active 
and coupled to the FPCN during the visuospatial planning task. These results 
confirmed previous literature relating regions of the FPCN to executive control. For 
example, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a main hub of the FPCN, is highly active 
during working memory tasks (Levy & Goldman-Rakic, 2000), tasks which rely on 
inhibitory control mechanism that give processing priority to task relevant material by 
blocking irrelevant material from reaching consciousness. Moreover, the FPCN forms 
part of the executive corticostriatal loop involved in suppression of both action and 
thought (Alexander & Crutcher 1990; Aron et al., 2007; Haber 2016). These results, 
combined with a study by Finn and colleagues (2015) which revealed the functional 
connectivity of the FPCN to be particularly subject-specific as well as particularly 
predictive of behavioural performance, suggest that the functional connectivity of the 
FPCN might be particularly informative of an individual’s ability to suppress irrelevant 
self-related material when necessary and instead focus on the task. 
A prediction that follows and one that we set out to test in the first two 
empirical chapters was that, considering the effects salience has on attention, 
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individuals with a more salient self should present reduced performance in tasks that 
require sustained attention on non-self-related material. If the magnitude of the self-
reference effect is indicative of the individual’s tendency to direct attention towards 
the self, and if this increased tendency results in higher perceptual decoupling, it is 
possible that individuals with a higher self-reference effect will be less efficient in tasks 
of inhibitory control which require sustained attention on external stimuli. In the first 
study we confirmed a relationship between inhibitory control and the mnemonic 
advantage for self-related material by correlating performance on a stop signal 
response time task (SSRT), classically used to measure inhibitory control, and the 
magnitude of the self-reference effect. Once having confirmed this behavioural 
relationship, the second empirical chapter explored its resting-state neural 
underpinnings. In particular, we hypothesised that functional connectivity of regions 
involved in self-referential processing might predict inhibitory control efficiency. 
Similarly, regions involved in inhibitory control might predict the magnitude of the 
memorial advantage for self-related material. Overall we expected the patterns of 
functional connectivity obtained using this cross-sectional design to shed light on the 
mechanisms that underlie appropriate control over the salient self.   
 
1.4 From an Objective Measure of Self-Focussed 
Attention to a Subjective Measure: The Self-
Consciousness Scale 
After having studied the relationship between the magnitude of the self-
reference effect and the functional connectivity of regions involved in memory such 
as the DMN, and executive control such as the FPCN, the third study took an 
alternative measure of self-focussed attention. Whereas the first and second studies 
demonstrated that the magnitude of the self-reference effect captures an aspect of 
one’s tendency to focus attention on the self, allowing this measure to be used as an 
indirect and objective measure of self-focussed attention, the third study used a 
classical, direct and subjective measure, namely the self-consciousness scale.  
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This scale, devised by Fenigstein and colleagues (1975) was designed 
specifically to measure individual differences in this trait. Using this questionnaire two 
major components of self-consciousness were obtained: a private and a public 
component. The private component measures an individual’s tendency to focus 
attention on one’s feelings and behaviours (e.g., ”I reflect about myself a lot”), 
whereas the public component measures the tendency to analyse how the self is 
perceived by others (e.g., “ I am very concerned about the way I present myself”). 
Despite the self is the focus of attention in both cases the public component has a 
social quality that the private one lacks. A third component, social anxiety, was also 
defined. Despite appearing as an independent component, this component was found 
to be mildly and consistently correlated to public self-consciousness. The authors 
argued that this is because public self-consciousness is a prerequisite to social anxiety, 
and whereas it does not automatically imply social anxiety, it is a potential by product 
of it. 
Extensive research has demonstrated that these components have predictive 
value. Not surprisingly, private self-consciousness correlates with one’s memorial 
advantage for items processed in a self-referential manner from the first person 
perspective (e.g., “Does punctual describe you?”)  (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; 
Nasby 1985). When instead subjects were asked to judge certain trait-adjectives in 
relation to one’s self but from an outsiders’ perspective (i.e., “Does Katie believe you 
are punctual?”) items judged in this condition were better recalled in individuals who 
reported higher public self-consciousness (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984).  
The third empirical chapter of the current doctoral work selected large-scale 
networks from the brain parcellation peformed by Yeo and colleagues (2011) and 
studied their relationship to these measures of self-focussed attention. Considering 
the strong relationship between self and memory and self and attention we focussed 
on large-scale networks involved in memory such as the DMN and the limbic network 
and on networks involved in executive control, i.e., the FPCN. A summary of the 







Figure 1.1: Road map of the three empirical chapters. Behaviourally, Study 1 and Study 2 
explored the relationship between the magnitude of the self-reference effect and inhibitory 
control efficiency scores. Neurally, the magnitude of the self-reference effect was studied in 
relation to 1) the functional connectivity of self-related regions (Study 1) and 2) the functional 
connectivity of inhibitory control-related regions (Study 2). Study 2 also studied the 
functional connectivity of self-related regions in relation to inhibitory control efficiency 
scores.  Study 3 measured self-consciousness scale scores and studied their relationship to the 
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Chapter 2 - Knowing me, knowing you: Resting-
State Functional Connectivity of Ventromedial 
Prefrontal Cortex Dissociates Memory Related 
to Self from a Familiar Other 
This chapter is adapted from: de Caso, I., Karapanagiotidis, T., Aggius-Vella, E., Konishi, M., 
Margulies, D. S., Jefferies, E., & Smallwood, J. (2017). Knowing me, knowing you: resting-
state functional connectivity of ventromedial prefrontal cortex dissociates memory related 




Material related to the self, as well as to significant others, often displays 
mnemonic superiority through its associations with highly organized and elaborate 
representations. Neuroimaging studies suggest this effect is related to activation in 
regions of mPFC. Incidental memory scores for trait adjectives, processed in relation 
to the self, a good friend and David Cameron were collected. Scores for each referent 
were used as regressors in seed-based analyses of resting-state fMRI data performed 
in ventral, middle and dorsal mPFC seeds, as well as hippocampal formation. Stronger 
memory for self-processed items was predicted by functional connectivity between 
ventral mPFC, angular gyrus and middle temporal gyri. These regions are within the 
DMN, linked to relatively automatic aspects of memory retrieval. In contrast, memory 
for items processed in relation to best friends, was better in individuals whose ventral 
mPFC showed relatively weak connectivity with paracingulate gyrus as well as positive 
connectivity with lateral prefrontal and parietal regions associated with controlled 
retrieval. These results suggest that mechanisms responsible for memory related to 
ourselves and personally-familiar people are partially dissociable and reflect 
connections between ventral mPFC, implicated in schema-based memory, and regions 
implicated in more automatic and controlled aspects of retrieval.  
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 2.2. Introduction 
A fundamental aspect of the brain is its ability to encode, update and retrieve 
information, processes that can occur in an automatic manner or through the 
application of conscious effort. Both encoding and retrieval are more likely when the 
information is personally relevant.  Strong automatic effects on memory are 
illustrated by the self-reference effect when incidental memory for material that is 
related to the self tends to be higher than for other types of material, such as items 
related to others (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Kelley et al., 2002) or semantically judged 
material (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker,1977). The strong automatic encoding that occurs 
during self-reference is thought to reflect the rich associative structure of knowledge 
about who we are (Symons & Johnson, 1997). Knowledge of oneself provides a 
powerful schema through which information can be organised during encoding and 
retrieval. In contrast, memory for information with a less rich associative structure is 
more difficult to encode and retrieve.  
There is a growing body of evidence that memories with a rich associative 
structure depend upon the DMN, a large-scale network anchored by medial regions in 
the mPFC and the posterior cingulate cortex (Andrews-Hanna, 2012).  The DMN, and 
in particular the mPFC, show high levels of activation during tasks that require self-
reference (Johnson et al., 2002; Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae et al., 2004; D'Argembeau 
et al., 2005; Northoff et al., 2006) as well as for personally familiar referents, such as 
a close friend (Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005), and when retrieving dominant 
semantic associations of words that come to mind relatively automatically (Binder et 
al., 2009; Davey et al., 2015). In all this cases memory encoding and retrieval are aided 
by the presence of previously formed schemas which are thought to be supported by, 
at least in part, the vmPFC (van Kesteren et al., 2010a; Ghosh et al., 2014). The notion 
that the DMN has an important role in the retrieval of information is also supported 
by studies that show strong coupling between the DMN and the hippocampus during 
successful retrieval (van Kesteren et al., 2010b; van Kesteren et al., 2012; Huijbers et 
al., 2011) as well as by studies that show that activity in the mPFC during the encoding 
phase of a self-reference paradigm predicts subsequent memory scores for items 
56 
 
encoded during self-reference (Macrae et al., 2004). Moreover, a related literature 
has shown stronger responses within the DMN during spontaneous retrieval states 
such as mind-wandering (Mason et al., 2007; Christoff et al., 2009; Starwarzyck et al., 
2011) in which internally generated information is processed. Activity in the DMN 
often leads to errors during tasks that depend on a detailed processing of perceptual 
input (Weissman et al., 2006; Li, Bergguist &Sinh,2007) and shows patterns of 
anticorrelation with regions involved in tasks involving controlled external attention 
at rest (Fox et al., 2005). These converging literatures are often taken as evidence that 
DMN can support spontaneous and undirected retrieval that interferes with ongoing 
processes requiring cognitive control (Anticevic et al., 2012). Together these parallel 
literatures implicate the DMN in the encoding and retrieval of personally relevant 
information into and from memory. However, recent research has also indicated that 
DMN sites can couple with regions implicated in executive control in situations that 
require memory retrieval to be controlled to suit the current demands (Spreng et al., 
2014). These and other findings (e.g., Konishi et al., 2015, Krieger-Redwood, et al., 
2016, Vatansever et al., 2015) suggest the DMN plays a more flexible role in memory 
processing than may have be recognised in the past. 
To elucidate a more nuanced view of the role of the DMN in memory retrieval 
the current study explored whether different patterns of functional connectivity  
could predict incidental memory scores and in particular, whether these differ for 
material with different levels of personal relevance. We asked participants who had 
already participated in a neuroimaging session in which we recorded resting-state 
activity to return to the laboratory to perform an incidental memory task. They made 
decisions about whether trait adjectives applied to three different referents: 
themselves, their best friend or David Cameron (UK Prime Minister). These referents 
differ on their strength of personal associations which should result in higher 
incidental memory scores for items related to the self than their best friend and the 
lowest retrieval for David Cameron. In addition, since memory for similar others are 
known to elicit similar DMN activation and may be organised using similar or 
overlapping schema (Mitchell et al., 2006), accurately retrieving information about a 
best friend may require that competition from self-processed items may be overcome, 
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which have been encoded in a similar way.  In contrast, items processed in relation to 
David Cameron will be more distinct and experience less interference. Individual 
variations in these scores were used to predict the functional connectivity in three 
sub-regions of the mPFC (ventral, middle, dorsal) taken from a decomposition of the 
DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). Given evidence that the hippocampal formation 
is important in retrieval of information from memory, and this region is also a member 
of a subsystem of the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) this region was also selected 
as a seed region. In the decomposition of Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010), the 
hippocampal formation showed stronger connectivity to ventral mPFC than the other 
seed locations, and ventral mPFC has also been implicated in schema-based memory 
(van Kesteren et al.,2012; Spalding et al., 2015), giving rise to the prediction that this 
site may be particularly critical for self and best friend memory. In addition, we 
measured executive control via the stop signal response time task (SSRT, (Logan & 
Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009)) to explore whether strong automatic 





Forty healthy right-handed participants were recruited through advert and 
either received a monetary reward of £20 or course credits.  One participant had to 
be excluded from all analyses due to irregularities observed during fMRI scanning. Two 
further participants were excluded due to poor task performance, one from each task. 
Separate functional connectivity maps for each task were calculated with a total of 38 
participants (21 males) with an average age of 22.5 (SD = 2.9) years.  Approval for this 
project was granted by the York Neuroimaging Centre (YNiC) Ethics Committee and 
was in accordance with the ethical standards of the responsible committee on human 
experimentation (institutional and national) and with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, 
as revised in 2008.  
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 2.3.2 Procedure 
2.3.2.1. Self-reference paradigm.  
This laboratory task involved an evaluation and a retrieval phase. During the 
evaluation phase (Figure 2.1A, top) participants were asked to make decisions about 
the association between adjectives and one of three referents (‘Self’, ‘Best Friend’ and 
‘David Cameron’). Adjectives were presented sequentially on-screen and participants 
were required to indicate whether each adjective applied to a particular referent by 
pressing ‘Y’ with the index finger of the right hand for ‘yes’ or ‘N’ with the index finger 
of the left hand for ‘no’. For each category, participants were presented with a list of 
18 unique adjectives presented in separate blocks and the order in which each 
category was presented was counterbalanced across participants. Each of the 18-item 
lists was also rotated across the different referents and the order of item presentation 
within each block was randomised. Stimuli were separated by an inter-stimulus 
interval of 2500ms during which participants were shown a blank screen with a 
fixation cross. Following the evaluation phase, subjects were presented with a surprise 
retrieval test in which they were sequentially shown words and asked whether or not 
that particular item had been presented in the previous phase. This retrieval phase 
(Figure 2.1A, bottom) contained all the words from the previous stage of the 
experiment, plus an equal number of new words. Items were presented in a random 
order and participants had to either press ‘Y’ if they thought the word had appeared 
before or ‘N’ if they thought it was a new word. All words were selected from a pool 
of normalized personality trait adjectives with meaningfulness and likeability ratings 
(Anderson, 1968). Positive, negative and neutral adjectives with the highest 
meaningfulness rating were selected for this experiment. Correct memory for each 
referent was calculated by subtracting the relative number of false alarms from the 






2.3.2.2. Stop signal response time task (SSRT). 
We developed a version of a stop-signal task (Logan & Cowan, 1984; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009) using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). Figure 2.1B presents a 
schematic representation of the trial sequence for the task. The task featured 
arrowheads pointing either to the left (<) or to the right (>) staying on the screen for 
1000 msec independently of RT and interleaved by a 500 msec fixation cross. 
Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as they could, using the left and 
right arrow keys for the left and right arrowheads, respectively. Participants were also 
instructed to withhold  their respond when they heard a beeping sound (the stop 
signal) accompanying the arrowhead stimuli, which occurred in 20% of the trials (stop 
signal trials); the latency between the beep and the arrowhead presentation (stop 
signal delay or SSD) was initially set at 250 msec and was then varied with a staircase 
tracking procedure: when inhibition was successful and participants correctly 
withheld response in stop signal trials, SSD was increased by 50 msec; when inhibition 
was unsuccessful, SSD was decreased by 50 msec. Participants initially received on-
screen instructions, followed by a brief practice session (20 trials) and then moved on 
to the experimental session, which was composed of 150 trials divided in two equal 
blocks, allowing participants a quick break in between. The whole task lasted 
approximately 7 minutes. 
For each participant, a Stop Signal Response Time (SSRT) score was calculated 
by subtracting mean SSD from the untrimmed mean RT (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 
1997). Given the wide variance of error percentage in participants a Stop Signal 
Efficiency score was also calculated by dividing the SSRT score by the proportion of 
correct stop-signal trial responses. One participant with a stop-signal trial error 






2.3.3 Resting-state  
2.3.3.1. Scan acquisition 
Functional MRI data was acquired independent of task stimulus on a 3 Tesla 
GE scanner. Participants observed a fixation cross for a scan that lasted 7 minutes. The 
scan had a repetition time of 2 seconds, resulting in 210 volumes. We used interleaved 
slice-timing and isotropic voxel dimensions of 3 mm3 (matrix size of 64 X 64, 192mm 
field of view, and 32 slices) with a 0.5mm gap between slices. 
2.3.3.2. Pre-processing 
All fMRI preprocessing and analysis was performed using FSL. We extracted 
the brain from the skull using the BET toolbox for both the flair and the structural T1 
weighted images and these scans were registered to standard MNI152 (2mm) space 
using FLIRT (Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). Prior to conducting the functional connectivity 
analysis, the following pre-statistics processing was applied to the resting-state data; 
motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002); slice-timing correction using 
Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting; non-brain removal using BET (Smith 2002); 
spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6mm; grand-mean intensity 
normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor; highpass 
temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 
100 s; Gaussian lowpass temporal filtering, with sigma = 2.8s.) 
 
2.3.3.3 First level analysis 
Following these steps, the time series of 4 regions of interest were extracted. 
The seed regions corresponded to 3mm radius spheres centred around the following 
MNI coordinates: vmPFC (0,26,-18), anteriomedial Prefrontal Cortex (amPFC, -6,52,-
2), dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (dmPFC, 0,52,26) and the hippocampal formation 
(HF+, -22,-20,-26). These locations were selected based on previous literature 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) that decomposes the DMN into three subsystems, each 
mPFC location belonging to a different subsystem.  The time series for each location 
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were averaged and used as an explanatory variable in a subject-level functional 
connectivity analysis, which also included the following nuisance regressors: the first 
five principal time-series components extracted from white matter (WM) and 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) masks in accordance with the CompCor method (Behzadi, 
Restom et al. 2007) and six motion parameters. WM and CSF masks were generated 
by segmenting each individual’s high-resolution structural image (using FAST in FSL). 
The default tissue probability maps, referred to as Prior Probability Maps (PPM), were 
registered to each individual’s high-resolution structural image (T1 space) and the 
overlap between these PPM and the corresponding CSF and WM maps was identified. 
Finally, these maps were thresholded (40% for the CSF and 66% for the 
WM), binarized and combined. The six motion parameters were calculated in the 
motion-correction step during pre-processing. Linear displacements in each of the 
three Cartesian directions (x, y, z) and rotations around three axes (pitch, yaw, roll) 
were included for each individual. No global signal regression was performed 
(Murphy, Birn et al. 2009). 
 
2.3.3.4. Second-level analysis. 
To understand how our psychological measures varied with the connectivity of 
the DMN seed regions, we used FSL to conduct a group-level regression of the 
connectivity matrices of each seed region. In this analysis we included the mean 
centred scores for the retrieval of items recalled for each item type as regressors of 
interest, and the mean movement during the scanning was included as a covariate of 
no interest. This procedure was repeated in an independent analysis using the SSRT 
scores instead of the self-other reference task scores. In these analyses the data were 
processed using FEAT version 5.98 part of FSL (FMRIB's Software 
Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) and the analyses were carried out using FMRIB's 
Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME).  A grey matter mask with a probability 
threshold of 40% was used as a pre-thresholding mask and the cluster-forming 
threshold was set as z-score of 2.3. For these analyses we controlled for Type I errors 
by controlling for the number of voxels in the brain (Worsley 2001), as well as the 
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number of seed regions and the two tailed nature of our comparisons yielding an alpha 
value of P<.005 FWE. The unthresholded maps from the contrasts reported in this 
paper are available at Neurovault at the following link: 
http://neurovault.org/collections/1373/ 
 
2.3.4 Neurosynth meta-analyses 
In order to study how the patterns of functional connectivity predictive of 
memory obtained in the current study were related to previous neuroimaging 
investigations, we performed a meta-analysis using the online Neurosynth database 
(Yarkoni et al., 2011).  We performed a meta-analytic decoding of the unthresholded 
maps produced in this study by uploading them onto Neurosynth. This allows the 
identification of the cognitive terms that are most likely to be associated with the 
specific image. We display the results of these terms in the form of word clouds in the 
relevant figures.  We also performed a specific meta-analysis of the relationship 
between the maps produced by our experiment, and the spatial maps that are 
generated by studies exploring the self. We performed a meta-analysis (903 studies) 
of the term “self” (http://neurosynth.org/analyses/terms/self/) and compared the 
corresponding map to the connectivity maps predictive of self memory obtained in 
the current study.  
 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1 Behavioural results  
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated a significant effect of 
referent on incidental memory performance (F (2, 76) = 21.58, p < .001, ηp 2 = .372,  
see Figure 2.1C), as measured during the retrieval phase of the self-other reference 
paradigm. Post-hoc Bonferroni corrected comparisons indicated that words referred 
to the Self were recalled better than best friend words (p < .01), and these were better 
recalled than David Cameron (p = .05) items. In addition, examination of the 
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confidence intervals for memory for David Cameron suggested it was at chance (95% 
CI [.46,.54], whereas memory for best friend (95% CI [.52,.60]) and self (95% CI 
[.61,.68]) were both above chance. Next we examined how the process of self-
reference was associated with a participant’s tendency for behavioural inhibition as 
measured by their efficiency on the SSRT. A linear regression with incidental memory 
for items processed in relation to the Self, Best Friend and David Cameron as 
independent variables and the SSRT inefficiency as the dependent variable, revealed 
a model that accounted for a 22% of the variance in behavioural inhibition scores [F 
(3, 36) = 3.14, p< .05, r2  = .22]. Higher memory for the Self was associated with less 
efficiency on the SSRT (standardized beta = .47, t(33) = 2.7, p < .01) (Figure 2.1D). 
Memory scores for best friend and David Cameron items were not a reliable predictor 
(standardized beta = .153, t(33) = 0.9, p = .35; standardized beta = -.34, t(33) =-1.9, p 
= 0.58, respectively).  
Figure 2.1: Behavioural results. A) Schematic representation of the self-reference task. Top 
row: Evaluation phase. Bottom row: Retrieval phase. B) Schematic representation of the stop 
signal response time task. C) Proportion of hits for each referent and error bars. Asterisks 
represent significant differences in memory performance across referents. D) Scatterplot 
reflecting the positive correlation between memory for self items and SSRT inefficiency. 
Acronyms: BF- Best friend, DC – David Cameron. 
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 2.4.2 RS fMRI analyses  
We conducted a series of multiple regressions in which the functional 
connectivity map of each region was the dependent variable. For each seed region we 
entered a measure of retrieval performance for each referent type (Self, Best Friend, 
David Cameron) as an explanatory variable. Independently we performed the same 
analysis using the SSRT efficiency scores instead of the memory scores. This SSRT 
measure did not reveal any patterns of functional connectivity predictive of inhibitory 
control for any of the seeded locations. 
Figure 2.2 displays the functional connectivity group maps for each seed 
location and Table 1 summarises the clusters that were predictive of memory 
performance and that passed correction for multiple comparisons, including 
correction for whole-brain analysis, two-tailed tests and the number of seeded 
locations. Clusters that passed the first two corrections but did not pass correction for 
the number of seeded locations are still included in the results but are presented 
separately (in yellow in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4). 
Figure 2.2: Seed regions (left column) and associated functional connectivity (FC) group maps 
(right column).     A) Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (dmPFC) 0,52,26. B) Anteriomedial 
Prefrontal Cortex (amPFC) -6,-52,-2. C) Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC) 0,26,-18. D) 
Hippocampal formation (HF+) -22,-20,-26. 
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 2.4.2.1 Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex  
The functional connectivity of the vmPFC seed region predicted memory for 
self and best friend items. In particular, memory performance for self items was 
related to the functional connectivity between vmPFC and 3 clusters: right middle 
temporal lobe (rMTG) (Figure 2.3A, first row), left superior angular gyrus (lAG) (Figure 
2.3B, first row), and left medial and anterior temporal lobe (lMTG cluster) (Figure 2.3c, 
first row). In all cases, stronger functional connectivity between the vmPFC and these 
clusters predicted better memory for self-related items as seen in the corresponding 
scatterplots in Figure 2.3. The rMTG cluster did not pass correction for the number of 
seeded locations (and is therefore shown in yellow). 
In order to study the association between the clusters found and resting-state 
networks, these clusters were overlaid with the Yeo networks (Yeo et al., 2011). The 
pie charts presented in the grey panel in Figure 2.3 illustrate the overlap with the DMN 
(Network 7), FPCN (Network 6) and Limbic Network (Network 5) as defined by Yeo and 
colleagues (2011). These show the greatest overlap with the DMN (indicated in red) 
suggesting that functional coupling within the DMN is associated with increased 
memory for self-related items. In addition, the region in the rMTG shows overlaps with 
the FPCN (indicated in orange). .  
Functional connectivity between vmPFC and the paracingulate gyrus predicted 
relatively poor memory for best friend items (Figure 2.3D, first row).  Overlay of this 
cluster with the Yeo networks revealed a strong overlap with the DMN and with the 
Limbic Network (indicated in purple in the corresponding pie chart in Figure 2.3). 
Therefore, stronger connectivity within DMN was associated with poorer memory for 
best friend related items, a result that stands in contrast to the findings associated 
with the self.  
 In contrast, memory for best friend items was predicted by high levels of 
connectivity between the vmPFC and three clusters on lateral regions of cortex. In 
particular, stronger functional connectivity between vmPFC and left middle frontal 
gyrus (lMFG) (Figure 2.4A, first row), right superior supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) (Figure  
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Figure 2.3: Association between ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) functional 
connectivity (FC) and better self memory (Panel A, B & C) and worse Best Friend (BF) memory 
(Panel D).  A) A region in Right Middle Temporal Gyrus (rMTG) was more coupled to vmPFC 
for individuals with better memory for self-related items. This cluster does not pass correction 
for the number of seeded locations. B) A Region of Left Angular Gyrus (lAG) showed stronger 
FC to vmPFC in individuals with stronger memory for self-related items. C) A Region of Left 
Middle Temporal Gyrus (lMTG) showed stronger FC to vmPFC for individuals with better 
memory for self-related items. D) A region of Paracingulate gyrus showed stronger FC to the 
vmPFC for individuals with reduced memory for BF items. Second Row: Scatterplots reflecting 
relationship between memory performance and FC between seed region and cluster. Third 
row: Overlap (yellow) between clusters and Default Mode Network (green). Grey panel: Pie 
charts and legend reflecting the percentage of the cluster that overlaps with each one the Yeo 
networks.    
 
2.4B, first row) and right middle and inferior frontal gyrus (rMFG) (Figure 2.4C,first 
row) predicted stronger memory for best friend items. The lMFG cluster did not pass 
correction for the number of seeded locations. These clusters were again overlaid with 




Figure 2.4: Regions showing increased functional connectivity (FC) with the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) showing increased memory for Best Friend (BF). A) A region of left 
Middle Frontal Gyrus showing stronger FC with vmPFC for individuals with better memory for 
BF-related items. This cluster does not pass correction for the number of seeded locations. B) 
A region of right Super Marginal Gyrus showing stronger FC to the vmPFC in individuals with 
stronger memory for BF-related items. C) Right middle frontal gyrus (rMFG) cluster with 
stronger FC to seed region in individuals with better memory for BF-related items (MNI: x=47) 
. First row: Cluster corrected maps illustrating regions of the FC map that correlate with 
behaviour. Second row: Scatterplots reflecting relationship between memory performance 
and FC between seed region and cluster. Third row: Overlap (yellow) between clusters and 
the Dorsal Attention and Frontal Parietal Control Yeo networks (green). Grey panel: Pie charts 
and legend reflecting the percentage of the cluster that overlaps with each one the Yeo 
networks. 
 
Yeo networks is displayed in the pie charts in Figure 2.4. These clusters generally 
overlap with regions that are important in tasks that demand externally oriented 
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attention such as the FPCN and the dorsal attention network (DAN). This overlap can 
be observed in the third row of Figure 2.4, in which the DAN and FPCN have been 
displayed with the same colour (green) for visualization purposes. Unlike a heightened 
memory for self, better retrieval of trait adjectives related to a best friend was 
associated with coupling in regions involved in executive control that largely fall 
outside the DMN. 
2.4.2.2. Anteromedial Prefrontal Cortex 
The functional connectivity of this brain location did not predict individual 
differences in memory for any of the three referents.  
2.4.2.3. Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex 
The functional connectivity of the dmPFC seed region predicted individual 
memory for self-related items. Stronger functional connectivity between dmPFC and 
a cluster located in the right occipital lobe was correlated with better memory for self-
referent items (Figure 2.5A, first row). This cluster overlapped with the visual network 
as defined by Yeo et al.’s (2011) resting-state network analysis (see Figure 2.5). 
 2.4.2.4. Hippocampal Formation 
The regression analyses performed on the HF+ seed revealed effects for self-
related items: in particular, stronger functional connectivity between the seed region 
and a cluster in left ventral anterior temporal lobe (lvATL) (Figure 2.5B, first row) 
resulted in a better memory for self-related items. This cluster showed strong overlap 
with the Limbic Yeo Network (see right pie chart in Figure 2.5). Visualization of this 
overlap can be observed in the third row of Figure 2.5B. 
2.4.3. Neurosynth Decoding Meta-Analysis 
To provide a quantitative inference of our experimental data, the connectivity 
maps obtained for each seed region and for each regressor was decoded using 
NeuroSynth’s dataset (http://www.neurosynth.org/decode/). Figure 2.6 displays all 
the functional terms from which the corresponding neuroimaging data from the 
database had correlation values bigger than 0.1 for each contrast in our data.  From 
this meta-analytic decoding it can be seen that the functional connectivity map  
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Figure 2.5: Functional 
connectivity (FC) of dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC)  and 
the hippocampal formation 
(HF+)  associated with stronger 
memory for the self .A) Cluster in 
the right occipital with stronger 
FC to dmPFC for individuals with 
better memory for self-related 
items. B) Cluster in the left 
ventral Anterior Temporal Lobe 
(lvATL) with stronger coupling to 
HF+ for participants with better 
memory for items related to the 
self. First row: Cluster corrected 
maps illustrating regions of the 
FC map that correlate with 
behaviour. Second row: 
Scatterplot reflecting 
relationship between memory 
and FC between seed region and 
cluster. Third row: A) Overlap 
(yellow) between limbic Yeo 
network (green) and right 
occipital cluster (red). B) Overlap 
(yellow) between Yeo visual 
network (green) and lvATL 
cluster.  Grey panel: Pie charts 
reflecting the percentage of the 
clusters that overlap with each 
Yeo network. 
obtained for stronger memory for self-related items was associated with studies from the 
database containing terms such as retrieval, autobiographical, emotion, mentalizing, 
semantics and theory of mind. In contrast, connectivity maps obtained for better memory 
for best friend were associated with terms such as working memory, working and task. 
Importantly the term self-referential was positively associated with the maps obtained 
for self memory and negatively associated with those obtained for best friend memory. 
These patterns of associations are consistent with the proposal that the map associated 
with self-related memory is associated with relatively automatic processes, and ones that 
are characteristic of the DMN, while the map associated with memory for a best friend is 





 Figure 2.6: Neurosynth meta-analysis of the unthresholded images obtained for each 
significant contrast. A) Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex (vmPFC) map B) Hippocampal 
formation (HF+) and C) Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex (dmPFC) maps associated with better 
memory for self-related items. D) vmPFC map associated with better memory for Best Friend 
(BF) related items. E) vmPFC map associated with worse memory for BF  items.  
 
Figure 2.7: Overlap (yellow) between Neurosynth meta-analytic map for term self (red) and 
clusters predictive of memory for self items (green). First row represents the seed region from 
where the clusters in green were originated. 
 
 2.4.4. Neurosynth “Self” Map Activations 
Finally, we formally compared the data produced through the individual difference 
analysis of resting-state functional connectivity approaches with a spatial meta-
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analysis of peak activations performed by Neurosynth (search term: “self”; 903 
contributing studies; http://neurosynth.org/analyses/terms/self/). The overlap 
between the meta-analytical map and the patterns of functional connectivity can be 
observed in Figure 7. It can be seen that there is overlap in several regions, most 
clearly in the left angular gyrus, and bilaterally in the lateral temporal lobe. 
 2.4. Discussion 
The current study set out to understand whether the functional architecture of the 
mPFC and the HF+ at rest predicted the strength of incidental memories produced 
when personality adjectives were related in terms of their applicability to different 
agents. Consistent with previous studies (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979; Kelley et al., 2002), 
the magnitude of incidental memory effects was related to the personal relevance of 
the individual to which a trait adjective was rated: Stronger memories were formed 
for words related to the self than a best friend and the weakest memories were 
produced when words were rated with respect to David Cameron (a non-familiar 
control), the latter not surpassing chance performance. Using the scores for each 
referent as regressors in an individual difference analysis of resting-state functional 
connectivity, we found that stronger memories following self-related processing were 
related to stronger functional coupling between the vmPFC and bilateral mid temporal 
lobe, and left angular gyrus, as well as coupling between HF+ and regions of lvATL. We 
also found that stronger memory for self related items was linked to coupling between 
the dmPFC seed and a region of medial visual cortex, a region that falls at the boundary 
of the DMN and the visual cortex. In contrast, successful retrieval of words encoded 
with respect to the best friend was linked to decoupling between the ventral 
prefrontal cortex and the paracingulate gyrus, plus coupling with lateral parietal and 
prefrontal regions. No patterns of functional connectivity predicted memory scores 
for items related to David Cameron possibly due to retrieval for these items being at 
chance. Finally, a meta-analytic decoding of the connectivity maps predictive of self 
and best friend memory supported our distinction between individuals who excel at 
memory for themselves, rather than their best friends: Memory for self was 






whereas enhanced memory for best friend was associated with terms like working 
memory.   
It is often assumed that the reason why items that are referred to the self form 
strong memories is because of the rich associative structure that is associated with 
our knowledge of who we are (Symons & Johnson, 1997): this self-knowledge provides 
a strong schema to support memory encoding and retrieval allowing it to be retrieved 
efficiently and automatically. Prior work has shown that schema-based memory 
engages vmPFC (van Kesteren et al., 2010a;  van Kesteren et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 
2014; Mckenzie et al., 2014; Spalding et al., 2015) and our study suggests that a strong 
bias to remembering information rated to ourselves depends on forming a network 
between this region and lateral and anterior regions of the temporal lobe and the 
angular gyrus – regions that together make up the DMN (Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle 
& Snyder, 2007). Functional studies often implicate the DMN in situations when 
information from memory is often retrieved effortlessly, such as making global 
semantic associations (Bar et al., 2007; Wirth et al., 2011) periods of spontaneous 
thought (Mason et al., 2007) and the process of self-reference itself (Gusnard et al., 
2001; Macrae et al., 2004; Northoff et al., 2006). These are all states that can involve 
the automatic retrieval of information from memory. Behaviourally we observed that 
self-memory was correlated with relatively poor performance on the SSRT. The SSRT 
is a measure of inhibitory control and previous studies have shown that errors in 
response inhibition are linked to a lack of DMN deactivation (Li et al., 2007). Moreover, 
SSRT can be used to distinguish subjects with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) from normal controls (Sendereka et al., 2012). Previous research on ADHD has 
also revealed reduced DMN deactivations during complex tasks (Fassbender et al., 
2009) supporting the notion that successful executive control requires DMN 
deactivation. In addition, high activity in the DMN precedes lapses in cognitively 
demanding tasks (Weissman et al., 2006). Altogether our results therefore are 
consistent with the idea that self-relevant memories are supported by integrated 
activity within the DMN, a state that promotes the automatic and elaborated 




Information related to best friends was retrieved more effectively than for the 
David Cameron control items. However, this type of memory was associated with a 
different network of regions than those observed for strong memories of the self. 
Better memory for a best friend involved a network that spanned the lateral surface 
of parietal and frontal cortex, including middle frontal and inferior frontal gyrus and 
supramarginal gyrus. Overlap with the Yeo networks, revealed that although this 
network was anchored in the vmPFC, these regions are a part of the dorsal attention 
and Frontoparietal Control networks, large-scale systems that are often activated by 
attention-demanding tasks (Collette et al., 1999; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Duncan, 
2010). Thus unlike a strong memory for the self, a tendency to remember items 
related to one’s best friend was linked to a coupling between ventral regions of the 
mPFC and regions beyond the broader DMN that are involved in goal-directed 
attention. Studies have shown that the lateral prefrontal cortex, particularly the 
inferior frontal gyrus, often activates when participants make semantic decisions that 
are more difficult either because the meaning is ambiguous or because participants 
must make links between stimuli that are only weakly related together (Noonan et al., 
2013). More generally, co-activation between the DMN and the lateral prefrontal 
cortex occurs when novel or complicated decisions have to be made based on memory 
such as during creativity (Beaty et al., 2014) or when we plan the future (Spreng et al., 
2010). Together the enhanced retrieval for best friend relative to the David Cameron 
control, as well as a functional connectivity network anchored in the vmPFC seed, 
suggest that memory for the best friend is likely to also benefit from an elaborate 
schema, perhaps one that is similar to that of the self (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2005).  
Importantly, this similarity with the self may mean that an accurate memory for close 
personal acquaintances is not only hampered by the weaker traces formed at 
encoding but may also depend on overcoming interference from associations with self 
memories and requires regions outside of the DMN that may function to guide 
retrieval in the face of interference. This possibility is supported by previous research 
which has commonly found inferior and dorsolateral prefrontal gyri, regions predictive 
of best friend memory in this study, to be involved in working memory processes 
(Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003). This hypothesis should be examined in future studies. 
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One general implication of our results is that vmPFC may act as a hub whose 
functional connectivity determines how schematic information is represented in the 
cortex. As well as connections to other regions of the mPFC, it can be seen from Figure 
2 that this region of cortex is connected to medial aspects of the temporal lobe, as 
well as other limbic regions. In topographical terms this region is therefore well placed 
to integrate affective and episodic information into the broader prefrontal cortex. 
Consistent with this view, our data shows that, across people, the nature of the 
patterns of connectivity it exhibits at rest has implications for aspects of social 
memory: A strong memory for self-relevant information was associated with greater 
integration within the DMN, whereas a stronger memory for best friend required 
integration with regions important for executive control. One implication of this view 
is that the vmPFC exhibits modes of cortical processing that reflect how different 
aspects of mnemonic and affective information dominate cognition. Although our 
current data are consistent with this hypothesis, it is impossible to infer whether these 
patterns exert their effect on memory during encoding or retrieval since the current 
study explored individual differences in resting-state functional connectivity rather 
than measuring online neural activity. Future studies exploring different patterns of 
functional connectivity during different types of social and non-social memory 
retrieval will help to address this question. 
It is worth considering certain limitations with the current data. Our study 
shows that better memory for different referents is associated with distinct patterns 
of functional connectivity however, the current study is unable to decipher whether 
the different patterns of functional connectivity predictive of memory for self and best 
friend items are indeed capturing the processing differences in referents per se, or 
whether instead they are reflecting differences in general memory strength. Future 
studies using a control memory task matched in accuracy to the reference task but 
instead employing a different memory manipulation such as elaborative semantic 
encoding will be able to address this issue.  
Regardless of these issues, our results suggest that information related to the 
self and to one’s best friend is supported by different patterns of functional 
connectivity with the vmPFC. Whereas information exclusively related to the self relies 
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on integration between this region and the DMN, remembering information about a 
similar other, benefits from integration between the vmPFC and executive control 
regions. We argue that this occurs because there are different strengths of association 
for the different types of memory. Memories associated with a best friend have 
weaker associations than do self-related. Consequently, remembering information 
about a personally significant other will requires additional executive control directed 
either to retrieve the weaker memory trace, or to correctly select the appropriate 
memory despite interference from the stronger, and often associated, memories 
about the self. 
Importantly, the current study found a negative correlation between inhibitory 
control and an individual’s self-bias, suggesting that reduced inhibitory control is 
related to one’s tendency to engage in self-focused attention. This in turn promotes 
states of perceptual decoupling that hinder task performance when sustained 
attention on the external world is required. The following chapter explores this 
relationship in more detail by using a cross-sectional design aimed at revealing 
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Chapter 3 - Don’t you forget about me: The 
Self-Reference Effect and its Relationship to 
Inhibitory Control. 
 
3. 1 Abstract 
Self-relevant material automatically triggers reallocation of attention, leading 
to states of perceptual decoupling and errors during tasks. Contrarily to this 
detrimental effect, self-referential processing has a positive effect on encoding, 
termed the self-reference effect (SRE). The current study hypothesised that 
individuals with a stronger SRE, measured using a self/other reference paradigm, 
would be less efficient at inhibitory control measured using a Go/No-Go task (GNG). 
The neural underpinnings of such relationship was explored using resting-state fMRI 
in a cross sectional design: Patterns of functional connectivity of inhibitory control 
regions were studied in relation to the magnitude of the SRE. Similarly, functional 
connectivity of regions involved in self-reference was explored in relation to inhibitory 
control scores. Behaviourally, analyses confirmed a trade-off between inhibitory 
control and the magnitude of the SRE. Neurally, stronger coupling between executive 
control regions and ventral striatum was related to a reduced SRE. Instead, good 
inhibitory control was related to stronger coupling between self-referential regions 
and the right inferior frontal gyrus located in the salience network. The meaning of 
these patterns of functional connectivity and the role they might play in suppressing 







The DMN is characterised as a set of highly coupled regions that show 
deactivation when attention is externally oriented (Grecius, Krasnow, Reiss, Menon, 
2003; Raichle et al., 2001) and activations when information from memory is being 
processed (Spreng, Mar & Kim, 2009). As such, it is highly active during periods of rest 
in which the mind is free of task. This default state is characterised by spontaneous 
and effortless generation of thoughts, colloquially termed mind wandering (Seli et al., 
2018; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). However, despite originally having been 
considered a task-negative network (Fox et al., 2005) further research revealed that 
tasks which recruit processes that are engaged during the mind wandering state, 
which are dependent on memory, also recruit the DMN, shifting the understanding of 
the processes carried out by this network from a task-negative one to a component 
process one. Examples of the processes the DMN is involved in are scene construction 
(Hassabis, Kumaran & Maguire, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007), mental time travel 
(Botzung, Denkova & Manning, 2008; Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2007; Spreng et al., 
2009), narrative comprehension (Mar, 2011) and social cognition (Iacoboni et al., 
2004; Mar, 2011; Spreng & Grady, 2010; Spreng et al., 2009), a common characteristic 
to all being that they rely on retrieval of episodic and semantic memory. Of special 
interest to the current study, self-referential processing also engages the DMN. This 
was first demonstrated by Kelley and colleagues (2002) who found stronger activation 
in midline cortical regions of the DMN during processing of items in a self-referential 
manner than during a non-self referential condition. In addition, Macrae, Moran, 
Heatherton and Banfield (2004) found that encoding of items processed in a self-
referential manner was related to stronger activation of the mPFC, a main hub of the 
DMN, and a meta-analysis performed by Northoff and colleagues (2006) further 
revealed that the role of these regions during self-reference applies to different 
domains (e.g., emotional, facial, memory, spatial). These self-referential thoughts are 
often concerned with the individual’s personal goals, constituting a core component 
of mind-wandering and future planning (Fox & Christoff, 2018; Smallwood et al., 2011; 
Stawarczyk & D’argembeau, 2015).  
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In the presence of an immediate goal this self-referential mode of cognition 
needs to be suppressed as adequate performance of either internally or externally 
oriented tasks requires attention to be sustained on task-relevant information until 
the task’s goal is achieved. During memory retrieval carried out by the DMN the 
system enters a state of perceptual decoupling by which external stimuli are not 
processed thoroughly. Evidence for this account comes from EEG studies in which 
cortical responses to targets and distractors were reduced when the participants 
reported higher levels of mind wandering (Smallwood, Beach, Schooler & Handy, 
2008).  Consistent with the view that DMN activity leads to perceptual decoupling 
several studies have found reduced DMN deactivation preceding lapses of attention 
and errors during tasks (Li, Yan, Bergquist & Sinha, 2007; Weissman, Roberts, Visscher 
& Woldorff, 2006).  Further evidence comes from studies showing that activation in 
the posterior cingulate cortex, a main hub of the DMN, increases during successful 
retrieval as well as during unsuccessful episodic encoding (Daselaar et al., 2009; 
Huijbers et al., 2012) which relies on processing of external stimuli. Because the 
spontaneous occurrence of processes carried out by the DMN may reflect a shift 
towards a state of memory guided cognition, if not suppressed efficiently under 
situations when external task-based information should be prioritized, DMN activity 
can interfere with goal-directed behaviour. Hence, during encoding or goal-directed 
action towards the external world, recruitment of mechanisms capable of suppressing 
the DMN are fundamental.  
Although contemporary theories suggest that DMN must be suppressed during 
tasks that require encoding of detailed external information, the precise mechanisms 
by which this modulation occurs remain unclear. Research on inhibitory control 
mechanisms has revealed a set of regions consistently engaged during interference-
resolution tasks. In particular, Nee, Wager and Jonides (2007) conducted a meta-
analysis of 47 studies using a peak density analysis and reported a distributed set of 
regions engaged across a range of inhibitory control tasks. It consisted primarily of 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), inferior frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex, 
anterior insula and posterior parietal cortex. This set of regions closely overlap with 
the FPCN defined in the parcellation by Yeo and colleagues (2011). Importantly these 
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set of regions have also been found to be anticorrelated with the DMN during the 
resting-state (Chai, Castañón, Öngür & Whitfield-Gabrieli, 2012; Fox et al., 2005) 
pointing towards the oppositional quality of DMN-related spontaneous cognition and 
FPCN-related controlled cognition.  
The current study aims to understand the potential mechanisms by which the 
DMN fails to be downregulated in instances when the context requires it. Smallwood 
and Andrews-Hanna (2013) argue for a context-regulation hypothesis based on studies 
that have shown that individuals with higher working memory report less instances of 
mind wandering during demanding tasks (Kane et al., 2007; Mcvay & Kane, 2009) 
whereas other studies have shown higher mind-wandering during low demanding 
tasks in individuals with high working memory (Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 
2012). These results suggest that executive processes such as working memory, 
anchored in the FPCN, play an important role in regulating the occurrence of mind 
wandering in a manner that is dependent on the context.  
The strong resemblance between the DMN and tasks that require self-
focussed attention ( D’argembeau et al., 2005; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman & Raichle, 
2001), the high degree of self-relevant content recruited during mind wandering (Fox 
& Christoff, 2018; Smallwood et al., 2011; Stawarczyk & D’argembeau, 2015) and 
research revealing that self-relevant material has similar properties to salient 
perceptual stimuli (Humphreys & Sui, 2015; Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui, Lui, 
Mevorach & Humphreys, 2013) lead us to hypothesise that certain instances of lapses 
of attention might be due to a shift towards a mode of  self-relevant information 
processing. During these instances self-related information is probably signalled as 
more salient than task-related stimuli, with the resulting compromise on task 
performance. If this was the case, due to the reallocation of resources away from the 
task, individuals with a higher self-bias may perform worse on tasks that require 
sustained attention, such as tasks that depend on inhibitory control.   
In order to measure individual differences in self-bias we measured the 
magnitude of the self-reference effect, which refers to the mnemonic advantage that 
material processed in reference to the self has over other types of processing. Many 
studies have found a positive correlation between this measure and one’s tendency 
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to analyse the self, as measured through self-consciousness questionnaires (Agatstein 
& Buchanan, 1984; Hull, Van Treuren, Ashford, Propsom & Andrus, 1988; Nasby, 1985; 
Turner, 1980), suggesting that the heightened activation of self-related information 
required to engage in private self-consciousness results in a stronger mnemonic 
advantage towards material processed by this system.  Hence the magnitude of the 
self-reference effect could potentially be used as an objective measure of self-
focussed attention tendencies, the logic being that subjects with a reduced memory 
exclusively for self-related items (i.e who maintain a good memory performance on 
the control condition) have a reduced tendency for self-focussed attention. Contrarily, 
highly self-focused individuals will present a heightened memory exclusively for self-
related items. Using a self-other reference paradigm, a previous study by this group 
found that heightened incidental encoding for items in the self-condition was 
correlated with worse inhibitory control (de Caso, Poerio, Jefferies & Smallwood, 
2017).  
The current study aims to replicate this negative correlation between 
inhibitory control efficiency and the magnitude of the self-reference effect as well as 
to explore potential patterns of functional connectivity in the resting-state involved in 
this DMN-FPCN interaction. To do this, two behavioural measures, one for self-bias  
(the self-reference effect) and one for inhibitory control (a Go / No-Go task) were 
recorded.  These were used to understand the neural basis of the hypothesised 
interference between self-focus and effective external goal directed attention. We 
employed a localiser in a subset of participants to identify regions important for both 
self-reference and inhibitory control. To select the DMN regions of interest involved 
in self-reference a self/other reference localiser task was ran inside the scanner and 
the DMN defined by Yeo and colleagues (2011) was constrained by the map obtained 
for self > other contrast in the localiser task. The same procedure was used to obtain 
an inhibitory control region of interest. Using a Go/No-Go localiser task, the map 
obtained for the No-Go > Go contrast was used to constrain the FPCN defined by Yeo 
and colleagues (2011). If the process of self-reference interacts with inhibitory control 
processes then the magnitude of the self-reference effect might predict the functional 
connectivity of regions involved in inhibitory control. Similarly, functional connectivity 
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of regions involved in self-reference might predict inhibitory control. By applying this 
cross-sectional design this study aims to decipher patterns of functional connectivity 
that underlie the relationship between inhibitory control and the magnitude of one’s 
self-bias, informing the theory surrounding how control mechanisms regulate self-
focussed attention.  
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1. Participants 
A total of one hundred and thirty nine (89 females, Age=22.50, SD= 2.93 years) 
healthy right-handed participants completed a self/other reference paradigm outside 
the scanner. A subset of these subjects (N= 51 (31 females, Age =20.2, SD = 1.86 years)) 
was later re-invited to complete a Go/No-Go paradigm in order to obtain measures of 
their inhibitory control ability. Both these tasks were performed outside the fMRI 
scanner and resting-state fMRI data was collected for all of the participants. The 
behavioural z-scores obtained from both paradigms were used as regressors of 
interest in subsequent second level seed-based analyses.  
In order to select regions of interest for our seed-based analyses two localiser 
scans were performed. 21 subjects (13 females, Age=20.7, SD = 2.32 years) performed 
the Go/No-Go task inside the scanner in order to obtain areas more engaged during 
the No-Go than Go trials. 33 subjects (16 females, Age = 20.2, SD= 2.35 years) 
completed a self/other reference localiser task in order to obtain areas more highly 
active during self-referential processing than other-referential processing.  
Once our seed-based analyses were completed, the clusters obtained 
predictive of the behavioural scores were seeded in an independent data set and a 
conjunction analysis was performed using the functional connectivity group maps of 
each cluster in order to find common regions with functional connectivity involved in 
the relationship between self-reference and inhibitory control. A chart describing the 
flow of the whole experiment can be found in Figure 3.1.   
In exchange for their participation all subjects received either monetary 
reward or course credits. Approval for this project was granted by the York 
Neuroimaging Centre (YNiC) Ethics Committee and was conducted in accordance with 
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the ethical standards of the responsible committee on human experimentation 
(institutional and national) and with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, as revised in 
2008. 
  
 3.3.2. Behavioural Procedure  
 
3.3.2.1 Self/Other Reference Paradigm 
 
The laboratory task measuring the self-reference memory advantage involved 
an evaluation and a retrieval phase displayed in the left panel of Figure 1. The 
evaluation phase consisted of two social conditions and one syllable count condition. 
In the social conditions participants were asked to make decisions about the 
association between adjectives and one of two referents (‘Self’ or ‘Lady Gaga’). In the 
syllable condition, participants indicated via button press whether the word on screen 
had three or more syllables or whether it had less. Adjectives were presented 
sequentially on-screen and participants were required to indicate whether each 
adjective applied to a particular referent/ had three or more syllables by pressing 
‘Y’ with the index finger of their right hand for ‘yes’ or ‘N’ with the index finger of their 
left hand for ‘no’. All words were selected from a pool of normalised personality trait 
adjectives with meaningfulness and likeability ratings (Anderson, 1968). An equal 
amount of positive, negative and neutral adjectives (40 adjectives /valence) with the 
highest meaningfulness rating were selected for this experiment. For each participant, 
these 120 words were randomly divided into two lists of 60 adjectives. One list 
contained all the items involved during the encoding phase, the other list contained 
the items that would be used as foils during the retrieval phase. This first encoding-
phase list was divided into three lists of 20 items, each of which was assigned to one 
of the three conditions (Self, Lady Gaga, Syllables). Finally, these condition-specific 
lists were subdivided into two 10-item lists, one list per experimental block.  
During encoding, participants were presented with these lists in separate 
blocks in an ABCCBA order allowing us to control for order effects within each 
participant. We also counterbalanced the order in which each category was presented 
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across participants. Each block was preceded by a screen indicating the specific 
condition and each block started after the participants button press. Stimuli were 
separated by an inter-stimulus interval of 5000ms during which participants were 
shown a blank screen with a fixation cross. Following the evaluation phase, 
participants were presented with a surprise retrieval test in which they were 
sequentially shown words and asked whether or not that particular item had been 
presented in the previous phase. This retrieval phase contained all the words from the 
previous stage of the experiment, plus an equal number of new words contained in 
the retrieval list. Items were presented in a random order and participants had to 
either press ‘O’ for old if they thought the word had appeared before or ‘N’ for new if 
they thought it was a new word. The old/new responses judged as “old” were followed 
by a source localisation judgement in which participants had to indicate using arrow 
heads whether they thought the old word had been presented during the self, the 
Lady Gaga or the syllable-count condition. Confidence ratings ranging from 1 (not 
confident at all) to 6 (very confident) for each old/new and source localisation 
judgements were also obtained. This paradigm allowed for 12 types of response types. 
Hits are considered old words that were correctly identified as old and correctly 
localised during the source localisation phase. This results in either “Self hits”, “Lady 
Gaga hits” or “syllable hits”.  Old words judged as new would be considered misses, 
again resulting in either a “self miss”, a “Lady Gaga miss” or a “syllables miss”. New 
words judged as new were considered “correct rejections”, and new words judged as 
old were considered “false alarms”. Based on the incorrect source localisation of these 
new words, these can further be subdivided into “Self false alarms”, “Lady Gaga false 
alarms” or “syllable false alarms”. The false alarms scores specific to each referent 
allowed us to control for guessing at a referent specific level by subtracting them from 
the hits. Lastly, if an old word from, for example, the syllable condition was judged as 
old but then incorrectly source localised as Lady Gaga it was considered a “wrong 
source localisation from syllables to Lady Gaga condition”.  
Due to the effect familiarity can have on memory (Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Kuiper& 
Rogers, 1979; Kuiper, 1982), at the end of the experiment participants were asked to 
rate, on a scale of 1 to 6, their familiarity to Lady Gaga. Bivariate correlations (r=.197, 
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p =.167 revealed an insignificant effect of familiarity ratings on Lady Gaga memory, 
hence the original Lady Gaga memory scores were used in all analyses.   
3.3.2.2. Go/No-Go Paradigm(GNG) 
The GNG paradigm used in the current study originally had four different 
conditions. Two of them were semantic and the other two perceptual. The stimuli in 
the semantic conditions were either words or pictures, depending on condition, 
whereas the stimuli in the perceptual conditions were obtained by scrambling the 
stimuli from the semantic condition. The two perceptual conditions varied in difficulty. 
All stimuli were framed by a box that was slanted to different degrees (slight slant, 
medium slant or pronounced slant). Each trial consisted of a fixation cross, followed 
by the stimulus and the duration of the fixations and stimuli were jittered between 
0.5-1s and 0.75-1.25s for fixation and stimulus respectively.  
This task was originally developed to probe semantic inhibition (Alam, Murphy, 
Smallwood & Jefferies, 2018), however, in the current study we were only interested 
in performance during the hard-perceptual condition so will only describe this 
condition in detail. The stop-signal cue in the perceptual conditions was the degree of 
the slant in the framing box in such a way that participants had to withhold their 
response when the degree of the slant increased. In the hard-perceptual condition the 
slant between the Go and No-Go trials only varied slightly, from a slight slant to a 
medium slant, in contrast to the easy-perceptual condition in which the slant varied 
from slight slant to pronounced. The hard-perceptual GNG task is displayed in the right 
panel of Figure 1 and further details of this task, including stimuli generation, can be 








3.3.3 Neuroimaging Procedure 
3.3.3.1. Localiser Scans 
3.3.3.1.1. Self/Other Reference Localiser 
In order to obtain brain regions involved in self-reference 33 subjects 
performed a localiser scan inside the scanner. Similar to the encoding phase of the 
self-other reference paradigm described above, participants were presented with 
adjectives on the screen and depending on the experimental condition had to decide 
whether the adjective defined themselves (self-reference condition) or whether the 
adjective defined Barack Obama (control condition). A total of 30 neutral adjectives of 
similar word length were selected from a set of norms (Anderson, 1968) and two 15-
item lists were created, counterbalancing across participants the condition for each 
list. For each trial the experimental condition was indicated by either the word 
“MYSELF” or “OTHER” and just above it the target word was presented in lowercase.   
3.3.3.1.2. Go/No-Go Localiser Scan 
The same Go/No-Go task used to obtain behavioural performance was used in 
the scanner to obtain regions more active during the No-Go trials than during the Go 
trials.  
3.3.3.1.3. MRI Acquisition  
For both localiser scans structural and functional data were acquired using a 
3T GE HDx Excite MRI scanner with an 8-channel phased array head coil (GE) tuned to 
127.4 MHz, at the York Neuroimaging Centre. Structural MRI acquisition was based on 
a T1-weighted 3D fast spoiled gradient echo sequence (TR = 7.8 s, TE = min full, flip 
angle= 20°, matrix size = 256 x 256, 176 slices, voxel size = 1.13 x 1.13 x 1 mm). 
Functional data was recorded using single shot 2D gradient-echo-planar imaging (TR = 
3 s, TE = minimum full, flip angle = 90°, matrix size = 64 x 64, 60 slices, voxel size = 3 x 
3 x 3 mm3 , 180 volumes). A FLAIR scan with the same orientation as the functional 
scans was collected to improve co-registration between scans. 
3.3.3.1.4. fMRI Analysis  
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For both localiser scans functional and structural data were pre-processed and 
analysed using FMRIB’s Software Library (FSL version 4.1, 
http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/FEAT/) (Smith et al., 2004). Individual FLAIR and T1 
weighted structural brain images were extracted using BET (Brain Extraction Tool, 
Smith, 2002). Structural images were registered to the MNI-152 template using 
FMRIB's Linear Image Registration Tool (Jenkinson & Smith, 2001; Jenkinson, 
Bannister, Brady & Smith, 2002). The functional data were pre-processed and analysed 
using the FMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT). Individual subject analysis involved: 
motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002); slice-timing correction using 
Fourier space time-series phase-shifting; spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of 
FWHM 6mm; grand-mean intensity normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single 
multiplicative factor; highpass temporal filtering (Gaussian weighted least-squares 
straight line fitting, with sigma = 100 s); Gaussian lowpass temporal filtering, with 
sigma = 2.8s. 
For the self/other localiser scan first level analyses modelled the two 
experimental conditions (i.e self and other). Explanatory variables (EV) modelled time 
periods of each condition. For the Go/No-Go localiser scan first level analyses 
modelled 10 EVs, only two of them being of interest to the current study:  the Go and 
No-Go time periods of the hard-perceptual condition.  Z stat maps were generated for 
each EV; Self-reference and Other-reference as well as hard-perceptual No-Go and 
hard-perceptual Go trials. These maps were then registered to a high resolution T1-
anatomical image and then onto the standard MNI brain (ICBM152). For both localiser 
scans, first level effects were entered into a group analysis using a mixed-effects 
design (FLAME, http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) with automatic outlier detection 
(Beckmann, Jenkinson & Smith, 2003). The group analysis for the self-reference 
localiser included a self > other contrast and the group analysis for the inhibitory 
control included a No-Go > Go. Whole brain analyses were cluster corrected using a z 
statistic threshold of 3.1 (Eklund, Nichols & Knutsson, 2016) to define contiguous 
clusters.  We controlled the rate of multiple comparisons using Gaussian Random Field 




3.3.3.2. Resting-state  
3.3.3.2.1. Scan Acquisition 
Functional MRI data was acquired on a 3 Tesla GE scanner. Participants 
observed a fixation cross for a scan that lasted 9 minutes. The scan had a repetition 
time of 2 seconds, resulting in 210 volumes. We used interleaved slice-timing and 
isotropic voxel dimensions of 3 mm3 (matrix size of 64 X 64, 192mm field of view, and 
32 slices) with a 0.5mm gap between slices. 
3.3.3.2.2. Pre-processing 
All fMRI pre-processing and analysis was performed using FSL. We extracted the brain 
from the skull using the BET toolbox for both the flair and the structural T1 weighted 
images and these scans were registered to standard MNI152 (2mm) space using FLIRT 
(Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). Prior to conducting the functional connectivity analysis, 
the following pre-statistics processing was applied to the resting-state data; motion 
correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002); slice-timing correction using 
Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting; non-brain removal using BET (Smith, 2002); 
spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6mm; grand-mean intensity 
normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor; highpass 
temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 
100 s; Gaussian lowpass temporal filtering, with sigma = 2.8s.). 
3.3.3.2.3. First Level Analysis 
Following these steps, the time series of 2 masks of interest were extracted. 
One of this masks represented the region of interest related to self-referential 
processing and was obtained by constraining the DMN as defined by Yeo and 
colleagues (2011) to the regions related to self-referential processing obtained in 
self>other contrast applied to the self/other localiser scan. The resulting mask can be 
visualised in bottom row of the top panel in Figure 3.3. The second mask contained 
regions involved in inhibitory control and was obtained by constraining the FPCN as 
defined by Yeo and colleagues (2011) to the regions related to inhibitory control 
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obtained in the No-Go > Go contrast applied to the Go/No-Go localiser. This mask can 
be visualised in the bottom row of the bottom panel in Figure 3.3.   
The time series for each voxel within each mask were averaged and used as an 
explanatory variable in a subject-level functional connectivity analysis, which also 
included the following nuisance regressors: the first five principal time-series 
components extracted from white matter (WM) and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) masks 
in accordance with the CompCor method (Behzadi, Restom, Liau & Liu, 2007) and six 
motion parameters. The Yeo et al (2011) parcellations in non-linear MNI152 volume 
space were downloaded from 
https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/fswiki/CorticalParcellation_Yeo2011 and 
resampled from 1mm3 to 2mm3.  WM and CSF masks were generated by segmenting 
each individual’s high-resolution structural image (using FAST in FSL). The default 
tissue probability maps, referred to as Prior Probability Maps (PPM), were registered 
to each individual’s high-resolution structural image (T1 space) and the overlap 
between these PPM and the corresponding CSF and WM maps was identified. Finally, 
these maps were thresholded (40% for the SCF and 66% for the WM), binarised and 
combined. The six motion parameters were calculated in the motion-correction step 
during pre-processing. Linear displacements in each of the three Cartesian directions 
(x, y, z) and rotations around three axes (pitch, yaw, roll) were included for each 
individual. No global signal regression was performed (Murphy, Birn, Handwerker, 
Jones & Bandettini, 2009). 
 
3.3.3.2.4. Second Level Analysis. 
To understand whether the magnitude of the self-reference effect and 
inhibitory control scores varied with the functional connectivity of the areas involved 
in inhibitory control and self-referential processing, respectively, we used FSL to 
conduct two group-level regression of the connectivity matrices of each mask.  
The first analysis examined whether the functional connectivity of regions 
involved in inhibitory control could predict the magnitude of the self-reference effect. 
We included the z-scores for the memory scores obtained for the self-referential and 
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the other-referential conditions as regressors of interest and were interested in the 
contrasts 1) Self Down and  2) Self Down, Lady Gaga up.   The second analysis looked 
at whether the functional connectivity of the mask related to self-reference could 
predict the inhibitory control scores. In this analysis,  we included the efficiency z-
scores obtained from the GNG as regressor of interest. This technique allows us to 
examine regions within or outside the masks whose connectivity varies with particular 
traits (the magnitude of the self-reference effect and the inhibitory control scores 
respectively). 
In order to control for spurious correlations related to subject motion we 
included framewise displacement as a regressor of no interest in both analyses 
(Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar & Petersen, 2012) and automatic outlier detection 
was selected in seed-based analyses. See Sormaz et al., (2017) for a prior 
demonstration of this approach. In these analyses the data were processed using FEAT 
version 5.98 part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) and the 
analyses were carried out using FMRIB's Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME). A 
grey matter mask with a probability threshold of 40% was used as a pre-thresholding 
mask and the cluster-forming threshold was set as z-score of 2.3. For these analyses 
we controlled for Type I errors by controlling for the number of voxels in the brain 
(Worsley, 2001), as well as the two tailed nature of our comparisons yielding an alpha 
value of p<.025 FWE.   
3.3.3.3 Conjunction Analysis 
Once the group level regression analyses were finalised the cluster obtained 
for the Self Up, Lady Gaga up contrast and the cluster involved in better inhibitory 
control were both independently seeded in a new data set (N=59) with the same MRI 
Acquisition, pre-processing and analysis parameters as the other data set. With the 
aim of finding regions simultaneously related to better inhibitory control and reduced 
self-reference effect a formal conjunction analysis using FSL’s “easythresh-conj” tool 




3.3.3.4. Neurosynth Meta-analyses 
In order to study how clusters obtained in this study were related to previous 
neuroimaging studies, meta-analyses were performed using the online Neurosynth 
database (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen & Wagner, 2011). In particular, we 
performed a meta-analytic decoding of 1) the unthresholded functional connectivity 
group map of the cluster obtained in the FPCN seed-based analysis predictive of 
memory of reduced self-reference effect, 2) the unthresholded functional 
connectivity group map of the cluster obtained in the DMN seed-based analysis 
predictive of inhibitory control efficiency, 3) the unthresholded functional 
connectivity group map of the mask obtained in the conjunction analysis. This was 
done by uploading the corresponding unthresholded maps onto Neuorsynth and 
performing a cognitive decoding of each map. This function allows the identification 
of cognitive terms in the database that are most strongly associated with the uploaded 











Figure 3.1 : Flow chart describing all the steps performed in the current study. Two localiser 
scans were performed to select regions of interest for inhibitory control and self-referential 
processing. Behavioural scores for both paradigms were collected outside of the scanner and 
used as regressors in the seed-based analyses using a cross-sectional design. The clusters 
obtained in the seed-based regressions were seeded in an independent data set and the 
functional connectivity group maps used in a conjunction analysis. Meta-analytic decoding 
was performed on the functional connectivity group maps and the conjunction map in order 







The current study aimed to study the relationship between inhibitory control 
efficiency and the degree of self-bias as well as to explore patterns of functional 
connectivity underpinning such relationship. In order to calculate an individual’s self-
bias their memory for items processed in a control condition, namely in relation to 
Lady Gaga, were subtracted from the memory scores obtained for items processed in 
reference to the self, obtaining a measure of the magnitude of their self-reference 
effect. Efficiency  scores from a Go/No-Go paradigm were used as a measure of 
inhibitory control and the relationship between the behavioural scores obtained in 
each paradigm was analysed using a hierarchical regression analysis.  
To explore patterns of functional connectivity involved in the relationship 
between mnemonic advantage for self-related items and inhibitory control these 
behavioural measures were used to drive seed-based regression analyses using a 
behavioural-resting-state functional connectivity cross-sectional design. In particular, 
the memory scores related to the mnemonic advantage of self-related items were 
used to predict functional connectivity of regions involved in inhibitory control, 
whereas performance scores at the GNG task were used to predict patterns of 
functional connectivity of regions involved in self-referential processing. The regions 
of interest were selected through running localiser tasks for self-reference and 
inhibitory control and using the maps obtained for self > other and No-Go > Go to 
constrain the DMN and FPCN as defined by Yeo and colleagues (2011), respectively.  
Lastly, the clusters with functional connectivity predictive of behaviour 
obtained in our seed-based analyses were seeded in an independent data set to obtain 
their functional connectivity group maps and a conjunction analysis of these 
functional connectivity group maps was performed to extract regions that potentially 
coordinate the patterns of functional connectivity predictive of behaviour.  
The maps obtained for the localiser scans, the seed-based regressions and the 
functional connectivity of the cluster obtained, as well as the conjunction analysis of 




3.4.1 Behavioural Results 
3.4.1.1. Self –Reference Effect 
Memory scores for each referent were calculated by counting how many 
words from each condition were source localised correctly. In order to control for 
guessing the number of new words erroneously assigned to each referent (false 
alarms) was subtracted from the number of correctly source localised words. In 
particular, the proportion of new words erroneously assigned to, for example, the 
syllable condition was subtracted from the proportion of old syllable-count words that 
were correctly source localised. This was done for the 3 conditions.  The memory for 
each referent is presented in the bar graph in Figure 3.2. 
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted using the 
data from the 139 participants who completed the self-reference task.  The three 
memory measures were included as a within-subject factor (F(2,276) =394.4, p < 
.0001, ηp2 = .741) revealing a significant effect of condition on memory scores. Paired 
sample t-test revealed the expected mnemonic advantage of self-related material 
over both the Lady Gaga condition (t(138) =12.6, p <.0001, d = 1.07)  and the syllable 
count condition (t(138) = 28, p <.0001, d = 2.38 ). The memory scores between the 2 
control conditions were also significantly different t(138) = 15.1, p <.0001, d = 1.28) 
with Lady Gaga scores being significantly higher than syllable count scores. Figure 3.2 
shows these differences in memory performance across the 3 conditions.  
We repeated this analysis using only the subjects that completed the GNG task 
(N=51) to assure these results were consistent in our subsample. A significant effect 
of condition was again found (F(2,100)=106.9, p < .0001, ηp2 =.681) with memory for 
Lady Gaga being significantly higher than memory for syllables (t(50) = 7.9, p <.0001, 
d = 1.12) and memory for self-related items being significant higher than memory for 
Lady Gaga items (t(50) =6.9, p < .0001, d = .97). Hence our results replicate the well-
established mnemonic advantage that material processed in relation to the self holds.  
In both samples memory for syllables was not above chance performance (Full sample: 
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N=139, Mean = .32, SD = .17; Subsample N= 51, Mean = .33, SD = .2) and was therefore 
excluded  from the subsequent behavioural and resting-state analyses. 
 
3.4.1.2. Go/No-Go Paradigm 
Inhibitory control efficiency scores were calculated by dividing the response time at 
Go trials (when a response was required) by the accuracy on the No-Go trials (when a 
response was successfully repressed), RT = 0.5s, SD = .07; Accuracy = 70.22%, SD = 
17.87. Note that lower efficiency scores therefore represent better performance at 
the GNG task (Mean efficiency scores = .81, SD =.37). Five outliers were detected, all 
performing below 3 standard deviations from the mean. The scores of these 
participants were imputed to 2 standard deviations of the mean and these efficiency 
scores were used for further analyses (Mean efficiency scores after imputing for 
outliers = .78, SD = .3).  
Figure 3.2: Behavioural 
results. Top Left: Bar graph 
displaying memory scores for 
each condition after 
controlling for guessing by 
subtracting number of false 
alarms in each condition. Top 
Right: Scatterplot displaying 
the correlation between the 
SRE and inhibitory control 
(high values reflect worse 
efficiency).  Bottom: 
Interaction plot displaying the 
relationship between 
inhibitory control and 
memory for Lady Gaga items 
moderated by memory for 
self-related items. At high 
levels of performance at the 
Lady Gaga condition the effect 






3.4.1.3. Relationship between the Self-Reference Effect and 
Inhibitory Control 
For each control condition, the magnitude of the self-reference effect was 
calculated by subtracting the memory scores in either control condition from the 
memory scores in the self-referential condition. Next, bivariate correlations between 
these measures and the efficiency scores at the Go/No-Go task were carried out. A 
positive correlation was found when computing the self-reference effect by 
subtracting Lady Gaga memory scores from self-referential memory scores (r = .316, 
p = .024). Note that lower efficiency scores at the GNG represent better performance 
hence the positive correlation is reflecting that individuals with a stronger self-
reference effect have worse inhibitory control. The relationship between the self-
reference effect and inhibition is displayed visually in the scatterplot in Figure 3.2. 
A linear regression was performed in order to identify whether the aspect of 
the self-reference effect linked to inhibitory control was a result of better memory for 
the self or worse memory for Lady Gaga, both of which would result in a reduced self-
reference effect. Efficiency scores at the GNG were included as the dependent variable 
with the memory scores for Lady Gaga and self used as predictors. In addition, an 
interaction term between the two predictors was added in a hierarchical regression 
analysis. To avoid potentially problematic high multicollinearity with the interaction 
term, the variables were centred and an interaction term between self and Lady Gaga 
memory scores was created (Aiken & West, 1991). This interaction term accounted 
for a significant proportion of the variance in the inhibition efficiency scores (ΔR2 = 
.067, ΔF(1,47) = 4.22, p = 0.45, b = 2.27, t(47) = 2.03, p =.045). There was also a main 
effect of Lady Gaga memory on inhibition scores (B= -.78, t(47) = -3.2, p =.002). 
Regarding the self-referential condition, there was a trend towards a significant effect 
(B= .48, t(47) =1.8 , p=.076). 
To understand the interaction effect, the data was plotted and can be 
visualised in the line graph in Figure 3.2. This plot helps us distinguish individuals who 
have a low self-memory due to low overall memory, as measured through the low 
Lady Gaga memory score, from those whose low self-memory is not due to bad 
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encoding mechanisms (as inferred from their high Lady Gaga scores). From the line 
graph it can be seen that high performance at self-related memory has a detrimental 
effect on inhibition, and how this effect becomes apparent within subjects with high 
memory for the memory control condition (i.e, Lady Gaga items). In these subjects we 
can confirm that low scores for self are not due to a bad encoding/retrieval ability, as 
they present good memory in the Lady Gaga condition. Instead, the individuals with 
the best inhibitory control (lower scores) are not those with the best memory scores 
for both conditions, but those who, on top of having a good memory for the non-self 
control condition, have a reduced mnemonic advantage for self-related items. This 
strongly supports the idea that a mnemonic advantage for self-material is capturing 
an aspect of self-focussed attention that acts as a distractor, with low scores for self-
related material accompanied by high memory for the control condition potentially 
reflecting a reduced tendency to focus attention towards the self.  
 
3.4.2. Neuroimaging Results 
3.4.2.1 Selection of Seed Regions 
The aim of the study was to explore the neural mechanisms that describe the 
relationship between inhibitory control and one’s tendency for self-reference (as 
measured through the magnitude of the self-reference effect).  In particular, we 
wanted to know whether patterns of functional connectivity of areas activated in 
periods of self-reference relate to individual variations in inhibitory control, as well as 
whether patterns of functional connectivity of areas engaged during inhibitory control 
could predict the magnitude of one’s memory advantage for self-related items.  
Prior meta-analytic studies have shown that self-reference engages regions 
within the DMN (Northoff et al., 2006) whereas inhibitory control activates areas in 
the FPCN (Nee et al., 2007), making these networks seed region candidates for the 
functional connectivity behavioural regressions. To constrain the size of these regions 
of interest we ran two localiser tasks in subsets of our larger sample to identify aspects 
of these networks that are most relevant to the specific cognitive processes. A Go/No- 
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Figure 3.3: Generation of regions of interest for the seed-based analyses. A: Generation of 
seed region involved in inhibitory control. Top row displays the clusters obtained for No-Go > 
Go in the localiser scan. Middle row displays the Frontoparietal Control Network (FPCN) as 
defined by Yeo et al (2011). Bottom row displays the overlap between the FPCN and the areas 
obtained for No-Go > Go contrast. The relationship between the functional connectivity of 
this mask and the magnitude of the self-reference effect was explored in the first analysis.  B: 
Generation of seed region involved in self-referential processing. Top row displays the clusters 
obtained for self > other in the localiser scan. Middle row displays the Default Mode Network 
(DMN) as defined by Yeo et al (2011). Bottom row displays the overlap between the DMN and 
the areas obtained for self > other contrast. The relationship between the functional 
connectivity of this mask and efficiency scores at inhibitory control was explored in the 
second analysis   
Go task was performed to obtain regions engaged during inhibition (No-Go > Go, N = 
21 , see Methods). The comparison of No-Go > Go events revealed 6 clusters located 
in the right lateral prefrontal cortex, right and left superior parietal lobe, right 
occipitotemporal lobe, left occipital lobe and left frontal pole. More details about 
these clusters can be found in Table 1. In addition, a self/other reference task was also 
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scanned to obtain regions engaged during self-reference (N = 33, see Methods). 
Comparison of the process of self-reference with the control condition revealed 4 
clusters located in the mPFC, the left and right occipital lobes and the posterior 
cingulate cortex. Further details can be found in Table 2. The No-Go >  Go activation 
map, displayed in Figure 3.3A (top row) was then multiplied by the FPCN as defined 
by Yeo et al (2011) (Figure 3.3A, middle row)  in order to obtain the final inhibitory 
control related mask (Figure 3.3A, bottom row). Similarly the map obtained for self > 
other displayed in Figure 3B (top row) was multiplied by the DMN (Figure 3.3B, middle 
row), using the resulting map as the self-reference mask (Figure 3.3B, bottom row) in 
the subsequent seed-based behavioural regressions of inhibition scores. 
 
 3.4.2.2. Seed-Based Behavioural Regressions 
Having established regions of interest within DMN and FPCN that are sensitive 
to the process of self-reference and inhibition, respectively, we conducted two 
independent seed-based analyses  with the aim of identifying whether the patterns of 
functional connectivity from regions of importance for inhibition were predictive of 
the magnitude of the self-reference effect and vice versa. A group regression was 
performed on the functional connectivity maps of the inhibitory control region of 
interest (Figure 3.3A, bottom row) using the scores from the self-reference task as 
regressors (memory scores from the syllable count condition were not included). This 
analysis included the 139 participants who completed the self-reference task. Results 
revealed a pattern of functional connectivity from the inhibitory control region to a 
subcortical cluster to be predictive of memory for self-related items. This cluster is 
displayed in green in the glass brain at the top left of Figure 3.4. In particular, stronger 
functional connectivity between the FPCN and this cluster was related to reduced 
memory scores in the self-referential condition, as can be seen from the green 
scatterplot.  In addition, the contrast for Self Down, Lady Gaga up revealed a left-
lateralized subsection of this cluster encompassing the left thalamus and left striatum. 
This cluster is displayed in yellow in the bottom glass brain as well as in the axial and 
sagittal slices of Figure 3.4 and, as can be seen from the yellow scatterplot, as the 
magnitude of the self-reference effect gets smaller so does the decoupling between  
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between the functional connectivity (FC) of inhibitory control related 
regions and the magnitude of the self-reference effect (SRE). The top glass brain displays the 
subcortical cluster (green) found to be more coupled to the inhibitory control related seed 
region in subjects with a reduced self-memory, whereas the bottom glass brain displays the 
subsection of the subcortical cluster (yellow) found to be more coupled to the inhibitory 
control related seed region in subjects with a reduced SRE. The scatterplots show these 
relationships:x axis displays the connectivity between the seed region and these cluster and 
the y axis displays the memory scores. Groups were generated by median splitting the 
memory scores and the mean FC of each group is displayed in the bar graphs. The subcortical 
cluster obtained for the SRE was further used as a seed region to explore its functionality. 
The inflated brains at the bottom display the FC group map of this cluster, with warm colours 
indicating areas that are functionally coupled above average to the subcortical cluster and 
blue indicating areas that are coupled below average. The word cloud on the bottom right 






Clusters obtained for the No-Go > Go contrast using the inhibitory control localiser 
Cluster location Regions Peak Size p-value 
Right Lateral PFC Frontal pole 54, 14, 36 2589 1.75E-14 
 Middle frontal gyrus    
 Frontal orbital cortex     
 Insular cortex    
 Inferior frontal gyrus    
         pars opercularis    
 Precentral gyrus    
 Superior frontal gyrus 
 
   
Right Superior Parietal Lobe Supramarginal gyurs 46, -42, 48 2233 4.39E-13 
         anterior division    
         posterior division    
 Angular gyrus    
 Lateral occipital cortex    
         superior division    
 Superior parietal lobule 
 
   
Left Superior Parietal Lobe Supramarginal gyrus -38, -44, 42 1658 1.36E-10 
         anterior division    
         posterior division    
 Lateral occipital cortex    
         superior division    
 Postcentral gyrus    
 Superior parietal lobule 
 
   
Right occipitotemporal lobe Inferior temporal gyrus 54, -34, -20 1417 1.82E-09 
         posterior division    
         temporooccipital part    
 Lateral occipital cortex    
         inferior division    
 Middle temporal gyrus    
         temporooccipital part 
 
   
Left Occipital Lobe Temporal Occipital Fusiform 
Cortex 
-46, -72, -6 796 3.3E-06 
 Lateral occipital cortex    
         inferior division    
 Inferior temporal gyrus    
         temporooccipital part 
 
   
Left Frontal Pole Frontal pole -42, -40, 20 245 0.02 
     
Note: Coordinates are based on the Montreal Neurological Institute coordinate system. Regions are based 
on the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas 
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between the functional connectivity (FC) self-referential related 
regions and efficiency scores of the Go/No Paradigm. The sagittal and axial slices display the 
cluster (cyan) in the right insula/orbitofrontal cortex found to be more coupled to the self-
referential related seed region in subjects with better efficiency scores at the Go/No-Go 
Paradigm (lower scores). The scatterplot shows this relationship with the x axis displaying the 
connectivity between the seed region and this cluster and the y axis displaying the efficiency 
scores of the Go/No-Go Paradigm.  This cluster was further used as a seed region to explore 
its functionality. The inflated brains at the bottom left display the FC group map of this cluster, 
with warm colours indicating areas that are functionally coupled above average to the 
subcortical cluster and blue indicating areas that are coupled below average. The word cloud 
on the bottom right displays the results from a meta-analytic cognitive decoding of the FC 
group map using Neurosynth.  
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these regions. To visualise this effect, the sample was median split on the basis of their 
memory for self-items and Lady Gaga items, presented in Figure 3.4 in the form of a 
bar plot. For the yellow bar graph participants were then grouped in either of 4 groups 
based on their memory for self and Lady Gaga. The bar graphs display the mean 
functional connectivity in each group. It can be seen that the individuals with below 
median memory scores for the self-condition have the highest FPCN-striatal coupling. 
Note from the yellow bar graph that the magnitude of the coupling between FPCN and 
striatum is not informative of the memory in the control condition as not all individuals 
with a higher memory score for Lady Gaga have less or more functional connectivity 
than all individuals with reduced Lady Gaga memory, suggesting this pattern of 
functional connectivity is specifically related to the magnitude of the self-reference 
effect and not to overall encoding/retrieval mechanisms. Further details about these 
clusters can be found in Table 3. In order to assign a functional role to these subcortical 
clusters, we seeded the cluster obtained from Self Down, Lady Gaga up in an 
independent data set (see Methods) and performed a meta-analytic decoding of the 
connectivity map using Neurosynth (Yarkoni et al 2011). The functional connectivity 
group map of this subcortical cluster is displayed in the inflated brains at the bottom 
of Figure 3.4, along with a wordcloud containing the most associated cognitive terms. 
This analysis revealed terms such as “reward” and “anticipation”. 
Having documented a relationship between regions important for controlled 
processing and variation in self memory, our next analysis considers the same 
question from the opposite perspective. Using a subset (N=51) of the larger sample 
that had measures of inhibitory control, we examined how this variable was linked to 
functional variation in regions linked to the process of self-reference. In this case the 
midline cortical areas engaged during self-reference displayed a pattern of increased 
temporal correlation to the right insula and right orbitofrontal cortex predictive of 
inhibitory control efficiency. In particular, stronger functional connectivity between 
the self-reference seed region and this cluster was predictive of better efficiency 
scores during the inhibition task. This relationship can be seen in the scatterplot in 
Figure 3.5, where the x-axis represents the functional connectivity between the seed 
region and the right insula/orbitofrontal cortex and the y-axis represents the 
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efficiency during inhibition (smaller values represent better performance). The brain 
slices in Figure 3.5 display the location of the cluster. See Table 4 for further details. 
This cluster was subsequently used as a seed region to obtain its functional 
connectivity group map, displayed in the inflated brains located at the bottom left of 
Figure 3.5. Cognitive decoding of this functional connectivity group map using 
Neurosynth revealed behavioural terms linked to inhibitory control such as “response 
inhibition” and “stop signal” as well as terms linked to language (word cloud in Figure 
3.5).  
After having found patterns of functional connectivity related to both of our 
behavioural measures we conducted a formal conjunction analysis between the 
functional connectivity group maps obtained from seeding each cluster to examine 
potential underlying intrinsic architecture common to both effects. This conjunction 
analysis revealed that the functional connectivity group map of the 
insula/orbitofrontal cortex cluster and the functional connectivity group map of the 
subcortical cluster overlapped in regions that included cortical, striatal and thalamic 
regions. These regions are displayed in the inflated brains in Figure 3.6 while the word 
cloud describes the results of a meta analytic decoding of this network using 
Neurosynth. The pie charts in Figure 3.6 display the overlap between the cluster and 
each cortical and striatal network as defined by Yeo et al (2011), as well as the overlap 
of the cluster with the thalamic nuclei found in FSL’s Oxford Thalamic Connectivity 
Probability Atlas. The thalamic nucleus most involved in the conjunction map found 
was the nucleus that projects into the prefrontal cortex. This nucleus is the 
dorsomedial thalamic nucleus previously associated with the salience network (Seeley 
et al., 2007). The striatal network that overlapped most with the conjunction map was 
the executive network whereas the cortical network that overlapped most with the 
conjunction map was the salience network. These results clearly suggest that the 
relationship between the self-reference effect and inhibitory control is driven by 




Figure 3.6: Conjunction analysis of the functional connectivity group maps obtained by 
seeding the subcortical and right insula clusters. The inflated brains display the conjunction 
map and the word cloud displays the results from a meta-analytic cognitive decoding of the 
conjunction map. The pie chart on the top right displays the proportion of the conjunction 
map that falls into cortical, striatal, thalamic or other (white matter) areas. The top left pie 
chart displays which thalamic nuclei (using FSL’s Oxford Thalamic Connectivity Probability 
Atlas) the conjunction map overlapped with. The bottom left pie chart displays the proportion 
of the cortical section of the conjunction map that overlaps with each of the cortical networks 
defined by Yeo et al (2011). Similarly, the bottom left pie chart displays the proportion of the 
striatal section of the conjunction map that overlaps with each of the striatal networks defined 







Regions with functional connectivity to inhibitory control FPCN mask predictive of memory scores. 
Contrast Cluster location Regions Peak Size p-value 
Self Up Bilateral striatum Left Prefrontal  Thalamus -8, -24, 8 1852 2.8E-06 
  Right Prefrontal Thalamus    
  Left Putamen    
  Right Putamen    
  Left Caudate    
  Right Caudate    
  Left Accumbens 
 
   
Self Up, LG 
Down 
Left striatum Left Thalamus -8, -24, 8 797 0.0024 
  Left Putamen    
  Left Accumbens 
 
   
Note: Coordinates are based on the Montreal Neurological Institute coordinate system.  Regions 
are based on the Harvard-Oxford Subcortical Structural Atlas and on the Oxford Thalamic 





Regions with functional connectivity to self-referential DMN mask predictive of inhibitory control 
Contrast Cluster location Regions Peak Size p-value 
 Good inhibitory control Right OFC Frontal operculum cortex 40, 24, -4 430 0.02 
  Inferior frontal gyrus    
          pars triangularis    
          pars opercularis    
  Frontal orbital cortex    
  Insular cortex    
Note: Coordinates are based on the Montreal Neurological Institute coordinate system. Regions are 




 3.5 Discussion 
The current study found that as efficiency scores at inhibitory control got 
better the magnitude of the self-reference effect decreased. In particular, better 
inhibitory control scores were related to reduced memory for self-related material 
when this was accompanied by good memory scores on the non-self control condition, 
in comparison to inhibitory control when memory scores were high in both self and 
non-self conditions. This finding allows us to rule out the possibility that the reduced 
self-reference effect linked to inhibitory control was being driven by higher Lady Gaga 
scores, as this effect was still found within individuals with equally high memory for 
Lady Gaga. Following the assumption that a higher self-reference effect is indicative 
of an increased tendency for self-focussed attention, confirmed by the relationship 
found between the magnitude of the self-reference effect and inhibitory control 
efficiency, these results support our postulated theory that a salient self can act as a 
powerful distractor.  
Exploration of the neural resting-state correlates of this inhibitory control-self-
reference relationship revealed that the functional connectivity of the FPCN regions 
identified during No-Go trials predicted the magnitude of the self-reference effect. In 
particular individuals with a reduced self-reference effect, i,e those with the best 
inhibitory control, had stronger functional connectivity between inhibitory control 
regions and a subcortical cluster located in the ventral regions of the left caudate and 
putamen, as well as in the dorsomedial nucleus of the thalamus that projects to the 
prefrontal cortex (Groenewegen 1988; Ray & Price 1993). Meta-analytic decoding of 
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the functional connectivity of this subcortical cluster using Neurosynth related this 
cluster to terms such as “reward” and “anticipation”. Extensive research has found the 
ventral striatum to be involved not only in reward processing but also in assigning self-
specificity to stimuli (for a review see Northoff & Hayes, 2011), aiding our 
interpretation of why the functional connectivity of this subcortical cluster was 
predictive of the magnitude of the self-reference effect. In particular, stronger 
functional connectivity between the striatum and the FPCN was related to a reduced 
self-reference effect. Shedding light on why a stronger, and not a weaker, functional 
connectivity between reward and control systems lead to a reduced self-reference 
effect, Dong, Lin, Hu, Xie and Du (2015) have shown that the functional connectivity 
between the nucleus accumbens and the executive control network is inversely 
related to the functional connectivity between the accumbens and the reward system 
and that this relationship is disturbed in compulsive internet gamers. This lead the 
authors to conclude that these two systems (i.e., control and reward) act in a “pull and 
push fashion”, in such a way that the inhibition of motivational desires coded in the 
reward system is executed through strong control signals originated in the FPCN.  On 
the other hand, heightened motivational signals will instead lead to a failure of 
executive control over immediate rewards. Our current study found an enhanced 
functional connectivity between FPCN and the left accumbens linked to a reduced self-
reference effect. Hence, based on Dong’s research (2015) it is possible that this 
pattern of functional connectivity between FPCN and ventral striatum reflects an 
enhanced control over automated behaviour linked to mind-wandering about self-
relevant material. In support of this, neuropsychological research has found that 
patients with damage to regions in the FPCN show a hyper self-bias (Sui, Enock, Ralph 
& Humphreys, 2015), suggesting an inability of these patients to suppress salient self-
related material.  Hence, the enhanced functional connectivity between FPCN and 
reward systems, closely related to self-related processing (de Greck et al., 2008; Enzi, 
De Greck, Proesch, Tempelmann & Northoff, 2009; Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, 
Samanez-Larkin & Knutson, 2009), might be reflecting one’s ability to suppress 
meaningful internal representations when the context requires it. In turn, it is 
plausible that this heightened suppression over self-related processing is manifested 
as the reduced self-reference effect linked to this pattern of functional connectivity.  
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In support of this suppressive role of the striatum, extensive research has 
shown that the striatum is a main component of the circuits involved in suppression 
and initiation of movement. For example, activity in striatum has been previously 
related to successful suppression of responses during stop-signal response paradigms 
(Aron & Poldrack 2006). Despite these structures have predominantly been studied in 
relation to initiation and suppression of movement, recent research has revealed 
these regions to also be recruited when thoughts need to be suppressed. In particular, 
a meta-analysis performed by Guo, Schmitz, Mur, Ferreira and Anderson (2018) found 
similar activations in the basal ganglia during a think/no think paradigm and a stop 
signal response task, suggesting a domain-general role of the basal ganglia for action 
and memory cancellation. Assuming the reduced self-reference effect linked to the 
FPCN-striatum pattern of functional connectivity emerges from a stronger tendency 
to suppress DMN-related material, our results suggest that this pattern of functional 
connectivity might be allowing the suppression of intrusive self-focussed attention, 
manifested as a reduced self-reference effect in the current study. 
Our other resting-state analysis using as seed region DMN regions identified 
during self-referential processing, revealed a pattern of functional connectivity 
predictive of GNG efficiency. In particular, stronger functional connectivity to a cluster 
in the right orbitofrontal cortex extending into the right insula predicted better 
inhibitory control. The functional connectivity of this cluster was related to terms like 
“response inhibition” and “stop signal”.  Extensive research has found the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortex, and in particular the pars opercularis to be related to inhibitory 
control. For example, Chambers and colleagues (2006) disrupted inhibitory control by 
applying transcranial magnetic stimulation to this area. In addition, performance at 
stop-signal paradigms is also disrupted by lesions to this region (Aron, Fletcher, 
Bullmore, Sahakian & Robbins, 2003).  In addition, a meta-analysis of OCD patients 
(Rotge et al., 2010), characterised by an inability to suppress self-referential thinking, 
uncovered a cluster located in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex that closely overlaps 
with the right orbitofrontal cluster found in the current study. Hence, it is possible that 
stronger functional connectivity between right orbitofrontal cortex and areas involved 
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in self-reference is linked to better inhibitory control through allowing suppression of 
self-referential cognition.  
In order to explore functional commonalties between the two clusters found 
in the current study (i.e., the subcortical cluster related to reward and the 
orbitofrontal cluster related to inhibitory control) a conjunction analysis of the group 
maps obtained for each cluster was performed. This conjunction analysis revealed a 
map that overlapped mostly with the salience network as defined by Yeo et al (2011). 
There was also a strong overlap with regions of the DMN, and on a lesser extent, with 
the limbic and FPCN networks. Using a subcortical parcellation of resting-state 
networks within the basal ganglia (Choi, Yeo & Buckner, 2012) we found that our 
conjunction map overlapped most strongly with regions of the basal ganglia 
functionally connected primarily to the FPCN but also to the DMN and the salience 
network. Taking into consideration the conjunction analysis our results point towards 
patterns of functional connectivity that connect the executive, salience and default 
mode networks through the striatum, in a manner that controls the balance between 
self-reference and inhibitory control.  
In addition to being related to self-specificity (Northoff & Hayes, 2011), the 
reward processing centres anchored in the striatum are part of the salience network 
(Seeley et al., 2007). These three concepts, (i.e., self-specificity, reward and salience) 
are closely associated:  stimuli that are relevant to the self (self-specificity) are those 
to which the self has assigned value to (reward) and hence will have a strong tendency 
to attract attentional resources (salience) anchored in the FPCN.  Several studies have 
suggested that the salience network, and in particular the insular cortex, plays an 
important role in coordinating the DMN and the FPCN networks. Sridharan, Levitin 
and Menon (2008) have shown that the right fronto-insular cortex, in close proximity 
with the cluster found in the current study and a main hub of the salience network, 
plays a casual role in activating the FPCN and deactivating the DMN during tasks that 
required external attention. Our analyses revealed that stronger functional 
connectivity between the right orbitofrontal cortex, strongly coupled to the salience 
network, and the DMN resulted in better inhibitory control, suggesting this DMN-
orbitofrontal cortex pattern of functional connectivity, through its coupling to the 
117 
 
salience network, might play a pivotal role in suppressing internally generated 
representations. In addition, Seeley and colleagues (2007) argue that, based on 
subjective salience, the salience network signals to the FPCN what information to 
operate on. It is therefore possible that instances of poor performance during 
sustained attentional tasks are due to internal representations processed in the DMN 
being signalled as more salient than external stimuli, attracting attentional resources 
away from the task. If this was the case, increasing the salience of task-stimuli through 
incentivising should improve task performance, as has repeatedly been observed in 
the literature (Jenkins, 1998; Leon & Shadlen, 1999).   
It is therefore possible that the psychological underpinning of failure at 
sustained attention, manifested as poor inhibitory control, relates to an excessive 
salience of self-related material that fixates attentional resources away from the task-
related material. If this self-related material acts as a powerful distractor, then 
individuals with a higher self-bias should have worse performance at inhibitory control 
tasks as we have observed in the current study. The current study cannot however 
rule out the opposite possibility, i.e., that the reduced inhibitory control linked to the 
self-reference effect does not originate from an excessive salient self but that instead 
the increased self-reference effect is the result of impaired inhibitory control. 
Whether a heightened self leads to worse inhibitory control or whether worse 
inhibitory control leads to a heightened self will have to be specifically addressed in 
future studies.  Both options are not mutually exclusive, however, based on the known 
distracting effect of emotions (Dolcos & McCarthy 2006; Mueller, 2011) and on the 
inherent salience of self-relevant material due to its high assigned value, it is tempting 
to speculate that the former option is more self-explanatory. In contrast, the latter 
option, i.e., bad inhibitory control leads to increased self-reference effect, would still 
leave unanswered why the inhibitory control is impaired in the first place. This effect 
was found in patients with damage to the FPCN however, considering the subjects 
used in the current study were healthy individuals, this option seems unlikely.  
Despite an inflexible tendency to direct attention towards the self is 
characteristic of many psychopathological conditions such as depression and anxiety 
(for a review see Ingram, 1990), which have extensively been related to impaired 
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executive function (Ansari & Derakshan, 2011; Kaiser et al., 2003), to our knowledge 
this is the first study that directly relates both of these measures, revealing a 
relationship within healthy subjects. The behavioural correlation found between the 
magnitude of the self-reference effect and inhibitory control, in combination with the 
cross-sectional design used in the resting-state analyses suggests that the magnitude 
of the SRE can be used as an objective measure of self-focussed attention and that 
self-related material can act as a powerful distractor.  In turn, the ability to suppress 
such material appears to be related to patterns of functional connectivity that couple 
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 Chapter 4: That’s me in the Spotlight: Neural 
Basis of Individual Differences in Self-
Consciousness 
This chapter has been adapted from: de Caso, I., Poerio, G., Jefferies, E., & Smallwood, J. 
(2017). That’s me in the spotlight: neural basis of individual differences in self-
consciousness. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, 12(9), 1384-1393. 
 4.1 Abstract 
A long-standing literature implicates activity within the DMN to processes linked to 
the self. However, contemporary work suggests that other large-scale networks 
networks might also be involved. For instance, goal-directed autobiographical 
planning requires positive functional connectivity between DMN and FPCN networks. 
The present study examined the inter-relationship between trait self-focus (measured 
via a self-consciousness scale; SCS), incidental memory in a self-reference paradigm, 
and resting-state functional connectivity (FC) of large-scale networks. Behaviourally, 
we found that private SCS was linked to stronger incidental memory for self-relevant 
information. We also examined how patterns of FC differed according to levels of self-
consciousness by using the SCS data to drive multiple regression analyses with seeds 
from the DMN, the FPCN and the limbic network. High levels of SCS was not linked to 
differences in the FC of the DMN, however, it was linked to stronger coupling between 
FPCN and a cluster extending into the hippocampus, which meta analytic decoding 
using Neurosynth linked to episodic memory retrieval. Subsequent analysis 
demonstrated that trait variance in this pattern of FC was a moderator for the 
observed relationship between private SCS and enhanced memory for self-items. 
Together these findings suggest that interactions between the FPCN and hippocampus 
may support the memory advantage of self-relevant information associated with SCS 
and confirm theoretical positions that argue that that self-related processing does not 
simply depend upon the DMN, but instead relies on complex patterns of interactions 





Human cognition is characterised by the capacity for self-consciousness – the 
process through which we can become the subject of our own conscious experience. 
The degree to which individuals engage in self-consciousness appears early in 
development (Berthental & Fischer, 1978; Lewis & Brooks, 1978; Lipka & Brinthaupt, 
1992), and it can have both positive and negative outcomes in daily life. For example, 
the ability to reflect on our own thoughts and actions is crucial for the development 
of personal identity (Turner, 1978); however, when taken to extremes, the same 
process can result in excessive shyness or anxiety (Crozier, 2002). A well established 
measure of self-consciousness (Carver & Glass, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Scheier 
& Carver, 2013) divides the construct into three related, yet independent, dimensions: 
1) private self-consciousness, which describes the extent to which people introspect 
and examine hidden aspects of the self (e.g., their beliefs or values), 2) public self-
consciousness, which describes the extent to which people examine how public 
aspects of the self may be perceived by others (e.g., what impression others might 
form), and 3) social anxiety, which describes the extent to which people react to 
perceptions of their public self and evaluations from others. 
When people engage in self-conscious thought, schema containing self-
relevant information are activated (Nasby, 1985) and this information possesses 
special mnemonic qualities. For example, people have a robust tendency to remember 
information more effectively when it is processed with respect to the self, a bias 
resulting in better memory recall for self-related information (termed “The self-
reference effect”; Rogers et al, 1977). One possibility is that the self-reference effect 
is simply an indirect consequence of familiarity: self-relevant information is likely to 
be highly familiar and familiarity is known to facilitate encoding (Prentice, 1990). 
However, research has ruled out familiarity as the mechanism underlying the self-
reference effect because a self-referent bias has also been observed for neutral 
shapes (Humphreys & Sui, 2015) and everyday items (Cunningham et al., 2011). 
Instead, self-reference is thought to improve memory because of the rich network of 
associations associated with ourselves which in turn allows for the formation of 
stronger memory traces (Symons & Johnson, 1997). As well as its effect on memory, 
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self-relevant information has strong salient properties which impact on attention (Sui 
et al, 2015), with studies showing that one’s name (Harris & Pashler, 2004) or face 
(Bredart et al, 2006) can act like an efficient distractor. Moreover, other studies have 
shown that self-relevant information has similar properties to salient perceptual 
stimuli, automatically triggering the reallocation of attentional resources (Sui et al, 
2015). These experimental paradigms share similarities with more naturalistic mental 
processes such as mind-wandering, where salient self-relevant information becomes 
the focus of conscious attention when we are otherwise engaged in external tasks 
(Smallwood et al., 2011). Although mind-wandering can often be associated with task 
errors (McVay & Kane, 2009; Weissman et al., 2006), the reallocation of attention 
towards the self during a task may serve a broader function because it can facilitate 
the processing of personally meaningful goals that extend beyond the here-and-now 
(Medea et al., 2016; for a review see Poerio & Smallwood, 2016). 
Recent neuro-imaging work has examined the neural basis of the process of 
self-reflection, a process important for self-consciousness (Grant et al., 2002). Task-
based studies of self-reference often observe activity in the mPFC, as well as regions 
in the posterior cingulate cortex (Kelley et al., 2002, Macrae et al., 2004; Northoff et 
al., 2006), regions that collectively form what is known as the default mode network 
(DMN). This large-scale network tends to show a pattern of deactivation during 
demanding external tasks (Raichle et al, 2001) and shows coherent activity during the 
resting-state (Greicius et al., 2003).  In addition, the DMN has also been linked to states 
of self-generated thought, such as mind-wandering (for recent meta-analyses see Fox 
et al., 2015; Stawarczyk & D'Argembeau, 2015). Recent work, however, suggests that 
the DMN often works in tandem with the other networks when internal 
representation must be manipulated in a goal directed fashion. For example, regions 
of lateral frontal and parietal cortex (that together form the FPCN), become coupled 
with the DMN when autobiographical information is organised to form a plan (Spreng 
et al., 2010) and when identifying perceptual aspects of semantic processing (Krieger-
Redwood et al., 2016). Moreover, extensive research has related regions in the FPCN 
to sustained attention and working memory (Coull et al., 1996, Koechlin et al., 1999; 
Rottschy et al., 2012), processes that allow conscious manipulation of information. 
These findings, along with those from Spreng and colleagues (2010), suggest that 
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processing of self-related information present during self-consciousness may recruit 
the executive system anchored in the FPCN. It is a possibility that differences across 
individuals in their attentional preferences, i.e., how often one engages in self-
conscious thought versus other types of information, is reflected in the functional 
connectivity of the FPCN. 
Moreover, a study conducted by Eisenberger and colleagues (2005) found a 
relationship between activity in a cluster in the FPCN, namely in the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex, and self-consciousness during a vigilance task. Similarly, studies have 
shown that when participants hold social information in mind they use lateral regions 
of cortex linked to executive control processes (Meyer et al., 2012). In addition to the 
DMN and the FPCN, the limbic system may also play an important role in self-oriented 
cognition. Extensive research has shown that negative mood increases self-focussed 
attention (Sedikides, 1992) as well as mind-wandering (Poerio et al., 2013; Smallwood 
et al., 2009) and some studies have suggested that the effect of mood on information 
processing in turn predicts later behaviour (Gendolla, 2000). Moreover, neuroimaging 
research has shown a distinction within the mPFC between cognitive and affective 
components of self-oriented cognition (Moran et al., 2006) while the amygdala, a main 
hub of the limbic system, is important in a range of psychiatric conditions associated 
with disturbances in the self (Davidson 2002; Phan et al., 2006; Strakowski et al., 
1999). 
The current study aimed to determine the functional architecture that 
underpins different forms of self-consciousness (private, public and social anxiety) and 
to understand how this is related to the strength of a person’s memory for self-
relevant information. We recorded functional imaging data in a large cohort of 
participants during wakeful rest who later completed the three subscales of the Self-
Consciousness Scale (Scheier & Carver, 2013). Previous research has consistently 
found a positive relationship between private self-consciousness scores and the 
magnitude of the self-reference effect (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull et al., 1988; 
Nasby, 1985; Turner, 1980) and so in this experiment we also measured incidental 
memory for self-relevant information in our participants. We hypothesised that 
differences in response on the self-consciousness scale should be reflected in the 
connectivity patterns of three large-scale networks (Default Mode, Frontoparietal 
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Control and Limbic). To select these large-scale networks we used a parcellation 
obtained by Yeo and colleagues who applied clustering techniques to resting-state 
data of 1000 individuals (Yeo et al., 2011).  
We were interested in (a) replicating prior findings linking high levels of private 
self-consciousness to better memory for the self, (b) identifying patterns of functional 
connectivity of the DMN, FPCN and Limbic networks associated with different aspects 
of self-consciousness and (c) determining whether any neurocognitive patterns linked 





A hundred and forty one healthy right-handed participants were recruited to the 
study; in exchange for participation they received a monetary reward or course 
credits. The sample had an average age of 22.50 (SD = 2.93) years. Approval for this 
project was granted by the York Neuroimaging Centre (YNiC) Ethics Committee and 
was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards of the responsible committee 
on human experimentation (institutional and national) and with the Helsinki 
Declaration of 1975, as revised in 2008. 
 
4.3.2 Procedure 
4.3.2.1 Self- Consciousness Scale 
Participants completed a 22-item version of the self-consciousness scale inventory 
(Scheier & Carver, 2013) from which three subscales can be derived: private self-
consciousness, public self-consciousness and social anxiety. Private self-consciousness 
is a measure of the tendency that an individual has to introspect and study one’s inner 
self and motives and was assessed with nine statements such as “I’m always trying to 
figure myself out”. Public self- consciousness refers to the tendency of an individual 
to think about what others think about him/her, and was assessed through seven 
statements such as “I care a lot about how I present myself to others” Finally social 
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anxiety was measured with six statements such as “It takes me time to get over my 
shyness in new situations”. Participants had to answer to each statement using a scale 
from 0 (not at all like me) to 3 (a lot like me). Items from each subscale were summed 
to create an overall score per scale.  
 
4.3.2.2. Self-Reference Paradigm 
This paradigm asked individuals to process words in either 1) relation to themselves, 
2) relation to an unfamiliar other (Lady Gaga) or 3) relation to the number of syllables. 
This judging phase was followed by a surprise retrieval phase in which participants 
were presented with a word and had to decide whether that word had been presented 
during the judging phase or whether it was a new word. A source localisation question 
followed all the words judged as old and memory scores were calculated for each 
condition. For more details of how the task was ran see Chapter 3.  
 
4.3.3 Resting-state 
4.3.3.1 Scan Acquisition 
Functional MRI data was acquired on a 3 Tesla GE scanner. Participants observed a 
fixation cross for a scan that lasted 9 minutes. The scan had a repetition time of 2 
seconds, resulting in 210 volumes. We used interleaved slice-timing and isotropic 
voxel dimensions of 3 mm3 (matrix size of 64 X 64, 192mm field of view, and 32 slices) 
with a 0.5mm gap between slices. 
 
4.3.3.2. Pre-processing 
All fMRI preprocessing and analysis was performed using FSL. We extracted the brain 
from the skull using the BET toolbox for both the flair and the structural T1 weighted 
images and these scans were registered to standard MNI152 (2mm) space using FLIRT 
(Jenkinson & Smith, 2001). Prior to conducting the functional connectivity analysis, 
the following prestatistics processing was applied to the resting-state data; motion 
correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002); slice-timing correction using 
Fourier-space time-series phaseshifting; non-brain removal using BET (Smith 2002); 
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spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of FWHM 6mm; grand-mean intensity 
normalisation of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor; highpass 
temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted least-squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 
100 s; Gaussian lowpass temporal filtering, with sigma = 2.8s.). 
 
4.3.3.3. First Level Analysis 
Following these steps, the time series of 3 masks of interest were extracted. These 
masks corresponded to 1) the DMN, 2) the FPCN and 3) the limbic system as defined 
by the 7 network parcellation performed by Yeo and colleagues (Yeo et al., 2011) and 
can be visualised in Figure 4.2. The approach of selecting large-scale network masks 
was based on previous studies using dual-regression, in which networks obtained 
through ICA group analyses are used as regions of interest in subsequent seed based 
analyses (Zuo et al., 2010; Rytty et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2014). Instead of using ICA 
group masks as regions of interest the current study used a reliable parcellation based 
on 1000 subjects (Yeo et al., 2011). 
The parcellations in non-linear MNI152 volume space were downloaded from 
https://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/fswiki/CorticalParcellation_Yeo2011 and 
resampled from 1mm3 to 2mm3. The time series for each voxel within each mask 
were averaged and used as an explanatory variable in a subject-level functional 
connectivity analysis, which also included the following nuisance regressors: the first 
five principal time-series components extracted from white matter (WM) and 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) masks in accordance with the CompCor method (Behzadi et 
al. 2007) and six motion parameters. WM and CSF masks were generated by 
segmenting each individual’s high-resolution structural image (using FAST in FSL). The 
default tissue probability maps, referred to as Prior Probability Maps (PPM), were 
registered to each individual’s high-resolution structural image (T1 space) and the 
overlap between these PPM and the corresponding CSF and WM maps was identified. 
Finally, these maps were thresholded (40% for the SCF and 66% for the WM), binarised 
and combined. The six motion parameters were calculated in the motion-correction 
step during pre-processing. Linear displacements in each of the three Cartesian 
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directions (x, y, z) and rotations around three axes (pitch, yaw, roll) were included for 
each individual. No global signal regression was performed (Murphy et al., 2009). 
 
4.3.3.4. Second Level Analysis. 
To understand whether our psychological measures of self-consciousness varied with 
either the between or within connectivity of the DMN, limbic and the FPCN, we used 
FSL to conduct a group-level regression of the connectivity matrices of each mask. In 
this analysis we included the residualised mean centred scores for the three self-
consciousness subscales as regressors of interest. In order to control for spurious 
correlations related to subject motion we included framewise displacement as a 
regressor of no interest, after controlling for four outliers by imputing their data to 2 
standard deviations (Power et al., 2012). See Sormaz et al., (2017) for a prior 
demonstration of this approach. This technique allows us to examine regions within 
or outside the network mask whose connectivity varies with particular traits (in this 
case different aspects of self-consciousness). In these analyses the data were 
processed using FEAT version 5.98 part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, 
www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) and the analyses were carried out using FMRIB's Local 
Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME). A grey matter mask with a probability threshold of 
40% was used as a pre-thresholding mask and the cluster-forming threshold was set 
as z-score of 2.3. For these analyses we controlled for Type I errors by controlling for 
the number of voxels in the brain (Worsley 2001), as well as the number of masks and 
the two tailed nature of our comparisons yielding an alpha value of p<.008 FWE. 
 
4.3.4 Neurosynth Meta-Analyses 
In order to interpret neuro-cognitive patterns of functional connectivity predictive of 
self-consciousness, we performed a meta-analysis using the online Neurosynth 
database (Yarkoni et al., 2011). We performed a meta-analytic decoding of the 
unthresholded maps produced in this study by uploading them onto Neurosynth. This 
allows the identification of psychological terms that are most likely to be associated 
with the specific spatial pattern that our analysis highlighted providing a quantitative 
interpretation of our data (for a prior illustration of this technique see de Sormaz et 
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al., 2017). For the purposes of interpretation we selected the 15 terms most related 
to the current spatial maps and displayed them in the form of word clouds in which a 




4.4.1.1. Self-consciousness scale 
The three subscales (private, public and social anxiety) for the self-consciousness 
questionnaire were calculated for each individual. The public subscale was correlated 
with both the private (r = .40, p < .001) and the social anxiety scale (r = 0.35, p < .001). 
No significant correlations were found between the private and the social anxiety 
subscales (r = .11, p=.235). In order to control for these correlations, the standardised 
residual scores were used in further analyses. 
 
4.4.1.2. Self-Reference Paradigm  
The first aim of our study was to establish whether in our sample we found a reliable 
self-relevant memory advantage. A repeated measures one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) using the proportion of hits for each referent as the within-participants 
factor indicated a significant effect of referent on incidental memory performance (F 
(2, 278) = 284, p < .001, ηp2  = .672) , as measured during the retrieval phase of the 
self-other reference paradigm. Post-hoc paired-samples t–tests were conducted to 
compare incidental memory across the three conditions (self, Lady Gaga, syllable 
count). Participants had significantly better memory in the self (M = 0.78, SD = 0.15) 
compared to the Lady Gaga (M = 0.62, SD = 0.19) condition; t(139) = 10.85, p < .001, d 
= .92; they also showed significantly better memory in the self condition compared to 
the syllable count(M = 0.4, SD = 0.18) condition; t(139)= 23.56, p < .001, d = 1.99. 
Participants also had significantly better memory in the Lady Gaga compared to the 
syllable condition; t(139) = 12.87, p < .001, d = 1.09 (Figure 4.1A). In addition, 
examination of the confidence intervals obtained from one-sample t-tests suggested 
memory for the syllable condition was at chance (95% CI [.37,.44], whereas memory 
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for Lady Gaga (95% CI [.60,.66]) and self (95% CI [.76,.81]) were both above chance 
performance. 
 
Figure 4.1: A) ANOVA results between memory scores for the 3 conditions. B) Scatterplot 
reflecting correlation between the standardised residual score for private self-consciousness 
and the magnitude of the self-reference effect (SRE). 
 
4.4.1.3. Private Self-Consciousness and Magnitude of the Self-
Reference Effect 
Next, we sought to identify whether in our sample individuals high in private self-
consciousness have a stronger memory when referring information to themselves 
rather than a familiar other (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull et al., 1988; Nasby, 
1985; Turner, 1980). In order to explore this possibility, we conducted a repeated 
measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). The within-subject factors included the 
main effects for the incidental memory for self and Lady Gaga items (corrected for 
guessing). The different types of self-consciousness scores were included as between 
participant covariates. This analysis revealed a significant interaction between the 
incidental memory for the two referents and the private self-consciousness scale (F 
(1,116) = 5.041, p<.05). Post hoc analyses demonstrated a significant positive 
correlation between the magnitude of the self-reference effect and private self-
consciousness (r = .19, p < .035) (Figure 4.1B). Based on previous research revealing 
that familiarity has a significant influence on memory, familiarity ratings for Lady Gaga 
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were obtained at the end of the experiment. A partial correlation controlling for the 
Lady Gaga familiarity ratings still showed a positive and significant correlation 
between the private self-consciousness scores and the magnitude of the self-
reference effect both controlling for false alarms (r = .18, p = .030) and without 
controlling for false alarms (r = .19, p = .035). Together these analyses allowed us to 
establish in our sample that private self-consciousness is linked to a stronger memory 





Next, we explored whether 
self-consciousness is reflected 
in the brain’s intrinsic 
connectivity by performing a 
seed based analyses on the 
DMN, FPCN and limbic 
networks defined by the 7 
network parcellation from 
Yeo and colleagues (Yeo et al., 
2011). We calculated the 
correlation between the time 
series for each of these 
networks and each voxel in the rest of the brain for each individual. The functional 
connectivity group maps obtained for each network can be visualised in Figure 4.3. 
Next, we used these spatial maps as the dependent variable in a series of multiple 
regressions using the standardised residuals of each component of the self-
consciousness scale as explanatory variables. Correction for multiple comparisons 
included a whole brain correction, correction for two-tailed tests and correction for 
the number of seeded locations (3), yielding an alpha value of p = .008 FWE. 
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Figure 4.3: Functional connectivity (FC) group maps. A) Default Mode network (DMN) B) 
Frontoparietal Control Network (FPCN). C) Limbic Network. Red and blue colours represent 
positive and negative functional connectivity, respectively.  
 
We found two patterns of functional connectivity that varied with different types of 
self-consciousness. The FPCN revealed a pattern of stronger functional connectivity 
between this network and a cluster with a peak in the temporal occipital fusiform 
cortex that extended into the hippocampus with greater levels of private self-
consciousness (Figure 4.4, top row). The unthresholded map for this contrast can be 
found at Neurovault at the following link: http://neurovault.org/images/39599/. 
Possibly due to the fusiform nature of the cluster, metaanalyitic decoding using 
Neurosynth revealed terms such as “objects”, however it also revealed terms such as 
“episodic”, “recognition” and “episodic memory” terms which are consistent with the 
hypothesised relationship between mnemonic processes and high levels of private 
self-consciousness. The limbic network revealed a pattern of functional connectivity 
to the occipital cortex predictive of social anxiety. In particular, stronger functional 
connectivity between these regions was predictive of higher social anxiety scores 
(Figure 4.4, bottom row). The unthresholded map for this contrast can be found at this 
link: http://neurovault.org/images/39600/ and meta-analytic decoding revealed this 
map to be related, among others, to the term “face”, which is in line with the social 
nature of this type of anxiety. Finally, analyses of the DMN did not reveal any patterns 
of functional connectivity predictive of either types of self-consciousness that passed 
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correction for multiple comparisons, although all unthresholded maps are available at 
the following URL:http://neurovault.org/images/43237/ and 
http://neurovault.org/collections/2284/. To understand these patterns of data in 
greater detail we extracted the connectivity with the relevant networks and the region 
identified through our analyses and plotted these as scatterplots in each figure. The 
details of these clusters can be found in Table 1.  
 
 Figure 4.4 Association between seed regions and clusters predictive of self-consciousness. Top 
row: results for the Frontoparietal Control Network. Bottom row: Results for the Limbic 
Network. A) Seed region. B) Cluster with functional connectivity (FC) predictive of self-
consciousness. C) Scatterplot reflecting relationship between FC and self-consciousness. D) 
Neurosynth’s meta-analytic decoding of cluster in B. 
 
4.4.3 Moderation Analysis 
Having identified that private self-consciousness is linked to better memory for 
information related to the self and that it is also associated with patterns of functional 
organisation at rest, we next explored whether the expression of better self memory 
can be related to these patterns of functional organisation. In these analyses we used 
the correlation coefficients between the FPCN and the cluster in the temporal occipital 
fusiform cortex as a moderator of the relationship between private self-consciousness 
and the task outcomes. Moderation analyses using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) revealed 
that the functional connectivity between the FPCN and the temporal occipital fusiform 
cluster moderated the relationship between private self-consciousness and the 
magnitude of the self-reference effect, ΔR2 = .037, F(1, 119) = 4.846.08, p < .05. This 
can be visualised in Figure 4.5 in which the data has been divided using a median split 
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of the functional connectivity coefficients. Here it is apparent that the positive 
relationship found between private self-consciousness and the magnitude of the self-
reference effect is present in individuals with a high functional connectivity between 
the FPCN and the temporal occipital fusiform cortex (r = .334, p = .011) and absent in 
individuals situated below the median (r = .03, p = .812) (Figure 4.5B). 
Figure 4.5: Moderation of the relationship between memory for self-items and private self-
consciousness by the functional connectivity of the Frontoparietal Control Network (FPCN). A) 
FPCN (yellow) and cluster with functional connectivity (FC) to the network predictive of private 
self-consciousness (green).  B) Median split of FC between FPCN and cluster. Top: Scatterplot 
reflecting the lack of relationship between memory for self-items and private self-
consciousness in the below median group. Bottom: Scatterplot reflecting the positive 




Regions that exhibit functional connectivity to seed dependent upon self-consciousness scores 
Seed Contrast Cluster Regions Peak  #voxels p-value 
FPCN Private Up Temporal post inferior temp 
temp occip fusiform 
parahippocampal 
hippocampus 
-48,-52,-28 1085 .006 
Limbic Social 
Anxiety Up 
Occipital inf lat occipital 
intracalcarine  
lingual gyrus 
-8,-90,10 1324 .001 
Note: Coordinates are based on the Montreal Neurological Institute coordinate system and 
regions are based on Harvard-Oxford Cortical Structural Atlas. 




 4.5. Discussion 
Our data suggest that the tendency towards private self-consciousness is 
characterised by a memory bias for self-relevant information that is rooted in the 
functional organisation of the brain at rest. We replicated prior studies showing that 
high levels of private self-consciousness are associated with a mnemonic advantage 
for self-relevant information (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull et al., 1988; Nasby, 
1985; Turner, 1980). Our functional connectivity analyses indicated that private self-
consciousness was also associated with strong connectivity between the FPCN and 
regions of lateral occipital cortex, fusiform cortex and hippocampus, a pattern that 
meta-analytic decoding suggests is often associated with functions including episodic 
memory. Critically, our moderation analysis demonstrated that these two effects are 
related: we found that the relationship between private self-consciousness and a 
heightened memory for the self was only present in participants who exhibited this 
episodic neural fingerprint at rest. Taken together, our results suggest that patterns 
of neural organisation associated with the effective retrieval of episodic details may 
be central to the ability to consciously reflect on who we are as indexed by private 
self-consciousness. 
They also support functional studies linking executive regions to process of 
self-consciousness (Eisenberger et al., 2005) and when working memory is focused on 
more personally relevant information (Meyer et al., 2012). Our study also raises the 
question of whether these patterns exhibited by individuals high on private self-
consciousness may also have a relationship to the thoughts experienced during the 
resting-state, a question that could be addressed using experience sampling after 
resting-state scans (for examples see Gorgolewski et al., 2014, Smallwood et al., 2016). 
Unlike private self-consciousness, we found that social anxiety was related to 
heightened connectivity between the limbic network and regions of visual cortex. It is 
not surprising that the functional connectivity of the limbic system predicted social 
anxiety scores, given the well documented links between these regions and emotion 
(Cardinal et al., 2002; Davidson 2002; Phan et al., 2006; Phelps & DeLoux, 2005; 
Strakowski et al., 1999). 
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Moreover, our analysis suggests that social anxiety is linked to heightened 
connectivity between the limbic system and regions of occipital cortex, a pattern that 
may explain the hyper vigilance to social cues that are often associated with this form 
of self-consciousness (Eysenck 1992; Mogg & Bradley 1998). Thus unlike private self-
consciousness, which was linked to heightened memory, our data is consistent with 
the view that social anxiety is linked to an attentional bias concerned with external 
attention, potentially to the reaction of other people to the public self (Bogels & 
Mansell, 2004; Mueller et al., 2009). It will be important in the future to determine 
whether the pattern of functional connectivity that we show supports social anxiety 
is a moderator for some of the attentional biases that this trait has been linked to in 
the past. 
Our analysis did not link the DMN to any of the types of self-consciousness 
measured in our study. Our analytic strategy highlights differences between types of 
self-consciousness, so it is possible that the absence of any observed associations with 
the DMN may be because this network plays a role common to all three types of self-
consciousness. Given evidence that the DMN is activated by states of self-focus 
(Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Northoff et al., 2006) perhaps the absence of an 
association with this system reflects the fact that it is generally important in all states 
of self-consciousness, rather than in the expression of specific types. On the other 
hand, our observation that private self-consciousness is described by the connectivity 
of the FPCN supports accounts of states of self-focus which have linked self-biases to 
the function of regions of the control networks such as the interparietal sulcus (Sui et 
al, 2015; Humphreys & Sui 2016). More broadly, our findings are consistent with 
theoretical positions that advocate a more complex component process architecture 
for states of higher-order cognition, such that different types of cognition emerge 
through the interaction of multiple different large scale networks (for examples see 
Ralph et al., 2016; Moscovitch et al., 2016; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). For 
example, an emerging literature has begun to show that the DMN is important in many 
situations beyond those linked to internal focus, such as working memory (Konishi et 
al., 2015; Vatansever et al., 2015), social memory (Meyer et al., 2012), or demanding 
semantic task performance (Krieger-Redwood et al., 2016), observations that are 
consistent with the notion that the DMN acts to integrate information from across the 
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cortex (Margulies et al., 2016). For example, research exploring autobiographical 
planning has shown co-activation in the FPCN and medial temporal lobe structures 
(e.g., the hippocampus) when we consider future goals (Gerlach et al., 2011), 
particularly those that are high on episodic detail (Spreng, et al., 2010). It is possible, 
for example, that trait levels of private self-consciousness may relate to particular 
aspects of mental life characterised by simulations of the future that contain high 
levels of detail, a perspective that is supported by studies that have shown priming 
self-relevant information increases an individual’s tendency to consider events in the 
future (Smallwood et al., 2011). This is an important question for future research to 
address. 
One limitation of our study is that we focused on a relatively coarse description 
of neural function that is characterized by a neural parcellation that divides the cortical 
landscape into seven large-scale networks. Recent accounts of the DMN suggest that 
it can be subdivided into different sub-networks (e.g., Yeo et al., 2011, Andrews-Hanna 
et al., 2010). One of these sub-divisions, known as the medial-temporal subsystem, 
encompasses regions of posterior parietal cortex, but critically aspects of the medial 
temporal lobe. It is therefore possible that a more fine-grained analysis of the 
relationship between DMN sub-networks at rest and different aspects of self-
consciousness would have revealed a role for one of these subsystems. Although our 
coarse analysis revealed patterns of neural activity that described two out of three 
forms of self-consciousness it remains an open question whether looking at the 
behaviour of subsystems of the DMN at rest, or during tasks, may reveal a role for 
aspects of this large scale network in trait differences in self-consciousness. Not 
withstanding this limitation, our current study suggests that trait variation in private 
self-consciousness is related to the functional connectivity of the FPCN, and in 
particular to its communication with regions involved in episodic memory retrieval. 
This pattern of functional connectivity moderates the association between private 
self-consciousness and a heightened memory for self-relevant information, identified 
by prior investigations. Together these findings suggest that a greater capacity for the 
retrieval of self-relevant information may explain important aspects of the processes 
through which we become the subject of our own conscious evaluations. 
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Chapter 5 - General Discussion 
 
5.1 Main Questions 
 
The current doctoral thesis was aimed at exploring patterns of functional 
connectivity in the intrinsic architecture of the brain related to individual differences 
in self-bias. The first and second used the memorial advantage for self-related material 
as a potential measure of the degree of one’s self-schema articulation, with the first 
study exploring how this measure related with functional connectivity of DMN regions 
classically involved in self-referential processing and the second one exploring how it 
related to regions of the FPCN. The selection of regions of the FPCN for the second 
study was based on a behavioural finding from the first study, that of a negative 
correlation between one’s mnemonic advantage for self-related material and 
inhibitory control efficiency. The second study did not only replicate this behavioural 
finding, but also provided insight into its neural underpinnings using a cross sectional 
design: functional connectivity of regions involved in inhibitory control was explored 
in relation to the magnitude of the self-reference effect, and on a similar fashion, 
inhibitory control efficiency was used to predict the FC of regions involved in self-
referential processing.  The third study took an alternative measure of self-focussed 
attention using the self-consciousness scale devised by Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss 
(1975) and explored the functional connectivity of both the DMN and the FPCN. 
  
5.2 Summary of findings 
The first question of the current work was whether the functional connectivity 
of regions involved in self-referential processing was predictive of the magnitude of 
the self-reference effect. The self-reference effect was assumed to capture the degree 
to which an individual has developed their self-schema, a process thought to involve 
self-focussed attention. The functional connectivity of regions in the mPFC, classically 
involved in self-referential processing was explored in relation to the magnitude of the 
self-reference effect and a common pattern emerged from the results: a stronger self-
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reference effect was related to stronger functional connectivity within the DMN. The 
DMN is assumed to be involved in internal representations and as such is tightly linked 
to memory.  Different subsystems exist within the DMN, one being involved in 
episodic aspects of memory, another one in semantic ones (Andrews-Hanna, 
Smallwood & Spreng, 2014). Our results mainly revealed that a stronger interaction 
between these two systems was related to a stronger self-reference effect, a pattern 
that has previously been related to increased mind wandering (Poerio et al., 2017).  
Another important question we set to answer was whether there was a 
relationship between the magnitude of the self-reference effect and inhibitory 
control. The rationale for this was based on the salient properties of self-relevant 
material. Salient stimuli act as powerful distractors (Theeuwes, 2010), and hence we 
hypothesised that individuals with stronger self-reference effect would be less 
efficient at tasks that require sustained attention on the external world such as 
inhibitory control tasks, a finding that would suggest that the magnitude of the self-
reference can be indicative of one’s tendency to engage in self-focussed attention. 
This hypothesis was confirmed and replicated in study one and study two. 
Importantly, we explored the relationship between the functional connectivity of the 
FPCN and two measures of self-bias: the self-reference effect (study 2) and scores in 
the self-consciousness scale (study 3). We found that both of these measures 
predicted the functional connectivity of the FPCN. While the self-reference effect was 
predicted by the functional connectivity of this large-scale network to the basal 
ganglia (BG)  and, in particular, the nucleus accumbens, private self-consciousness was 
predicted by stronger functional connectivity between the FPCN and a cluster in the 
fusiform gyrus that extended into the hippocampus. Similarly, the first study found 
that regions of the FPCN were more connected to regions of the DMN in individuals 
with smaller self-references effects caused through enhanced memory in the familiar 
other condition. 
As we will discuss in the coming sections a pattern emerges in which stronger 
coupling between areas involved in executive control and self-representation results 
in a reduced self-reference effect, whereas enhanced functional connectivity between 
memory related areas involved in self-representation results in heightened mnemonic 
advantage for self-items. In particular, a reduced self-reference effect was related to 
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increased coupling between the FPCN and the nucleus accumbens, a central region of 
the reward system highly related to value-signalling and hence, self-relevance (Study 
2). Reduced magnitude of the self-reference effect, caused by increased memory for 
the unfamiliar-other condition, was also related to stronger coupling between regions 
of the FPCN and the vmPFC (Study 1). When instead the vmPFC coupled to regions in 
the DMN individuals presented a stronger self-bias caused by both an increased 
memory for self-items and a decreased memory for items in the unfamiliar-other 
condition. A summary of the patterns of functional connectivity related to self-
focussed attention can be found in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1: Summary figure reflecting patterns of functional connectivity related to self-
focussed attention. The blue lines represent reduced coupling, the orange lines represent 
increased coupling, the dotted lines represent connections defined previously in the literature 
(Meredith & Totterdell 1999). The yellow boxes represent regions in the Default Mode 
Network. The boxes situated between the lines represent the behavioural outcome that was 
associated with the pattern of functional connectivity depicted by the particular line. ATL: 







5.3 The Relationship between the DMN and the SRE 
 
Self-focussed attention emerges as an interplay between a semantic 
representation of self and episodic memory that allows an individual to, for example, 
revise one’s behaviours. In other words, engagement in this processes requires a point 
of reference in which one’s values or personality are activated and used to make 
decisions or judgements.  Material related to the self has repeatedly been shown to 
be encoded better than other types of material (see meta-analysis by Symons and 
Johnson 1997). This is in part due to the vast network of associations related to the 
self which, by creating extensive memory traces, aids retrieval. This is further 
enhanced thanks to the activation of the self-schema during encoding. Following 
previous research suggesting memory performance is related to elaboration 
processes and to schema-activation we assumed that a stronger memorial advantage 
for self-related material would be indicative of the degree to which someone has 
developed their self-schema, in turn potentially reflecting an individual’s tendency to 
engage in self-focussed attention.  
Having obtained a potentially objective measure of self-focussed attention, we 
explored whether this measure was predictive of the intrinsic architecture of regions 
in the brain involved in self-referential processing. Self-referential processing has been 
related to activations in the DMN (see meta-analysis by Northoff et al., 2006), with 
particular consistency in the most anterior aspect of this network, i.e., the mPFC. This 
result was replicated in the second study in the current doctoral thesis in which a 
localiser task comparing activation during self-reference versus activation during 
other reference revealed the mPFC. Previous research has revealed this area to be 
particularly involved in the enhanced memorial properties of self-relevant material, 
with stronger activations during processing of self-referenced items resulting in 
enhanced subsequent retrieval of such items (Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae, Moran, 
Heatherton, Banfield & Kelley, 2004). Other areas such as the parahippocampal 
cortices and the left anterior prefrontal cortex were also involved in heightened 
encoding of self-relevant material, however these areas seem to have a more domain 
general and verbal role in encoding, respectively (e.g., Aguirre, Detre, Alsop & 
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D’Esposito, 1996; Fernandez et al., 1998; Li, Lu, Li & Zhong, 2010; Rombouts et al., 
1997; Stern et al., 1996;  Wagner et al., 1998) suggesting only the mPFC to be specific 
to the self-reference effect. Based on these findings, the first study explored how the 
functional connectivity of several regions of the mPFC related to the magnitude of the 
self-reference effect. 
The first study revealed that stronger self-reference effect was related to 
heightened coupling between the mPFC to other regions of the DMN, a network 
classically involved in processing of internal representations (Spreng, Mar & Kim, 
2009) which deactivates during processing of external stimuli (Raichle et al., 2001). 
This network is however not homogeneous, with clustering analyses revealing three 
different subsystems (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014).  The first empirical chapter found 
that a higher memory for self-related items was associated with stronger coupling 
between two of these systems. As revealed in an analysis that fractionalised the DMN 
into subsystems (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014), different portions of the mPFC belong 
to different subsystems: the ventral mPFC is part of the medial temporal subsystem 
which also includes areas in the medial temporal lobes; the anterior mPFC is part of 
the core subsystem which includes the PCC; and the dmPFC, in combination with the 
angular gyrus and the lateral and frontal temporal lobes, form the dorsomedial 
prefrontal subsystem. Whereas nodes in the medial temporal and the dorsomedial 
subsystems present strong correlations with the core subsystem, the correlations 
between them is much lower, suggesting a segregation of functions (Andrews-Hanna 
et al., 2014). In particular, the dmPFC is involved in semantic processes (e.g., Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2014; Mummery et al., 2000; Visser, Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2010; 
Visser, Jefferies, Embleton & Lambon Ralph, 2012)  and the medialtemporal one on 
episodic processes (e.g., Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014; Nyberg, McIntosh, Houle, 
Nilsson & Tulving, 1996; Race, Keane & Verfaellie, 2011; Schacter & Wagner, 1999 ). 
For example, when subjects are asked to think about the self in an episodic way, such 
as when they are asked to think about where they will be tomorrow, activation on the 
medial temporal subsystem increases. Note that activation in regions of this 
subsystem such as the hippocampal formation and the parahippocampal cortex are 
also heavily involved in encoding and retrieval (e.g., Epstein, Harris, Stanley & 
Kanwisher, 1999; Epstein, DeYoe, Press, Rosen & Kanwisher, 2011; Hayes, Nadel & 
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Ryan, 2007), processes that interact with schemas held in semantic memory, 
accounting for why the vmPFC, highly involved in schema activation, belongs to 
episodic subsystem principally anchored in the medialtemporal lobes. Instead, when 
subjects are asked about a certain aspect of themselves, a process that relies more on 
semantic than episodic material, increased activation is found in the dorsomedial 
prefrontal subsystem (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014). Additionally, areas in this 
subsystem, like the angular gyrus, are also involved in social cognition such as theory 
of mind or mentalizing (e.g., Calarge, Andreasen & O’Leary, 2003; Schurz, Radua, 
Aichhorn, Richlan & Perner , 2014; Seghier, 2013). Evidently, both subsystems strongly 
interact. For example, during introspection the semantic self has to be activated and 
revised when judging one’s actions in a specific episode. 
In relation to this, Study 1 found that a stronger coupling between the two 
subsystems, in particular between the ventral mPFC (episodic subsystem) and the 
angular and middle temporal gyri (semantic subsystem) was related to enhanced 
memory for self-related items. Note that, based on this subdivision of the DMN, the 
vmPFC is considered an important node of the episodic medialtemporal lobe 
subsystem. However, the vmPFC also has a well-established role during tasks that 
require engagement of schemas, thought to rely on semantic memory (Ghosh & 
Gilboa, 2014). Given the vmPFC’s role both during self-referential processing, schema-
based encoding and episodic memory, it is tempting to suggest that this area is 
involved in the semantic representation of the self and in particular in how this 
representation interacts with episodic memory.  Importantly, the results suggest that 
an increased interaction between the episodic and the semantic subsystems is related 
to the enhanced encoding of self-related material. The increased interaction between 
both systems might be suggesting a heightened recruitment of the semantic self 
during the episodic reconstructions.  It is possible that this heightened activation of 
the semantic self, and in particular through its interaction with the episodic 
information, would in turn lead to the increased self-bias related to this pattern of 
functional connectivity. Importantly, increased integration between both subsystems 
has previously been linked to mind wandering (Poerio et al., 2017), a process which 
highly overlaps with self-referential processing, as can be seen from previous 
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literature (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman & Raichle, 2011; Spreng et al., 2009) as well as 
the results from the self > other contrast obtained in the localiser scan in Study 2.  
The discussion so far has argued that an increased memory for self items 
seems to be related to a stronger integration within DMN subsystems. Overall this 
higher integration between subsystems of the DMN results in a stronger within DMN 
synchrony. This result was similarly mirrored when exploring the memory for the non-
self condition. In this case, stronger coupling between the vmPFC and the 
paracingulate cortex, embedded within the DMN, was observed in individuals with a 
reduced memory for the control condition measuring memory for best friend items. 
Note that the individuals with the highest self-reference effect will not only present 
the strongest memory for self items but also the weakest memory for the control 
condition, hence once again, stronger functional connectivity across DMN regions 
results in enhanced self-reference effects. Overall our results thus far suggest that a 
stronger self-reference effect is related to a hyperconnected DMN. 
 
 
5.4 Self and Reward 
 
The results from the second study might help us understand why certain 
individuals more commonly activate self-related systems than others. In this study 
functional connectivity analyses of the FPCN revealed that a reduced self-reference 
effect was related to stronger coupling between the FPCN and the ventral striatum 
classically involved in reward. A growing number of studies have shown a strong 
overlap between self-related regions, in particular those involved in assigning 
personal relevance to stimuli, and the reward system, shedding light on why this 
reward related region was obtained for analyses of the self-reference effect.  
Consistent activations during processing of self-specific stimuli have been found in 
classic reward system regions such as the ventral striatum and ventral tegmental area, 
as well as in the vmPFC (de Greck et al., 2008; Enzi, De Greck, Proesch, Tempelmann 
& Northoff, 2009; Ersner-Hershfield, Garton, Ballard, Samanez-Larking & Knutson, 
2009). This is not surprising, as both self-specificity and reward rely on value-
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assignment, i.e., self-relevant material is that to which the self has assigned either 
positive or negative value to. Similarly, one needs to activate the semantic self in order 
to make everyday judgements. For example, “Did I behave in a correct way?”, “Was 
Mary wearing too much makeup?”, “Should Adam apologise to Tom?” are all 
examples in which one needs to access the semantic self which holds the belief system 
of who we are in order to answer these questions. Further supporting the relationship 
between the reward/value assignment system and self-relevant stimuli, other studies 
have found that performance for self-related material mirrors that of trials with high-
reward items, with both sorts of stimuli leading to an advantage during processing (Sui 
& Humphreys, 2015), an advantage possibly achieved through the effect both self and 
rewarding stimuli have over attentional resources. Hence, this close relationship 
between self and reward systems might account for why the functional connectivity 
of the nucleus accumbens, classically involved in reward processes, was found to be 
involved in the magnitude of the self-reference effect.  
 
5.5 Within and Between Functional Connectivity of 
Self-Referential and Executive Control Regions: 
Relationship to the Self-Reference Effect 
 
Whereas the nucleus accumbens is part of the reward system, and as such, is 
closely related to orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (Kringelbach, 2005), our functional 
connectivity results revealed that it was its coupling to the FPCN that was predicted 
by the magnitude of one’s self-bias. The ventral striatum, where the nucleus 
accumbens is located is part of the motivational corticostriatal loop, with the ventral 
striatum receiving strong projections from the orbitofrontal cortex. Another 
important corticostriatal loop is the executive loop connecting cortical regions 
involved in executive control such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to the dorsal 
basal ganglia. Although these loops are highly segregated, recent research has shown 
that the corticostriatal circuits converge in the more rostral and ventral aspects of the 
striatum where the nucleus accumbens is located (Haber, 2016). Hence, since the 
156 
 
nucleus accumbens was obtained from seeding the FPCN, this pattern of functional 
connectivity seems to be indicating that a stronger integration between the executive 
and motivational corticostriatal loops is linked to a reduced self-reference effect. 
Considering that thinking about the self can be an automatic and even compulsive 
behaviour that results in a heightened self-bias, and that it is closely associated with 
the reward system, we turned to research on addiction to help us decipher why 
enhanced integration between the motivational and executive loops was related to a 
reduced self-reference effect.   
A hallmark of addictive behaviour is an inability to suppress actions that lead 
to immediate reward in the pursue of a later reward. Whereas the reward system is 
active during immediate rewards, delayed rewards recruit regions like the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex involved in executive control (McClure, York & Montague, 2004). 
Neurologically, addiction is related to an imbalance between these two systems. 
Whereas the reward system is overactive, with individuals displaying enhanced 
reward sensitivity and increased synchrony within the reward system, the executive 
system shows reduced functional links (Dong, Huang & Du, 2011; Dong, Hu & Lin, 
2013). Based on this imbalance, Dong, Lin, Hu, Xie and Du (2015) explored the 
functional connectivity of the reward and the executive control systems in internet 
gaming addicts, with a particular interest in the interaction between these two 
systems. Several seed regions in the reward and the control network were selected 
with the intention of exploring how the functional connectivity of the accumbens 
related to both systems. With special interest to the results obtained in the second 
empirical chapter, the authors found a negative correlation between the functional 
connectivity of the accumbens to the reward system and the functional connectivity 
of the accumbens to the control network in all subjects: as the functional connectivity 
of the accumbens to the FPCN increased, the functional connectivity of the accumbens 
to the rest of the reward system decreased, with this anticorrelation being more 
pronounced in gamers than in control subjects. Taking into account that the reward 
and the control system appear to compete for the functional connectivity of the 
nucleus accumbens, the stronger functional connectivity between the FPCN and the 
accumbens found in individuals with a reduced self-reference effect should also be 
related to a reduced functional connectivity between the accumbens and the other 
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regions of the reward/self system such as the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex. This 
reduced functional connectivity between main components of the reward system 
would be translated into a reduced synchrony within this system in subjects with 
reduced self-biases, which is the opposite of what is found in addicts.  Similar to 
addictive behaviour, self-focussed attention is automated, can occur compulsively and 
can be hard to inhibit (Ingram, 1990). Importantly, previous research has shown that 
controlling mind wandering is linked to better delaying of gratification (Ruby, 
Smallwood, Engen & Singer, 2013). Hence, this pattern of functional connectivity 
linked to a reduced self-reference effect might be reflecting the mechanism by which 
one successfully suppresses compulsive self-referential processing, a process that in 
turn would have an impact on the magnitude of the self-reference effect. 
Having found that a stronger coupling between regions that are highly 
connected to DMN regions (i.e., the accumbens) and regions in the FPCN resulted in a 
reduced self-reference effect, a similar pattern emerges when we consider the results 
for the best friend condition found in the first study. This study found that a stronger 
coupling between vmPFC and the FPCN resulted in better memory for the best friend 
items. If we consider the self-reference effect to be the difference between one’s 
memory for self items and one’s memory for items in the control condition, the 
individuals with an enhanced memory for the items in the control best friend 
condition will also be the ones with the smallest self-reference effect. Hence, taking 
this into account, a pattern emerges in which individuals with a reduced self-reference 
effect separate nodes that are commonly associated with the DMN, such as the vmPFC 
(study 1) or the accumbens (study 2), from the DMN and instead couple them to 
control regions in the FPCN. 
Instead, a stronger self-reference effect is observed in individuals in which the 
DMN is hyperconnected to itself, a pattern that has previously been linked to poor 
executive control (Poerio et al., 2017). Note that the first study revealed stronger 
functional connectivity between the vmPFC and the paracingulate gyrus for 
individuals with worse memory for best friend items. Meta-analytic decoding of this 
cluster associated this cluster with terms such as “reward”, “self-referential” or 
“value”. Instead of coupling to the paracingulate gyrus, the vmPFC seed region from 
which this pattern of functional connectivity was obtained coupled more to FPCN in 
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individuals with better memory for best friend items as discussed previously. Hence, 
taking into account that the best friend memory relates to the magnitude of the self-
reference effect, this dissociation in vmPFC’s functional connectivity supports the 
notion that the relationship between reward and executive control plays an important 
role in an individual’s self-reference effect magnitude. 
 
 
5.6 Self-Focussed Attention and the Frontoparietal 
Control Network 
 
5.6.1 Automatic and Controlled Processes Involved in the 
Self-Reference Effect 
In support of this apparent competition between the DMN and executive 
control processes, the first and second studies both found that individuals with a 
bigger magnitude of the self-reference effect (calculated by subtracting memory 
scores from an unfamiliar-other condition from memory scores at a self-reference 
condition) were worse at inhibiting responses. This replication was found despite both 
studies used different inhibitory control paradigms as well as slightly different 
memory measures. During the retrieval phase the first study only tested participants 
on their familiarity for the items, whereas the second study included a source 
localisation phase, resulting in both studies measuring related but slightly different 
measures. Additionally, the first study used a stop signal response time task whereas 
the second one used a Go/No-Go task. Despite using different measures, the negative 
correlation between the magnitude of the self-reference effect and inhibitory control 
efficiency was found in both studies, suggesting this to be a robust relationship.  
Some behavioural differences were however found. Whereas in both studies 
the magnitude of the self-reference effect correlated with inhibitory control, when 
the magnitude of the self-reference effect was broken down into the scores for self 
and the non-self memory control condition, scores in the non-self memory control 
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only correlated directly with inhibitory control in the second study, whereas in the first 
study only scores in the self condition correlated directly to inhibitory control.  A 
potential explanation underlying the different relationship found across studies for 
the non-self control condition might be the different nature of the memory scores. 
Whereas the first study measured familiarity scores, the second study included a 
source localisation phase and only considered hits those words that had been encoded 
in detail, as proven by an accurate source localisation. The fact that only the second 
study found a direct correlation between incidental encoding scores in the unfamiliar-
other control condition and inhibitory control suggests that inhibitory control is more 
strongly correlated with source memory than it is with familiarity memory in the case 
of the unfamiliar, non-self condition. Having said that, the magnitude of the self-
reference effect, which takes this unfamiliar other condition scores into account, was 
much more strongly correlated with inhibitory control (r =.426, p =.007) than merely 
the memory scores for self-items in the first study (r= .333, p =.038). In addition, when 
the relationship between both memories was controlled for by including both self and 
unfamiliar-other memory scores as regressors in a linear regression model, a 
significant model (F(2,36) = 4.8, p< .05, R2 = 21) was obtained in which both variables 
explained a significant amount of variance of the inhibitory control efficiency variable 
( self: standardized beta = .53, t(36) = 3, p < .005; unfamiliar-other: standardized beta 
=-.37, t(36), p <.05). In particular, better inhibitory control was associated with both 
reduced familiarity memory for self-related items and with increased familiarity 
memory for items in the control condition, shedding light on how the memory for self-
items and memory for non-self items is supported through different mechanisms: 
Whereas self-memory benefits from automatically orienting attention towards the 
self, memory for the other condition suffers and instead benefits from more 
controlled processes.  
5.6.2 Thought suppression and the self-reference effect: 
Cancellation or Prevention?  
The current doctoral work studied the relationship between tasks that require 
action inhibition and the self-reference effect. In the following section we discuss the 
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idea that the pattern of functional connectivity of the FPCN related to reduced self-
bias might be understood with respect to thought suppression mechanisms. 
Importantly, the following section delves into different suppression mechanisms such 
as cancellation and prevention in an attempt to decipher, on light of the results 
obtained in the second study, which one of these two suppression mechanisms is 
potentially involved in the reduced self-reference effect. 
The SSRT and GNG both measure action suppression and performance in both 
tasks is diminished in subjects with ADHD, a reason for which both tasks have 
commonly been used interchangeably as a measure of inhibitory control (Alderson, 
Rapport &Kofler, 2007; Dillo et al., 2010; Senderecka, Grabowska,Szewczyk, Gerc & 
Chmylak 2012; Wright, Lipszyc, Dupuis, Thayapararajah & Schachar, 2014). However, 
recent meta-analytic evidence suggests that these two tasks measure different 
aspects of inhibitory control: action cancellation and action prevention, respectively 
(Aron et al., 2007;  Guo, Schmitz, Mur, Ferreira & Anderson, 2018). In the SSRT all trials 
are Go trials, i.e, an action is being prepared in every trial and only after having started 
preparing the action is one indexed to cancel it through a beeping sound. The SSRT 
therefore measures efficiency at action cancellation. Instead, in the GNG the Go trial 
stimuli differ in colour from those in the No-Go trials, therefore, if close attention is 
being paid on a trial by trial basis, there should be no action initiation in the presence 
of the No-Go colour and in turn action prevention, instead of action cancellation, 
should be present. Despite these differences might appear subtle, evidence 
supporting that these two tasks rely on different processes is presented in a meta-
analysis performed by Guo and colleagues (2018). Comparing neuroimaging data of 
both tasks the authors found no overlap in brain activation between the SSRT and the 
GNG. Whereas the GNG recruited the left putamen, the SSRT was related to activation 
in the right caudate, among other cortical regions.  
Inhibition has mostly been researched in terms of action inhibition, however 
semantic inhibition is also a fundamental aspect of appropriate cognition and 
executive control. For example, research on semantics suggests that in order to 
retrieve words that are only weakly associated with a specific term, one must inhibit 
those words which are highly associated with it (Levy & Anderson 2002; Rafal & Henik, 
161 
 
1994). This is because highly associated words can act as distractors, impeding access 
to the weaker ones. Hence, controlled suppression of the automatic associations is a 
fundamental aspect of semantic control and one that is disrupted in semantic aphasia, 
a disorder characterised by an inability to access weaker associated items without the 
help of cues that aid such retrieval (Jefferies & Lambon-Ralph, 2006). A situation 
depicting this that we can all relate to is trying to recall someone’s name. If for some 
reason, for example similar phonetics, another person’s name comes to mind, this 
erroneous name can cause great interference and disrupt access to any other names. 
Equally so, if one is trying to focus on a certain task but keeps thinking about the plans 
for Friday night, task performance will likely be negatively affected. Suppression of the 
most highly associated or more salient information is therefore fundamental when 
tasks require our focus and it is this aspect of inhibition that we believe accompanies 
a reduced self-reference effect. Despite the current doctoral work has used tasks that 
measures action inhibition we will now present some evidence that suggests thought 
and action suppression share some mechanisms.  
 In order to study the relationship between thought and action suppression 
Guo and colleagues (2018) included data of a Think No Think (TNT) task in their meta-
analysis including data obtained from the GNG and the SSRT paradigms. The TNT has 
been used with the intention to measure one’s ability to suppress thought. In this 
paradigm subjects first have to learn pairs of words until they can remember them to 
a certain degree of accuracy. Subsequently, subjects are presented with one of the 
words in the pair, and depending on the colour of the word, they either have to 
remember the associated pair or suppress it from entering consciousness. In order to 
measure the suppression performance memory tests are completed at the end with 
the idea that those words that had had to be suppressed were recalled less than those 
that had to be recalled. The meta-analysis searched for the neural correlates of this 
task during thought suppression and compared them to those obtained for the SSRT 
and the GNG. The authors found that the neural correlates of retrieval suppression 
obtained in the TNT task were the same as those obtained for the SSRT leading the 
authors to conclude that thought suppression in the TNT was achieved through 
thought cancellation rather than through thought prevention.  
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The functional connectivity results of the FPCN related to the self-reference 
effect found in study 2 however revealed a cluster located in the left accumbens and 
putamen that resembled more the meta-analytic results found for the SSRT than for 
the GNG. A potential explanation for this is the nature of the TNT task used in the 
meta-analysis. In this task subjects first learned a pair of words. When latter shown 
one of the words in the pair they were asked to inhibit it. If the word pair has been 
deeply encoded, it is possible that exposure to one of the words automatically leads 
to the activation of the other word. Whether this automatic activation is avoided or 
whether it is only suppressed after it has occurred is a confound that the TNT used in 
the meta-analysis did not address.  To overcome this confound, Guo (2017) conducted 
an fMRI study of the TNT task in which they included intrusion ratings of the associated 
pair. After excluding from the test phase all pair-associates that had not been properly 
encoded, trials in which intrusions were not reported were considered to have been 
governed by prevention processes whereas cancellation processes where assumed to 
be engaged during trials in which intrusions were reported.  The authors found that 
downregulation of the hippocampus was associated with efficient retrieval 
suppression and dynamic causal modelling analyses revealed that this was achieved 
through a dlPFC-BG-hippocampus pathway. In particular, intrusion reduction was 
correlated with the dlPFC-BG coupling in such a way that a stronger coupling between 
these two regions resulted in a more pronounced intrusion reduction, resembling the 
pattern of functional connectivity related to a reduced self-reference effect in the 
second empirical chapter of this thesis and suggesting thought prevention to be 
responsible for the reduced self-reference effect. Furthermore, the results revealed 
found that both retrieval prevention and retrieval cancellation were marginally 
anticorrelated with BG-hippocampal coupling, supporting previous research 
suggesting that the BG and the dlPFC play an important role in the downregulation of 
the hippocampus (Benoit, Hulbert, Huddleston & Anderson, 2014; Benoit, Davies & 
Anderson, 2016; Gagnepain, Hulbert & Anderson, 2017; Levy & Anderson, 2012). 
Overall these finding strongly suggest that the  magnitude of the self-reference effect 
used in the current doctoral work is indicative of one’s ability to suppress intrusive 
thought. Furthermore, the results from these studies suggest that the aspect of 
inhibitory control efficiency that is related to reduced memorial advantage for self 
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memory found in the current doctoral work resembles that of thought prevention 
rather than that of thought cancellation and that this process is achieved through BG 
downregulation of the hippocampus triggered by BG-FPCN coupling.  
 
5.6.3 The Frontoparietal Control Network and Private Self-
Consciousness 
Further evidence suggesting an important role of executive control processes 
and self-focussed attention was found in the third study.  In this study an alternative 
measure of self-focussed attention was used. Instead of using the memory scores for 
self and other related material the functional connectivity of large scale networks was 
explored in relation to a self-reported measure of self-focussed attention measured 
through the self-consciousness questionnaire.  This study found that the functional 
connectivity of the FPCN and not the DMN predicted the degree to which an individual 
engaged in private self-consciousness. The private subscale of the self-consciousness 
questionnaire asks individuals to for example rate how often they reflect upon their 
feelings, behaviours or motifs, ultimately measuring the degree to which an individual 
engages in introspection.  Previous research has repeatedly found that one’s memorial 
advantage for self-related material is correlated with one’s tendency to think about 
one’s self, as measured through the private self-consciousness scale (Agatstein & 
Buchanan, 1984; Nasby 1985). Having explored how the functional connectivity of 
regions of the FPCN and several regions of the mPFC and hippocampal formation, 
located in the DMN and Limbic networks as defined by Yeo and colleagues (2011), 
were related to the magnitude of the self-reference effect, the third study used the 
self-consciousness scale as an alternative measure of self-focussed attention to 
explore how the patterns of functional connectivity of these networks related to this 
subjective measure of self-focussed attention. Surprisingly, the DMN didn’t reveal any 
patterns of functional connectivity predictive of self-consciousness. This was not the 
case for the FPCN, for which increased functional connectivity to an area of the medial 
temporal lobes was related to increased private self-consciousness. Despite 
neurocognitive decoding of this cluster revealed terms such as “navigation”, “objects” 
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or “encoding”, generally involved in processing of the external world, this cluster 
slightly overlapped with the hippocampus and was also related to terms such as 
“episodic memory”. Considering the role of the FPCN in working memory, an 
alternative but not mutually exclusive explanation is that the stronger coupling 
between the FPCN and this cluster in individuals with higher private self-consciousness 
could be indicating the increased time that these individuals spend revising their 
episodic memory, this being a prerequisite for private self-consciousness. During such 
revision, material from memory has to be kept in working memory, a process linked 
to the FPCN (Brunoni & Vanderhasselt, 2014), hence it is possible that this pattern of 
functional connectivity is reflecting the process by which the FPCN is manipulating 
information from episodic memory. Furthermore, this cluster was also related with 
terms such as “face” and embedded the right fusiform face are (FFA), particularly 
related to self-face processing. With special relevance to the current result, a study by 
Utevsky, Smith, Young and Huettel (2017) found that during social reward the 
functional connectivity of the FFA exhibited more coupling to the FPCN (relative to the 
DMN) suggesting that private self-consciousness might be motivated by future social 
reward.  
5.6.4. Summary of the FPCN Involvement in Self-Focussed 
Attention 
An overarching theme emerges from the results obtained in the three studies: 
The functional connectivity of regions involved in executive control located in the 
frontoparietal cortex is closely related to self-focussed attention. Whereas the second 
study found a pattern of functional connectivity to the ventral striatum possibly 
related to the suppressive role of the FPCN, the third study found a pattern of 
functional connectivity from FPCN to fusiform cortex extending into hippocampus 
possibly related to the role the FPCN plays in the maintenance of episodic information 
in working memory. Functional connectivity between the vmPFC and regions of the 
FPCN was also found in the first study in relation to the memory for the best friend in 
such a way that better memory for the non-self-referent was obtained when the 
vmPFC dissociated itself from the paracingulate gyrus, involved in reward processes, 
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and instead coupled to regions involved in working memory.  Overall results suggest 
that stronger coupling between FPCN to reward regions that are commonly activated 
during self-relevance results in reduced self-reference effect.  
5.7 Coupling between DMN and Salience network: 
Relationship to Go/No-Go efficiency 
The current work hypothesised that there would be a negative relationship 
between the magnitude of the self-reference effect and inhibitory control. The 
rationale for this was based on the salient and hence distracting properties of self-
relevant material by which, whilst having an enhancing impact on the self-reference 
effect, would interfere in sustained attention on the external world. After having 
explored the functional connectivity of inhibitory control regions in relation to the self-
reference effect, a second analysis explored the relationship between inhibitory 
control performance and the functional connectivity of regions involved in self-
referential processing.  
The results revealed that an enhanced functional connectivity between the 
self-referential regions and the right inferior frontal gyrus was predictive of better 
inhibitory control. Further functional connectivity analyses of the right inferior frontal 
gyrus revealed this cluster to be part of the salience network and meta-analytic 
decoding related it to terms such as “inhibition response” and “stop signal”.   It is 
important to note that although the right inferior frontal gyrus has commonly been 
related to inhibitory control processes (Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004), activation in 
this region has also been found in cases in which no response inhibition was required. 
For example, Hampshire, Thompson, Duncan and Owen (2009), found that this region 
was recruited when important cues were presented regardless of whether a response 
was required. Their findings suggest that its previous association with inhibition tasks 
might have been driven by cue detection processes rather than by inhibition per se. 
In particular, the salience network, through its close relationship with interoceptive 
signals processed in the insula (Craig & Craig, 2009; Menon & Udin, 2010), is involved 
in the detection of stimuli that are salient to the individual (Perini et al., 2018). In the 
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case of laboratory tasks, as long as the individual is willing to engage in the task, the 
presentation of target cues should be processed as salient. In turn, this salience 
detection will redirect attentional resources according to the task demands in order 
to perform efficiently. However, if there is a failure at detecting the cue, subsequent 
performance in the task will be impaired. This interpretation would still account for 
why both transcranial magnetic stimulation and lesions in the right inferior frontal 
gyrus have been related to reduced efficiency at inhibitory control tasks (Aron et al., 
2004; Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2014; Chambers et al., 2006).  
The role of the salience network in directing attentional resources in 
accordance to the task has been demonstrated through both dynamic causal 
modelling (Goulden et al., 2004) and granger causality (Sridharan, Levitin & Menon, 
2008) analyses. Both methods replicated the same findings: the salience network 
plays a causal role in switching between networks, particularly through suppressing 
the DMN and activating the FPCN (Menon & Udin, 2010; Sridharan et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, aberrant functioning of these three networks is involved in many 
psychopathological states (Menon, 2011).  Hence, the pattern of functional 
connectivity found in which stronger coupling between the DMN and the salience 
network is involved in better performance at the GNG further supports the notion that 
appropriate interaction between these networks is a fundamental aspect of efficient 
cognition. In particular, our results, which reveal that stronger functional connectivity 
between DMN regions and salience network is involved in better inhibitory control, 
suggests that increased coupling between the DMN and the right inferior frontal gyrus 
is involved in the mechanisms which, through allowing the salience network to 
deactivate the DMN, result in higher inhibitory control efficiency.  
How does the impaired interaction between these three networks relate to 
psychology? What is motivating the excessive salience of self? These are questions 
that will have to be addressed in future studies, however previous literature on the 
right inferior frontal gyrus invites us to speculate about the role social cognition might 
be playing in the relationship between self-focussed attention, inhibitory control and 
the appropriate interaction between these networks. Eisenberger, Lieberman & 
Williams (2003) have shown that social rejection activates a region that overlaps with 
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the right IFG cluster found in the DMN analysis linked to inhibitory control efficiency. 
Moreover, social information is high in emotional content, known to be a powerful 
distractor (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Mueller, 2011) and Levens & Phelps (2010) have 
implicated both the insula and the inferior frontal cortex in resolution of such 
emotional interference. This evidence suggests that this region is highly involved in 
interference resolution caused by emotional and socially relevant stimuli. As social 
animals, information about our reputation is valuable and hence should be signalled 
as salient, recruiting systems involved in self-evaluation and perspective taking 
anchored in the DMN. Hence, acquiring a good reputation can act as a strong 
incentive.  In fact, the same system involved in monetary reward is recruited during 
socially rewarding cues (Izuma, Saito & Sadato, 2008), including the insula. Building on 
such previous literature and on the results of the current doctoral thesis, a hypothesis 
to be tested in future studies is whether social reward is related to the patterns of 
functional connectivity found in the current work linked to self-focussed attention and 
inhibitory control.  
5.8 Concluding remarks 
The current work explored the relationship between different measures of 
self-bias and patterns of functional connectivity in the brain. It explored the self from 
a mnemonic and an attentional perspective by studying the degree of an individual’s 
self-bias as measured by 1) the magnitude of self-reference effect (Study 1 and Study 
2) and 2) private self-consciousness (Study 3) and relating these measures to the 
intrinsic architecture of regions involved in 1) self-representation supported by 
memorial mechanisms (Study 1 and Study 3) and 2) regions involved in executive 
control (Study 2 and Study 3). The results revealed that the magnitude of the self-
reference effect and the scores on the private self-consciousness, despite correlated, 
differ. In particular, the patterns of functional connectivity obtained from the FPCN 
suggest that whereas the magnitude of the self-reference effect seems to be capturing 
an individual’s tendency to suppress automatic retrieval of information (Study 2) in 
the form of self-focussed attention, the private self-consciousness is revealing a 
pattern of functional connectivity that might be representative of when retrieval of 
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self-related material is not suppressed and is instead manipulated in working memory 
(Study 3). Further research will have to confirm this interpretation by using methods 
of psychophysiological interactions that explore functional connectivity during tasks 
that monitor self-focussed attention or self-focussed suppression. Ideally, such results 
would reveal stronger functional connectivity between the FPCN and the ventral 
striatum during instances of self-suppression, following results from Study 2. This 
pattern of functional connectivity would revert during self-focussed attention and in 
turn the FPCN would increase its coupling to regions involved in episodic memory 
representing the maintenance of episodic memory in working memory, following 
results from Study 3.  
Whereas the DMN didn’t reveal any patterns of functional connectivity 
involved in self-consciousness, a stronger self-reference effect was related to stronger 
coupling between episodic and semantic subsystems of the DMN (Study 1). This 
increased interaction supports the notion that as the semantic self interacts with 
episodic memory, as revealed by the patterns of functional connectivity obtained from 
the vmPFC, the self-schema gets revised, updated and elaborated resulting in a 
stronger self-reference effect.  
The current work has:  
 Provided the literature on self with a novel application of the self-reference 
effect by interpreting its magnitude as an indirect measure of self-focussed 
attention, an interpretation that was confirmed by the observed negative 
correlation found with efficiency at tasks that require external attention. 
 Demonstrated that this measure is directly related to an individual’s inhibitory 
control efficiency, furthering understanding on the powerful distracting 
properties of self-related material. 
 Revealed patterns of functional connectivity of not only the DMN but also the 
FPCN that are related to ones’ tendency to direct attention inwards. 
 Left open questions about how and why two measures of self-focussed 
attention, that of the magnitude of the self-reference effect and private self-
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